the mind paffes either from a state of infenfibility to a state of difcernment, or from one kind of difcernment to another, as from fights to founds, or taftes, or reflections, according to the variety of objects that act upon it.'

That we are active in the exertions of our will, will be readily allowed. But by the common turn of our language we feem to claim an activity in the exercises of our understanding too : for we generally exprefs them by active verbs.-Yet a very little confideration may fhew us, that in all fenfations at least, the objects are agents, and ourselves the patients.-The matter is not quite fo plain in the bufinefs of reflection, which the mind feems to carry on entirely upon its own fund, without aid of the body, without intervention of the fenfes, or impreffion of any thing external; acting folely and immediately in and upon itself. But, as our Author argues, if we confider the nature and effence of action, which feem to require two fubftances, one to act, and the other to be acted upon, we shall be led to conclude that no one individual thing can act immediately and directly upon itself, or without fome instrument or medium intervening between the power exerted and the effect produced thereby. Left this abftruse reasoning from the nature and effence of action fhould prove unintelligible or unfatisfactory, Mr. Search further adviseth us to confider what paffes in our mind in the work of reflection. This will furnifh us with numberless instances wherein reflections intrude upon the mind whether we will or no: in regard to which the mind fhews evident marks of paffiveness; the will, wherein its activity lies, being ftrongly fet a contrary way. This is the cafe, alfo, with other reflections, which come upon us without, though not against, our will. Even with respect to voluntary reflection, fuch as recollecting, ftudying, meditating, reafoning, deliberating, and the like, if we examine the matter clofely, we fhall find that the mind does not call up all our thoughts directly by its own immediate command, but feizes on fome one as a clue, whereby it draws in all the reft: we frequently choose our fubject, but we do not choose the reflections from time to time occurring thereupon. Whoever,' fays our Author, will carefully obferve what he does when he fets him felf down to study, may perceive that he produces none of the thoughts paffing in his mind, not even that which he uses as the clue to bring in all the others: he firft withdraws his attention from fenfible objects, nor does he then inftantly enter upon his work. Some little time must be given for reflection to begin its play, which prefently fuggefts the purpose of his enquiries to his remembrance, and fome methods of attaining it: that which appears moft likely to fucceed he fixes his contemplation upon, and follows whitherfoever that fhall lead, or checks his thoughts from

time to time, when he perceives them going aftray; or stops their courfe if he finds it ineffectual, and watches for its falling into fome new train: for imagination will be always at work, and if restrained from roving in all that variety of fallies it would make of its own accord, it will ftrike into any paffages remaining open.' Finally, we may remark, that the mind cannot always call up thofe thoughts which, for the moft part, lie ready to appear at cur fummons. How often do we endeavour in vain to recollect a name, a tranfaction, a circumstance we know extremely well? How often do we try to ftudy without effect, to deliberate with various fuccefs, and perplex ourfelves with difficulties we have heretofore made nothing of?" From thefe premiles our Author concludes, with the greatest probability, that the more narrowly we examine our procedure in all exercifes cf the understanding, the more firmly we fhall be perfuaded that the mind ufes a medium by whofe miniftry it obtains what it wants. Both in fenfation, and reflection of our own procuring, the mind acts upon the medium, and that again acts upon the mind: for as in reading we only open the book, but the page prefents the words contained in it to our fight; fo, in thinking, we fet our imagination to work, which exhibits appearances to our difcernment.

If we go about to examine what those mediums are we find fo neceflary to the mind, it will prefently occur that the ideas floating in our own imagination are to be ranked among the mediums.'

Upon thefe ideas Mr. Search proceeds to beftow a particular confideration. We fhall felect only fo much as may be neceffary to give our Readers a proper conception of his fcheme.

Idea.' fays he, is the fame as image, and the term imagination implies a receptacle of images: but image being appropriated by common ufe to vifible objects, could not well be extended to other things without confufion; wherefore learned men have imported the Greek word Idea, fignifying image or appearance, to which, being their own peculiar property, they might affix as large a fignification as they pleafed. For the image of a found, or of goodnefs, would have offended our delicacy, but the idea of either goes down glibly: therefore idea is the fame with refpect to things in general, as image with refpect to objects of vifion.

In order to render the notion of ideas clearer, let us begin with images. When a peacock fpreads his tail in our fight, we have a full view of the creature with all his gaudy plumage before us the bird remains at fome diftance, but the light reflected from him paints an image upon our eyes, and the optic nerves tranfmit it to the fenfory. This image, when arrived at the ends of the nerves, becomes an idea, and gives us our dif

cernment

cernment of the animal; and after the bird is gone out of view we can recal the idea of him to perform the fame office as before, though in a duller and fainter manner. So when the nightingale warbles, the found reaches our ears, and, preffing through the auditory nerves, exhibits an idea affecting us with the difcernment of her mufic: and after fhe has given over finging, the fame idea may recur to our remembrance, or be raised again by us at pleasure. In like manner, our other senses convey ideas of their respective kinds, which recur again to our view long after the objects first exciting them have been removed.

• These ideas, having entered the mind, intermingle, unite, feparate, throw themselves into various combinations and poftures, and thereby generate new ideas of reflection strictly fo called, fuch as thofe of comparing, dividing, diftinguishing, of abstraction, relation, with many others: all which remain with us as a stock for our further ule upon future occafions.

