own innocence. What pains do we see taken, to overthrow a false evidence, and what colours of art do we see employed to palliate or disguise a true one! No man needs be told that this is the constant practice of Christians: and did not the Heathens the same? Here then is a fresh proof of the point in question; an argument of familiar evidence arising from the transactions of common life. For, in the altercations with each other, in reference to right and wrong, there is manifestly supposed some prior Law of universal reason, to which the appeal on both sides is directed, and by which the decision is finally to be made. And this, as the Apostle's argument suggests, whichever of the contending parties be in the wrong. For the charging another with wrong conduct, equally implies a Rule, determining my judgement of moral action; as the defending myself or others from such a charge, evinces my sense of it. Thus, whether I accuse, or answer for myself, either way, I shew a law written

in

my heart; whence I estimate the right or wrong of the supposed question. Thus much might be inferred from the ordinary topics of conversation: but the case is still clearer, when they come to be debated in courts of Justice. More especially, therefore, the strug

reason.

gles and contentions of the Bar (for the terms, employed in the text, being forensic, direct us chiefly to that interpretation), a series of civil and judiciary pleadings, such as have been preserved to us, from heathen times, in the writings of a Demosthenes, or Cicero, are a standing, unanswerable argument for the existence of a Rule of Right, or Law of natural For how should these debates be carried on without a Rule, to which the advocates of either party refer? or how should these judicial differences be composed, without a common Law, to arbitrate between them? And what though the Law, referred to, be a written institute: It was first written in the heart, before legislators transcribed it on brass, or paper.

You see then, the sum of the Apostle's reasoning stands thus. The Heathens, who had no revealed Law, DID by nature, the things of the Law: their JUDGEMENT, too, of their own actions, conformed to the judgement of the Law: and, lastly, their DEBATES with one another, whether public or private, concerning right and wrong, evidenced their sense of some Law, which Nature had prescribed to them.

And in this fine chain of argument, we may observe the peculiar art, by which it is conducted, and the advantage, resulting from such conduct to the main conclusion. For if the argument from WORKS should seem of less weight (as it possibly might, after the Apostle's own charge upon the heathen world, and in that age of heathen corruption) yet the evidence arising from CONSCIENCE, which was an appeal to every man's own breast, could hardly be resisted or, if conscience could be laid asleep (as it might be by vice and ill habits) it was impossible they could deny the DEBATES among themselves, or not see the inference that must needs be drawn from them.

It may, further, seem to have been with some propriety that the sacred reasoner employed these topics of argument, in an address to ROMANS: Who could not but feel the weight of them the more, as well knowing the ancient VIRTUE of their country; as knowing too, that the Roman people had been famous for their nice sense of right and wrong, or, in other words, a moral CONSCIENCE; and that, as having been a free people, they had been always accustomed to DEBATES about moral action, public and private.

Such is the force, and such the elegant disposition and address, of the Apostle's reasoning. The conclusion follows irresistibly, That there is a Law written in our hearts, or that, besides a Revealed Law, there is a law of natural reason.

That this conclusion is not injurious to revealed Law, but indeed most friendly and propitious to it; that, in particular, it no way derogates from the honour of the Christian Law, nor can serve in any degree to lessen the value, or supersede the use and necessity of it; I shall attempt to shew in another discourse.

SERMON IV.

PREACHED MAY 24, 1767.

GAL. iii. 19.

Wherefore then serveth the Law?

WHEN the Apostle Paul had proved, in his Epistle to the Romans, that if the uncircumcision kept the righteousness of the Law, his uncircumcision would be accounted for circumcision; that is, if the Gentile observed the moral law, which was his proper rule of life, he would be accepted of God, as well as the Jew, who observed the Mosaic Law; this generous reasoning gave offence, and he was presently asked, WHAT ADVANTAGE THEN HATH THE JEW b?