probability and internal evidence, with regard to the systems or histories, both physical and moral, which may be presented to us.

If, then, the subject matter of Divine revelation be entirely new to us, we cannot possibly have any ground on which we may rest our judgment as to its probability. But is this the case with that system of religion which is called Christianity? Is the object which it has in view an entirely new object? Is the moral mechanism which it employs for the accomplishment of that object, different in kind from that moral mechanism which we ourselves set to work every day upon our fellow creatures whose conduct we wish to influence in some particular direction, or from that by which we feel ourselves to be led in the ordinary course of providence? Is the character of the Great Being to whose inspiration this system is ascribed, and whose actions are recorded by it, entirely unknown to us, except through the meIdium of this revelation? Far from it. Like Archimedes in the case which I have supposed, we have never before seen this particular combination of causes brought to bear on this particular combination of results; but we are acquainted with each particular cause, and we can trace its particular train of consequents;

and thus we can understand the relation between the whole of the combined causes and the whole of the combined results.

The first faint outline of Christianity presents to us a view of God operating on the characters of men through a manifestation of his own character, in order that, by leading them to participate in some measure of his moral likeness, they may also in some measure participate of his happiness. Every man who believes in the existence of a Supreme Moral Governor, and has considered the relations in which this belief places him, must have formed to himself some scheme of religion analogous to that which I have described. The indications of the Divine character, in nature, and providence, and conscience, were surely given to direct and instruct us in our relations to God and his creatures. The indications of his kindness have a tendency to attract our gratitude, and the indications of his disapprobation to check and alarm us. We infer that his own character truly embodies all those qualities which he approves, and is perfectly free from all which he condemns. The man who adopts this scheme of natural religion, which, though deficient in point of practical influence over the human mind, as shall be af

terwards explained, is yet true,-and who has learned from experience to refer actions to their moral causes,-is in possession of all the elementary principles which qualify him to judge of the internal evidence of Christianity. He can judge of Christianity as the rude shipcarpenter of a barbarous age could judge of a British ship of the line, or as the scientific anatomist of the eye could judge of a telescope which he had never seen before.

He who holds this scheme of natural religion, will believe in its truth (and I conceive justly,) because it urges him to what is good, deters him from what is evil, and coincides generally with all that he feels and observes; and this very belief which he holds on these grounds, will naturally lead him to believe in the truth of another scheme which tends directly to the same moral object, but much more specifically and powerfully, and coincides much more minutely with his feelings and observations.

The perfect moral tendency of its doctrines, is a ground on which the Bible often rests its piea of authenticity and importance. Whatever principle of belief tends to promote real moral perfection, possesses in some degree the quality of truth. By moral perfection, I mean.

the perception of what is right, followed by the love of it and the doing of it. This quality,

therefore, necessarily implies a true view of the relations in which we stand to all the beings with whom we are connected. In this sense, Pope's famous line is perfectly just,"His (faith) can't be wrong, whose life is in the right." But it is evident that a man may be a very useful member of this world's society, without ever thinking of the true relation in which he stands to the beings about him. Prudence, honourable feelings, and instinctive good-nature, may ensure to any man, in ordinary times, an excellent reputation. But the scene of our present contemplations lies in the spiritual universe of God, and the character that we speak of must be adapted to that society. We cannot but believe that true moral perfection contains the elements of happiness in that higher state; and therefore we cannot but believe that that view of our moral relations, and of the beings to whom we are so related, which leads to this moral perfection, must be the true view. But if the attainment of this character be the important object, why lay so much stress upon any particular view? The reason is obvious: We cannot, according to the constitution of our nature, induce upon

our minds any particular state of moral feeling without an adequate cause. We cannot feel anger, or love, or hatred, or fear, by simply endeavouring so to feel. In order to have the feeling, we must have some object present to our minds which will naturally excite the feeling. Therefore, as moral perfection consists of a combination of moral feelings (leading to correspondent action,) it can only have place in a mind which is under the impression or has a present view of those objects which naturally produce that combination of feelings.

The object of this Dissertation is to analyze the component parts of the Christian scheme of doctrine, with reference to its bearings both on the character of God, and on the character of man; and to demonstrate, that its facts not only present an expressive exhibition of all the moral qualities which can be conceived to reside in the Divine mind, but also contain all those objects which have a natural tendency to excite and suggest in the human mind that combination of moral feelings which has been termed moral perfection. We shall thus arrive at a conclusion with regard to the facts of revelation, analogous to that at which Archimedes arrived with regard to the narrative of the traveller,-viz. a conviction that they con