Here perhaps I fhall be put in mind that I have before fuppofed two fubftances neceffarily concurring in every action;and thereupon afked whether I conceive ideas to be substances? To which I anfwer, No: but as fuch anfwer will feem to imply a contradiction,-I fhall be called upon to reconcile it,

For which purpose I fhall have recourse again to the image employed before. When we look upon a peacock, what is that image conveyed to us, confidered in the feveral ftages through which it paffes? Not any thing brought away by the light from the bird, and thrown in upon us through our organs, but a certain difpofition of the rays ftriking upon our eyes, a certain configuration of parts arifing in our retina, or a certain motion excited thereby in our optic nerves: which difpofition, configuration, and motion, are not fubftances, but accidents, in ancient dialect, or modifications, according to modern philofophers. But accident or modification cannot exift by itself; it must have some fubftance to inhere in or belong to, which fubftance is indeed the agent upon all occafions. Nevertheless we commonly afcribe the action to the modification, because what kind it fhall be of depends entirely upon that: for the fame rays, the fame retina, the fame nerves, differently modified by the impulfe of external objects, might have ferved to convey the image of an owl, or a bear, or any other animal, to our difcernment. Therefore that laft fubftance, whatever it be, which immediately gives us the fenfation, is the agent acting upon our mind in all cafes of vifion: and in like manner that fomething, fo or fo modified, which prefents to our difcernment, is the agent in all cafes of mental reflection, which modification we call our idea but because we know nothing more of the substance than the operation it performs, therefore, if we would speak to be understood,

understood, we can fay no otherwife, than that the idea is the thing we difcern.'

The fubftance of which our ideas are the modification, compofes, in the opinion of our Author, a fet of material organs of a very fine and fubtile contexture, with which the mind, properly fo called, is furnished, by which it receives all its perceptions, and performs all its operations. Thefe organs Mr. Search has called the mental organs, to diftinguish them from those which are ufually termed the bodily organs. The mental organs are of fo fine and fubtile a nature as to elude the difcernment of the niceft eye and the finest glaffes. Senfation, reflection, judgment, imagination, the paffions, and the virtues, are only different modifications of them. Impreffions from external objects are conveyed by the fenfes to the mental organs, and tranfmitted by them to the feat of perception, where the mind refides in kingly ftate, receiving the notices thus communicated, and by the fame inftruments performing actions agreeable to them. The mind is invefted with two powers only, or rather, in philofophical ftrictnefs and propriety of fpeech, with one power, namely the will, and one capacity, namely the understanding. It perceives the various modifications of the mental organs, and acs according to the appearances which they exhibit. Our Readers will judge for themselves of the probability of this fcheme, which, finding ourselves unable to accompany the Author step by step through his admirable work, we have extracted from different parts of it. It is the foundation upon which he hath erected his building. The paffivity of the underftanding, and the correfpondent activity of the will, appear to be the main principles of his fyftem, which he hath explained and illuftrated with an aftonifhing mixture of reafon and fancy, ferious arguments, witty allufions, plaufible conjectures, and humorous representations.

Having difcourfed, in the firft chapter, on the Faculties of the Mind, he proceeds, in the following chapters, to confider, Action -the Caufes of Action-Ideal Caufes-Motives-SatisfactionSenfation-Reflection-Combination of Ideas-Trains (ufually ftyled Concatenation of Ideas)-Judgment-Imagination and Understanding-Conviction and Perfuafion-and Knowledge and Conception.

That the mind never acts but upon fome motive: and that fatisfaction is the ingredient which gives weight to our motives, are points which he has laboured to prove, in our opinion, with equal affiduity and fuccefs. In the chapter on Judgment we have a juft, though mortifying, representation of the fallibility and uncertainty of human knowledge: which ought not to make us doubt of the clear judgments of our understanding, but only to make us acknowledge a poffibility of their being erroneous: and this, if not overlooked, muft prevent every man

from

from being fo wedded to an opinion as to turn a deaf ear upon all evidence that can be offered against it.'

Though fenfations which are conveyed to it from external objects furnish the mind with its firft ideas; reflection increases its ftock, which runs into various affortments, and produces other ideas different from the reft whereout they fpring; whence we quickly become provided with ftore of affemblages, affociations, trains, and judgments.' 'Thefe ftores, together with the rep fitory containing them, Mr. Search ftyles, the Imagination. 'Among the ideas which are brought into view by fome fenfation, or ftart up of their own accord, fome, being more engaging than the reft, attract the notice particularly to themfelves: the mental eye fingles them out from the whole scene exhibited before it, fees them in a ftronger light, holds them longer in view, and thereby gives occafion to their introducing more of their own affociates than they could have done in the rapidity of their natural courfe. This operation of the notice being frequently repeated, at length becomes itself an object of our obfervation, and thus we difcover a power we have of heightening the colour of our ideas, of changing or directing their courfe by the application of our notice: and the exercife of this power I take to be what is commonly meant by an act of the understanding.' The diftinction between imagination and understanding is further explained in another fection. This then is the diftinction I would make between the ftores of knowledge contained in our mind. Thofe that have an aptnefs to rife up fpontaneously, or be introduced inftantly by fenfation, whether originally depofited by cuftom, experience, or our own industry, I would affign to imagination; and their rifing in fuch manner I fhould deem a movement of imagination. On the other hand, thofe which lie below the furface, and require fome thought and reflection, be it ever fo little, to fetch them up, I conceive belonging to the understanding; and that operation whereby they are fo brought to light, I call an act of understanding.

Perhaps this allotment of the boundaries between the two faculties may be thought arbitrary, and not warranted by any lawful authority; but I do not apprehend authority has yet interfered in the cafe: for though we often diftinguish between understanding and imagination in our difcourfes, yet we as often use them promifcuoufly, and affign the fame territories and operations to the one or the other, according to the humour we are in, or according to the light in which we happen to take things. Therefore, in a matter fo unfettled, every one is at li berty to do as he pleafes, and I have chofen that partition which I think will be most convenient for the course I am following,