Wanted spirit to contest it. Whichever of these opinions went forth, neither of them would do credit to the commons of Great Britain. Mr. Pitt fpoke next to this knotty queftion. The Houfe, he obferved, had, on the preceding debate on this fubject, explicitly declared the act under confideration not illegal. But were a bill of indemnity to pass, would not this be recalling their declaration? The bufinefs had undergone a folemn and mature deliberation, and no more could with propriety be faid relating to it. It had long been the wisdom of Parliament to avoid precife decifions on points of a difputable nature, and to act in the mean time with a view to feafons and circumftances, which were a furer guide. Nothing but unavoidable neceffity fhould force men to decide in a cafe where the fue must be mortifying to one of the parties concerned. It had been afferted that the prerogative in debate had never yet been kid properly before Parliament; but this affertion was erroneous. No war had occurred within a century, that had not brought it into difcuffion. But Parliament had conftantly declined a pofitive decifion, doubtless, for reasons which, when coolly examined, would to the impartial appear juftly founded. No fpecific law could be cited, prohibiting the crown to introduce foreign troops into the kingdom without confent of Parliament. Precedents were manifeftly in favour of this prerogative. Minifters were defcribed as too proud to court a bill of indemnity; but fuch a bill was no difgrace, when required for the legalizing of a tranfaction, evidently beneficial to

the community:-and fuch a bill he fhortly propofed to claim. But it were unbecoming to folicit such a bill, merely to avoid altercation, or to obtain popularity.

After a few words in reply from Mr. Grey, expreffing the neceffity of coming to an immediate decifion on this matter, the motion was negatived by 170 against 41.

This fubject was alfo brought before the Houfe of Lords on the 21ft of February, by the Earl of Albemarle. He took a retrofpective view of all that had paffed for a long courfe of years refpecting the fubject in debate, in order to fhew what folicitude it had at all times occafioned. He particularized the bill of indemnity infifted on by the Houfe of Commons against the ministry, which had garrifoned Gibraltar and Minorca with foreign troops. The previous landing of thefe in England, in the way to their deftination, occafioned a formal afleveration in that Houfe, that the crown had no right to take fuch a ftep without the formal content of Parliament. In confequence of thefe premifes, he moved that a bill of indemnity fhould be brought in, for the conduct of minifters on this occafion.

It was contended, on the other hand, by Lord Spencer, that when a foreign force was only landed in the kingdom on its paflage to another place of deftination, when itş refidence was to be of fhort continuance, and an immediate communication of the measure was made to Parliament, there was no law prohibiting the crown to introduce foreign troops under fuch circumftances. The quartering of the Heffians in the Isle of Wight,

anfwering

anfwering precifely this defcription, the miniftry ftood acquitted in their use of the royal prerogative on this occafion. It was not pretended that the King's prerogative extended to the introduction of a foreign military either to fupprefs domeftic infurrections, to ferve as garrifons, or to be ftationed permanently in any part of the realm, unless by formal confent of Parliament; but no law forbade their tranfient admiffion on the terms above specified.

It was acknowledged by Lord Aukland, that he did not confider the landing of the Heffians as ftrictly conformable to law, nor yet as an illegal act on the part of miniftry. The filence of the law, in fome cafes, was an admonition to Parliament to pafs them over unobferved, unless it were evident that to be filent, would amount to a breach of the duty they owed to their country. But without well founded apprehenfions that an ill ufe was intended of the prerogatives vefted in the crown, they thould be left untouched, as neceflary for the quiet and good order of the community.

Lord Romney took notice on this occafion, that nineteen years before, when he was a member of the other Houfe, it was not even pretended that to introduce foreign troops into the British dominions, was not contrary to law; the only point then agitated was, how to word the bill of indemnity granted to the minifters who had taken that ftep, fo as to remove all doubt as to the unlawfulness of the meafure, in which all men were agreed.

