support from nothing but those common rules of grammar and logic on which the sense of all kind of writings are or ought to be interpreted.

He goes on in this manner. "Nempe id unum voluisse mihi videtur sacer Scriptor, ut iis omnibus, utcunque afflictis, humilitatis et patientia perpetuum extaret documentum ex contemplatione gemina, hinc infinite Dei perfectionis, sapientiæ et potentiæ; illinc humanæ, quæ in sanctissimis quoque viris inest, corruptionis, imbecillitatis et ignorantiæ." For the SOLE purpose of the sacred writer seems to me to be this, to compose a work that should remain a perpetual document of humility and patience to all good men in affliction from this two-fold consideration, as on the one hand of the infinite perfection, power, and wisdom of God; so on the other, of human corruption, imbecillity, and ignorance, discoverable even in the best of men. Such talk in a popular discourse, for the sake of a moral application, might not be amiss: but to speak thus to the learned world, is surely out of season. The Critic will be apt to tell him, he hath mistaken the Actor for the subject; and that he might on the same principle as well conclude that the purpose of Virgil's poem is not the establishment of an empire in Italy, but the personal piety of Æneas. But to be a little more explicit. The book of Job consists of two distinct parts; the narrative, contained in the prologue and epilogue; and the argumentative, which composes the body of the work. Now when the question is of the subject of a book, who means any other than the body of it? yet the learned Doctor mistaking the narrative part for the argumentative, gives us the subject of the introduction and conclusion for that of the work itself. And it is very true that the beginning and the end do exhibit a perpetual document of humility and patience to all good men in affliction. But it is as true that the body of the work neither does nor could exhibit any such document. First it doth not; for, that humility and patience, which Job manifests before his entering into dispute, is succeeded by rage and ostentation when he becomes heated with unreasonable opposition. Secondly, it could not; because it is altogether argumentative; the subject of which must needs be a proposition debated, and not a document exemplified. A precept may be conveyed in history; but a disputation can exhibit only a debated question. I have shewn what that question is; and he, instead of proving that I have assigned a wrong one, goes about to persuade the reader, that there is no question at all.

He proceeds. "Quamvis enim in sermonibus, qui in eo habentur, de religione, de virtute, de providentia, Deique in mundo gubernando sapientia, justitia, sanctitate, de uno rerum omnium principio, aliisque gravissimis veritatibus dissertetur, hunc tamen quem dixi unicum esse libri scopum, tam ex initio et fine, quam ex universâ ejus œconomiâ cuivis opinor manifestum erit. Ea enim, ut rem omnem summatim complectar, Jobum exhibet, primo quidem querentem, expostulantem, effræno luctui indulgentem; mox (quum, ut sacri dramatis natura postulabat, amicorum contradictione, sinistrisque suspicionibus magis magisque irritatus et lacessitus esset) imprudentius Deum provocantem, atque in justitia sua gloriantem; ad debitam tandem summissionem suique cognitionem revocatum, tum demum, nec antea, integritatis suæ tam præmium, quam testimonium a Deo reportantem." For although in the speeches that occur, there be much talk of religion, virtue, and providence, of God's wisdom, justice, and holiness in the government of the world, of one principle of all things, and other most important truths, yet that this which I have assigned is the only scope of the book will appear manifest to every one, as well from the beginning and the end as from the economy of the whole. For to say all in a word, it first presents

