forget, that a clear divine interposition, plainly requiring a particular act of obedience to an immediate divine command, so materially affects the principle on which that action is performed, the motives from which it proceeds, and the effects it produces on the minds of those who are thus employed by the Divinity, that it may altogether change

*

the

*This is expressed with his usual acuteness and closeness of reasoning by Bishop Butler in his Analogy, Part II. ch. iii. on the credibility that a revelation should appear liable to objections; after clearly establishing this general conclusion, by proving, p. 250 and 251, "We are incompetent judges even "of the constitution of nature, which is very different from "what before experience would have been expected, and "such as men fancy there are great objections against, "which renders it beforehand highly credible, that they "may find the revealed dispensation likewise (if they judge "of it as they do of the constitution of nature) very dif "ferent from expectations formed beforehand, and liable "in appearance to great objections: and thus, as we fall "into infinite follies and mistakes, whenever we pretend, "otherwise than from experience and analogy, to judge of "the constitution and course of nature, it is évidently "supposeable beforehand, that we should fall into as great, "in pretending to judge in like manner concerning revela"tion; nor is there any more ground to expect, that the "latter should appear to us clear from objections, than that "the former should." After illustrating this principle by a variety of instances most striking and conclusive, he applies it to that part of the revealed scheme now before us, p. 266: "And now what is the just consequence from all these "things?

the moral character of the action itself. A distinction similar to this, is admitted uniformly

things? Not that reason is no judge of what is offered "to us, as being of divine revelation; for this would be to "infer, that we are unable to judge of any thing, because "we are unable to judge of all things. Reason can, and "it ought to judge, not only of the meaning, but also of "the morality and the evidence of revelation. First, it is "the province to judge of the morality of the Scriptures, ❝i. e. not whether it contains things different from what we "should have expected from a wise, just and good Being; "for objections of this kind have been now obviated: but "whether it contains things plainly contradictory to wisdom, "justice or goodness, to what the light of nature teaches "us of God; and I know nothing of this sort objected "against Scripture, excepting such objections as are formed "upon suppositions, which would equally conclude that the "constitution of nature is contradictory to wisdom, justice "or goodness, which most certainly it is not. Indeed "there are some particular precepts of Scripture, given to "particular persons, requiring actions, which would be "immoral and vicious, were it not for such precepts; but it "is easy to see, that all these are of such a kind, as that the "precept changes the whole nature both of the case and of the "action, and both constitutes and shews that not to be un"just or immoral, which, prior to the precept, must have

appeared and really have been so; which may well be, "since none of these precepts are contrary to immutable

morality. If it were commanded to cultivate the principles " and act from the spirit of treachery, ingratitude or cruelty, the "command would not alter the nature of the case or of the "action, in any of these instances. But it is quite other"wise in precepts, which require only the doing of a single "action; for instance, taking away the life or property of any: for men have no right to either life or property, but

"what

formly in common life. If an individual, hurried on by ferocious resentment, and unsanctioned

"what arises solely from the grant of God: when this grant "is revoked, they cease to have any right at all in either; "and when this revocation is made known, as surely it is

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possible it may be, it must cease to be unjust, to deprive "them of either; and though a course of external acts, "which without command would be immoral, must make "an immoral habit, yet a few detached commands have no "such natural tendency..

"I thought proper to say thus much of the few Scripture 'precepts, which require, not vicious actions, but actions "which would have been vicious had it not been for such "precepts; because they are sometimes weakly urged as "immoral, and great weight is laid upon objections drawn "from them. But to me there seems no difficulty at all in "these precepts, but what arises from their being offences, "i. e. from their being liable to be perverted (as indeed they are) by wicked and designing men, to serve the "most horrid purposes, and perhaps to mislead the weak "and enthusiastic; and objections from this head are not "objections against Revelation, but against the whole no

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tion of religion as a trial, and against the general consti"tution of nature." On this subject of a state of trial, vide Butler, Part I. ch. iv, and v.

Equally important is the observation of the celebrated Cumberland, on this subject, in the twenty-fourth section of the Prolegomena to his profound and comprehensive work on the Law of Nature, p. 29 and 30; in which, after having previously reduced all the precepts of that Law to one general principle, even the "steady pursuit of the "common good of the whole system of rational beings, as "far as it is in our power," he observes among the various advantages arising from this simplification, that it enables

us

sanctioned by public authority, avenges the wrong he has sustained, by inflicting death

us to deduce that subordination amongst the various particular laws of nature, according to which, that of prior obligation frequently limits the application of an inferior precept; he proceeds, " Ex hoc ordine inter leges naturæ,

"

quo speciales omnes generali subordinantur, et illarum "posteriores prioribus, commodissime ostendi posse videtur, "de illarum nullâ unquam a Deo dispensatum esse; sed in "iis casibus, in quibus posterioris obligatio tolli videatur, ma"teriam ita mutari ut priori tantum legi observandæ locus "sit. Sic patet non dispensari de lege dominiorum divi"sionem stabiliente, et alieni invasionem prohibente; si “Deus licitum faciat Israelitis, Cananæorum in ipsum delinquentium terram invadere. Quippe eadem illa lex de

66

66

cernit, necesse esse ad bonum commune, ut Deo imprimis "tribuatur dominium illud eminens in omnes et omnia, *cujus vi ipse, quoties ad summum finem conducere videbi"tur, auferre potest dominium cujusvis creaturæ in suam "vitam ac bona, et illud in alteram transferre per idonea "voluntatis suæ signa: quod in casu proposito factum fuisse legimus ; unde Israelitæ sua sibi vendicabant, non aliena “invadendi potestatem accipiebant. Pariter etiam non dispensatur de lege quæ propter bonum commune vetat inno"centibus nocere, si quando jubeatur innocens, (cum ad hunc "finem necessarium est) periculum noxæ, ipsam ve mor"tem subire; Deo præsertim voluntatem suam hac in re "satis aperte indicante. Hinc enim et Deo omnium regi "suus defertur honos, et aptissime (quia secundum ipsius “judicium) summo fini consulitur." Vide also Grotius de Jure Belli et Pacis, as quoted in the last note. But Grotius, Cumberland and Butler, appear shallow reasoners to such writers as Messrs. Tyndall and Morgan, Chubb and Bolingbroke, Voltaire and Paine, and narrow-minded bigots to the liberal Dr. Geddes, who to the assertion that God

could

upon his

enemy, we stigmatise him as a murderer; but if a criminal is convicted of atrocious guilt, condemned by the solemn decision of the Law, and the execution of the sentence committed to the minister of public justice, the infliction of death in this case is a duty, not a crime. Now what we contend for is, that with regard to the Canaanites, the Jews stood exactly in the relation of ministers of justice, plainly commanded, nay irresistibly impelled, by the Supreme Ruler of the world, to execute upon that nation his solemn sentence of confiscation and death. They obeyed this command of necessity, driven by the terror of immediate and severe punishment from God, if in the smallest item they relaxed the rigour of the sentence. On their first approach

to

could dispense with any moral law, by giving authority in a special instance, to take away the life or property of any human being, declares, "I might obstinately deny this asser

tion, and maintain that he could not without being unjust; "nor do I see what solid argument could be adduced to prove "the contrary." Vide Critical Remarks, p. 423. It is to be hoped, few will be found to imitate this obstinacy of the Doctor's: to affirm that God cannot without injustice authorize the infliction of punishment on guilt, is a discovery in natural religion so novel, it ought to be maintained with diffidence, not obstinacy. See more on the Doctor's opinions in the Appendix to this Volume.