This fubject was confidered by Lord Grenville, as altogether of an abftrat nature, and highly impro

a

per at prefent for debate. The Heffian troops were in a fituation that required them to be landed for the benefit of air and refreshment: this furely was no ftraining of the prerogative. The crown, it was true, could not, without confulting Parliament, maintain ftanding army of natives, much lefs of foreigners; but in the prefent cafe, nothing had been done to throw the leaft blame on miniftry. It was ungenerous to look upon the exercife of the royal prerogative as neceffarily attended with abule. It might fometimes appear inconfiftent with liberty; but while under conftitutional ref-, trictions, was experimentally found of effential utility. The refponfibility of minifters had heen held out in a dangerous light: but it anfwered two equally beneficial ends: they were not only anfwerable for doing wrong, but alfo for omitting to do what was right. In a cafe like the prefent, for inftance, were they to introduce a foreign force without neceffity, or to neglect their aid when wanted here, they would be alike culpable. Hence it fairly appeared, that to prefs a bill of indemnity upon minifters for what they had done reipecting the Heffians, would prevent all future minifters, as well as the prefent, from reforting to the meature of calling in the affiftance of foreigners when it might be most wanted, and while they were alfo nearest at hand to afford relief.

Better therefore to leave a doubtful bufinefs undecided, than by circumfcribing the motives of minifters, to expofe government to a probable failure in its opera tions against the enemies of this country.

In oppofition to this reafoning, Lord Guildford was decidedly of opinion, that no expediency could be alleged against the pofitive tenor of the law. Aftrong example had been given in the laft century, of the backwardness even of a wicked adminiftration to run counter to the fenfe of the people, by introducing an army of foreigners into the kingdom. This was the miniftry of James II. However violently intent on the accomplishment of his defigns, that monarch did not dare to accept of the affiftance offered him by his friend and abettor Lewis XIV. of France; and chofe rather to incur the risk of not fucceeding in his projects, than to offend his people by a meature which he was confcious would lay him open to their univerfal odium. The bill of indemnity recommended to minifters, thewed how little difpofed the nation was to cenfure them for what they had done; but was no lefs a proof how unacceptable the principle of empowering the crown to admit a foreign force was to the fenfe of the nation. Meffges from the crown were no juftification of minifterial measures. The words of Lord Coke, on a fimilar occafion, might pertinently be quoted on the prefent: "the King's meffage was gracious; but what favs the law of the land?"

Arguments of the fame import as thofe already fpecified, were urged by other Lords, on each fide of the queftion. But the iffue of the debate was, that the bill of indemnity propofed by Lord Albemarle, was negatived by feventy-feven against twelve.

This rejection of a bill which Could not have affected the repu.

tation of ministers, nor diminished the influence of the crown, was greatly cenfured by numbers, who wifhed that government, while engaged in fo terious a buûiness as the conteft with France, would have laid afide all needlefs tenacioufiefs of its authority, and yielded to the ideas of the generality, efpecially as they extended no farther than to require the genuine principles of the constitution to be acknowledged. It was faid, an abridgement of the royal prerogatives was undoubtedly in the contemplation of that party which had imbibed the doctrines imported from France among its neighbours; but this party was fo greatly outnumbered by thofe who adhered to the established government, that no danger could have accrued from indulging thefe reiterated defires, that minifters would refrain from all appearance of haughtinefs, obftinacy, and love of power, and truft more than they feemed difpofed to do, to the goodwill and readiness of the public to fupport and carry them through the arduous tafk of putting a ftop to the progress of the ancient enemy of the British nation.

The ftrength and inveteracy of that formidable enemy were now daily encreasing; and it required the utmost efforts of combined Europe to meet him in the field. The empire of the fea was that

object which he ftrenuously fought, above all others, to compats; certain that if he fucceeded, the world itself would be at his command. Full of this mighty project, his efforts were exerted in every maritime town and province of France, to collect a futficient number of feamen to man the

fleet

fleet he was preparing at Breft, in order to make trial of his naval prowefs with the ftrength of Great Britain, on what is not improperly called her Own ele

ment.

To prepare for a conteft, the iffue of which would be very ferious to the lofing party, was equally the ftudy of the British government. On the 27th of January 1794, Lord Arden moved, that the number of feamen for the fervice of the navy, during the approaching season, fhould be augmented to 85,000. The motion was cheerfully complied with: all parties, even thofe who difapproved of the war as unneceffary, were alike convinced of the propriety of carrying it on with vigour after it had been undertaken, and of fupporting the honour of the British arms, both by fea and land, againft an enemy who, fufhed with his late fucceffes, was become more dangerous than ever, and menaced Britain particularly, as the chief agent in the coalition against him.