Job complaining, expostulating, and indulging himself in an ungovernable grief: but soon after (when, as the nature of the sacred drama required, by the contradiction of his friends, and their sinister suspicions, he became more and more teized and irritated) rashly challenging God, and glorying in his own integrity; yet at length brought back to a due submission and knowledge of himself. The reader sees that all this is just as pertinent as if I should say, Mr. CHILLINGWORTH's famous book against Knot the Jesuit, was not to prove the religion of Protestants a safe way to salvation, but to give the picture of an artful Caviller and a candid Disputer. "For, although, in the arguments that occur, there be much talk of protestantism, popery, infallibility, a judge of controversies, fundamentals of faith, and other most important matters, yet that this which I have assigned is the only scope of the book, will appear manifest to every one, as well from the beginning and the end, as from the economy of the whole. For it first of all presents the sophist quibbling, chicaning, and indulging himself in all the imaginable methods of false reasoning: and soon after, as the course of disputation required, resting on his own authority, and loading his adversary with personal calumnies; yet at length, by the force of truth and good logic, brought back to the point; confuted, exposed, and put to silence." Now if I should say this of the book of Chillingworth, would it not be as true, and as much to the purpose, as what our author hath said of the book of Job? The matters in the discourse of the Religion of Protestants could not be treated as they are without exhibiting the two characters of a Sophist and a true Logician. Nor could the matters in the book of Job be treated as they are without exhibiting a good man in afflictions, complaining and expostulating; impatient under the contradiction of his friends, yet at length brought back to a due submission, and knowledge of himself. But therefore, to make this the sole or chief Scope of the book, (for in this he varies) is perverting all the rules of interpretation. But what misled him we have taken notice of above. And he himself points to it, where he says,—the subject I have assigned to the book of Job appears the true both from the BEGINNING and the END. It is true, he adds, and from the economy of the whole likewise.

Which he endeavours to prove in this manner: For it first presents Job complaining, expostulating, and indulging himself in an ungovernable grief: but soon after (when, as the nature of the sacred drama required, by the contradiction of his friends, and their sinister suspicions, he became more and more teized and irritated) rashly challenging God, and glorying in his own integrity: yet at length brought back to a due submission and knowledge of himself; and then at last, and not before, receiving from God both the reward and testimony of his uprightness. This is indeed a fair account of the CONDUCT of the drama. And from this it appears, first, that that which he assigns for the SOLE SCOPE of the book cannot be the true. For if its design were to give a perpetual document of humility and patience, how comes it to pass, that the author, in the execution of this design, represents Job complaining, expostulating, and indulging himself in an ungovernable grief, rashly challenging God, and glorying in his own integrity? Could a painter, think you, in order to represent the ease and safety of navigation, draw a vessel getting with much pains and difficulty into harbour, after having lost all her lading and been miserably torn and shattered by a tempest? and yet you think a writer, in order to give a document of humility and patience, had sufficiently discharged his plan, if he made Job conclude resigned and submissive, though he had drawn him turbulent, impatient, and almost blasphemous throughout the whole piece. Secondly,

it appears from the learned Author's account of the conduct of the drama, that that which I have assigned for the sole Scope of the book is the true. For if, in Job's distressful circumstances, the question concerning an equal or unequal providence were to be debated: His friends, if they held the former part, must needs doubt of his integrity: this doubt would naturally provoke Job's indignation; and, when it was persisted in, cause him to fly out into the intemperate excesses so well described by the learned Doctor: yet conscious innocence would at length enable patience to do its office, and the conclusive argument for his integrity would be his resignation and submission.

The learned Writer sums up the argument thus. "Ex his inquam apparet, non primario agi in hoc libro de providentia, sive æquali, sive inæquali, sed de personali Jobi integritate." From all this, I say, it appears, that the personal integrity of Job, and not the question concerning an equal or unequal Providence, is the principal subject of the book. He had before only told us his opinion; and now, from his opinion, he says it appears. But the appearances, we see, are deceitful; and so they will always be, when they arise only out of the fancy or inclination of the Critic, and not from the nature of things.

But he proceeds. "Hanc enim (quod omnino observandum est) in dubium vocaverant amici, non ideo tantum quod afflictus esset, sed quod afflictus impatientius se gereret, Deique justitiæ obmurmuraret: et qui strenuus videlicet aliorum hortator fuerat ad fortitudinem et constantiam, quum ipse tentaretur, victus labasceret." For that [i. e. his personal integrity] it was which his friends doubted of, not so much on account of his affliction, as for the not bearing his affliction with patience, but murmuring at the justice of God. And that he who was a strenuous adviser of others to fortitude and constancy, should, when his own trial came, sink under the stroke of his disasters.-But why not on account of his afflictions? Do not we find that even now, under this unequal distribution of things, censorious men (and such doubtless he will confess Job's comforters to have been) are but too apt to suspect great afflictions for the punishment of secret sins. How much more prone to the same suspicion would such men be in the time of Job, when the ways of Providence were more equal? As to his impatience in bearing affliction, that symptom was altogether ambiguous, and might as likely denote want of fortitude as want of innocence; and proceed as well from the pain of an ulcerated body, as the anguish of a distracted conscience.

Well, our Author has brought the Patriarch thus far on his way, to expose his bad temper. From hence he accompanies him to his place of rest; which, as many an innocent man's is, he makes to be in a bad argument. "Quum accesserat sanctissimi viri malis, hæc gravissima omnium tentatio, ut tanquam improbus et hypocrita ab amicis damnaretur, et quod unicum ei supererat, conscientiæ suæ testimonio ac solatio, quantum ipsi potuerunt, privandus foret, quid misero faciendum erat? Amicos perfidiæ et crudelitatis arguit : Deum integritatis suæ testem vindicemque appellat : quum autem nec Deus interveniret, ad innocentiam ejus vindicandam, nec remitterent quicquam amici de acerbis suis censuris, injustisque criminationibus, ad SUPREMUM ILLUD JUDICIUM provocat, in quo REDEMPTOREM sibi affuturum, Deumque a suis partibus staturum, summa cum fiducia se novisse affirmat." Now when (says the learned Writer) the most grievous trial of all was added to the other evils of this holy person; to be condemned by his friends as a profligate, and an hypocrite, and to be deprived, as much as in them lay, of his only remaining support, the Testimony of a good con

science, What was left for the unhappy man to do? He accuses his friends of perfidy and cruelty; he calls upon God as the witness and avenger of his integrity: But when neither God interposed to vindicate his innocence, nor his friends forbore to urge their harsh censures and unjust accusations, he appeals to that LAST JUDGMENT, in which with the utmost confidence he affirms that he knew that his REDEEMER would be present to him, and that God would declare in his favour. To understand the force of this representation, we must have in mind this unquestionable truth; "That, be the subject of the book what it will, yet if the sacred Writer bring in the persons of the drama disputing, he will take care that they talk with decorum and to the purpose." Now we both agree that Job's friends had pretended at least to suspect his integrity. This suspicion it was Job's business to remove; and, if the Doctor's account of the subject be right, his only business. To this end he offers various arguments, which failing of their effect, he at last (as the Doctor will have it) appeals to the SECOND COMING OF THE REDEEMER OF MANKIND. But was this likely to satisfy them? They demand a present solution of their doubts, and he sends them to a future judgment. Nor can our Author say (though he would insinuate) that this was such a sort of appeal as disputants are sometimes forced to have recourse to, when they are run aground and have nothing more to offer: For Job, after this, proceeds in the dispute; and urges many other arguments with the utmost propriety. Indeed there is one way, and but one, to make the appeal pertinent and that is, to suppose our Author mistaken, when he said that the personal integrity of Job, and not the question concerning an equal or unequal Providence, was the main subject of the book: And we may venture to suppose so, without much danger of doing him wrong: for, the doctrine of a future judgement affords a principle whereon to determine the question of an equal or unequal Providence; but it leaves the personal integrity of Job just as it found it. But the learned Author is so little solicitous for the pertinency of the argument, that he makes, as we shall now see, its impertinence to be one of the great supports of his system. For thus he concludes his argument. "Jam vero si cardo controversiæ fuisset, utrum, salva Dei justitia, sancti in hac vita, adfligi possent, hæc ipsa declaratio litem finire debuerat. Sin autem de personali Jobi innocentia disceptetur, nil mirum quod veterem canere cantilenam, Jobumque ut fecerant, condemnare pergerent socii, quum Dei solius erat, qui corda hominum explorat, pro certo scire, an jure merito sibi Jobus hoc solamen attribueret, an falsam sibi fiduciam vanus arrogaret." But now if the hinge of the controversy had turned on this, Whether or no, consistently with God's justice, good men could be afflicted in this life, this declaration ought to have finished the debate: but if the question were concerning the personal innocence of Job, it was no wonder that they still sung their old song, and went on as they had begun, to condemn their much afflicted friend; since it was in the power of God alone to explore the hearts of men, and to know for certain whether it was Job's piety that rightly applied a consolation, or whether it was his vanity that arrogated a false confidence to himself. This is a very pleasant way of coming to the sense of a disputed passage: Not, as of old, by shewing it supports the Writer's argument, but by shewing it supports the Critic's hypothesis. I had taken it for granted that Job reasoned to the purpose, and therefore urged this argument against understanding him as speaking of the Resurrection in the xixth chapter. "The disputants" (say I) "are all equally imbarassed in adjusting the ways of Providence. Job affirms that the good man is sometimes unhappy; the three friends pretend that he never can be so; because such a situation would reflect upon God's justice. Now