Mr. Fox, though he acquiefced in the motion, was very fevere in his examination of the conduct of the war. Minifters, he observed, had boafted of the good condition and great fervices of the navy during the preceding year, particularly of the attention fhewn to the commercial fleet; and yet it appeared that several branches of our trade had greatly fuffered; feventeen of the traders to the Baltic had been taken, and they had all narrowly escaped: the fhipping from Quebec had been left to the protection of only one hip in a bad condition; and their fafe arzival was owing to the circumftance

of the abfence of an enemy. In the Channel, fix French frigates had been fuffered to take twenty - fix fail of rich merchantmen. These particulars made him doubtful of the care and vigilance profeffed by the miniftry. Nor was it certain that we had not loft as many veffels in the foregoing year as in 1778, when we contended alone with Holland, France, and Spain. It was an undeniable fact, that, fince the commencement of the war, in February last year, the French had feized near one hundred veffels more than they had loft.

Mr. Pitt, in reply, stated, that no fhips had fallen into the enemy's hands through want of convoy. Six French frigates had remained uninterrupted in the Channel the fpace of fix days, while our fleet, just returned from a cruize, was lying in port to refit; but they were foon driven into their own harbours. Our fucceffes at fea had, on the whole, been great: our East and West India fleets had fafely arrived at their destinations abroad, and failed fecurely home our trade was immenfe, and profpered in every quarter of the globe. Thefe were truths that could not be controverted. The British navy had, in the mean time, ruled irrefiftibly in every fea. Many years would elapfe before the French could recover from the blow they had received at Toulon. Our fleets were out everywhere in fearch of the enemy, who conftantly avoided coming to action. As to the intelligence brought from France, relating to the advantages of which the French were continually boafting, but little reliance could be placed upon it; and the

Speakers

peakers in the Convention were fo careful to magnify their fucceffes and diminish their loffes, and to represent their fituation as completely profperous, though it was well known that France was full of difcontent, confufion, and wretchednefs.

When it was moved by Mr. Pitt, that the treaty with the King of Sardinia fhould be referred to the committee of fupply, Mr. Fox reprefented that treaty as one by which this country engaged to do much for an ally who was to make no return. The port of Nice might have been a compenfation for our aid; but of that the French were matters, as well as of his hereditary Dukedom of Savoy. He was to receive a fubfidy of two hundred thousand pounds to enable him to defend his own dominions; and Great Britain ftipulated at the fame time to procure the recovery of the territories he had loft. But the fulfilling of thefe terms, confidering the many chances against us, arifing from this unpropitious war, might prove a burden of ruinous weight to this country. Without entangling this expenfive ally in a dangerous quarrel, it would have been wifer in us, and more advantageous to him, whenever a pacification took place, to have made the restoration of his domihions a condition of the treaty.

It was obferved by Mr. Powis, in reply, that the ancestor of the King of Sardinia, who acceded to the grand alliance against France at the beginning of the prefent century, was treated with on fimilar terms. The French were at that time, as they are now, grafp. ing at undue power; and Europe was, in like manner, compelled to

unite for its prefervation. To pro tect the King of Sardinia was one of the means of our own defence. He was fubfidized to fight our battles as well as his own; and the fucceffes he might obtain, were no lefs advantageous to us than to him, by weakening the common enemy, and by diverting a confiderable part of that force which he might otherwife employ against this coun try and its allies.

Mr. Ryder added, that, in his opi nion, the fituation of the King of Sardinia's dominions in Italy, rendered him an ally of confiderable weight, by enabling him to prevent the French from penetrating into the Milanese.

The augmentation of the army was the next object of importance brought before the Houfe. The fecretary at war, on the 3d of February, moved, in a committee of fupply, that the land-forces for the fervice of the current year, fhould confift of 60,000 men. This augmentation was oppofed by Mr. Huffey, on the ground of its ineffi cacy for the purposes of this war. The navy of Great Britain ought rather to have been augmented. A few tout fhips were of much more utility than a land-force, in making fuch an impreffion upon the enemy as would be folid and ferviceable to the interefts of this country. He entertained no doubt of the courage and gallantry of our officers and foldiers; but would rather have feen our naval lift carried to 100,000 men, than vote for any farther increase of the army.

He was followed by Major Maitland, who entered largely into the fubject. He complained that much more money was expended in raifing men than heretofore; and that

economy