the doctrine of a Resurrection supposed to be urged by Job cleared up all this embarras. If therefore his friends thought it true, it ended the dispute; if false, it lay upon them to confute it. Yet they do neither: They neither call it into question, nor allow it to be decisive. But without the least notice that any such thing had been urged, they go on as they began, to inforce their former arguments, and to confute that which they seem to understand was the only one Job had urged against them; viz. the consciousness of his own innocence."-Now what says our learned Critic to this? Why, he says, that if I be mistaken, and he be right in his account of the book of Job, the reason is plain why the three friends took no notice of Job's appeal to a Resurrection; namely, because it deserved none. As to his being in the right, the reader, I suppose, will not be greatly solicitous, if it be one of the consequences that the sacred Reasoner is in the wrong. However, before we allow him to be right, it will be expected he should answer the following questions. If, as he says, the point in the book of Job was only his personal innocence, and this, not (as I say) upon the PRINCIPLE of no innocent person being miserable; I would ask how it was possible that Job's friends and intimates should be so obstinately bent on pronouncing him guilty, the purity of whose former life and conversation they were so well acquainted with? If he will say, the disputants went upon that PRINCIPLE, I then ask how came Job's appeal to a Resurrection not to silence his opposers? as it accounted for the justice of God in the present unequal distribution of things.

P. 93. Q. This is one thing (says Job) therefore I said it, HE DESTROYETH THE PERFECT WITH THE WICKED, chap. ix. 22. as much as to say, this is the point or general question between us, and I stick to the affirmative, and insist upon its truth. The words which follow are remarkable. It had been objected, that when the good man suffered it was for a tryal; to this Job replies: If the scourge slay suddenly, he will laugh at the trial of the innocent, ver. 23. suddenly, or indiscriminately, as Schultens rightly understands it; as much as to say, when the sword devours the innocent and the wicked man without distinction, if the innocent will distinguish his ill hap from the wicked man's, and call it a tryal, the wicked man will mock at him; and indeed not without some shew of reason.

P. 93. R. "Supposing" (says the Cornish Answerer) "we should allow such an equal Providence to have been administered in Judæa; yet, since he himself reckons it the utmost extravagance to suppose it any where else; what an idea does he give us of the talents of Ezra? who, according to him, has introduced persons who were no Jews debating a question so palpably absurd as that it NEVER entered into the head of any one man living to make. a question of it out of the land of Judæa? consequently could not with the least probability or propriety be handled by any but Jews. Is this like one who, he would make us to believe, was a careful observer of Decorum? certainly the rule of Decorum would have obliged him 'reddere personæ,' &c. as Horace speaks-either to look out for proper persons to debate his questions, or to fit his question to the persons." I should have reason to complain of this insolence of Language, so habitual to these Answerers, did it not always carry its own punishment along with it. For, look, in proportion to their rudeness, is generally their folly, or ill faith.-Supposing (says this man) we should allow such an equal Providence, &c.-Now, when the Reader considers I am only contending for the actual administration of such a providence as the Bible, in almost every page, represents to have been administered, will he not naturally suppose this to be some infidel-writer making a gracious concession even at the expence of his own cause? But when he