126

HESITATION OF THE GOVERNMENT.

alert against surprise or sudden assault; but even this was not given by the President before January 3, 1861, when it was too late.' He went to Washington City on the 12th of December, and on the following day begged the Secretary of War to re-enforce the Southern forts. The Secretary did not coincide in his views. He then asked Floyd to procure for him an early interview with the President. That interview occurred on the 15th, when the subject of secession and the strengthening of the forts was freely discussed. In reply to Scott's suggestion to send re-enforcements immediately to Charleston harbor, the President said the time for such measures had not arrived. He expected the Convention of South Carolinians, who would assemble on the 17th, would send commissioners to him, to negotiate with him and Congress respecting the secession of the State, and the property of the United States within its limits, and that, if Congress should decide against secession, then he would send a re-enforcement, and order Major Anderson to hold the forts against attack.

2

The last sentence gave Floyd a new idea of a method to aid the conspiracy. The Virginia traitors (of whom he was the chief, in efficient action), at that time, contemplated the seizure of the immense Fortress Monroe at Hampton Roads, which guarded the great Navy Yard at Norfolk, and would be of vast importance to the conspirators in executing the scheme entertained by Wise and others, of seizing the National Capital before Lincoln's inaugu ration, and taking possession of the Government. Floyd would gladly weaken the garrison of Fortress Monroe for that purpose, at the expense of the Charleston forts; and he now said quickly, and with great animation, "We have a vessel-of-war (the Brooklyn) held in readiness at Norfolk, and I will send three hundred men in her, from Fort Monroe to Charleston.” Scott replied that so many men could not be spared from Fortress Monroe, but might be taken from New York. No doubt it was Floyd's intention, had the President ordered re-enforcements to Charleston, to take them from the already small garrison in Fortress Monroe.'

committed them to writing. They were afterwards modified by the Secretary of War, so as to more closely restrict Major Anderson. Buell arrived at Fort Moultrie on the 11th of December.

The wife of one of the officers of the garrison wrote as follows, at this time:-" I feel very indignant. I can hardly stand the way in which this weak little garrison is treated by the head of the Government. Troops and proper accommodations are positively refused, and yet the commander has orders to hold and defend the fort. Was ever such a sacrifice-an intentional one-known? The Secretary has sent several officers, at different times, to inspect here, as if that helped. It is a mere sham, to make believe he will do something. In the mean time a crisis is very near. I am to go to Charleston the first of the week. I will not go farther, if I can help it. Within a few days, we hear-and from so many sources, that we cannot doubt it-that the Charlestonians are erecting two batteries, one just opposite to us, at a little village-Mount Pleasant-and another on this end of the island; and they dare the commander to interfere, while they are getting ready to fight sixty men. In this weak little fort, I suppose, President Buchanan and Secretary Floyd intend the Southern Confederation to be cemented with the blood of this brave little garrison. Their names shall be handed down to the end of time. When the last man is shot down, I presume they will think of sending troops. The soldiers here deserve great credit. Though they know not but an unequal number is coming to massacre them, yet they are in good spirits, and will fight desperately. Our commander says, he never saw such a brave little band. I feel desperately myself. Our only hope is in God."

1 See Memoir of Lieutenant-General Scott, LL. D., written by Himself, il. 622.

2 Memoir of Scott, ii. 614.

The same, ii. 614.

4 “The plan invented by General Scott to stop secession," said the Richmond Examiner, in a enlogy of Floyd, “like all campaigns devised by him, was very able in its details, and nearly certain of general success. The Southern States are full of arsenals and forts, commanding their rivers and strategie points. General Scott desired to transfer the Army of the United States to these forts as speedily and quietly as possible. The Southern States could not cut off communication between the Government and the fortresses without a great fleet, which they cannot build for years-or take them by land without one hundred thousand men, many

RESIGNATION OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

127

The appeals of Major Anderson and the urgent recommendations of General Scott produced much feeling in the Cabinet at Washington. General Cass, the Secretary of State, warmly urged the President to order re-enforcements to be sent at once, not only to Charleston, but elsewhere. Most of the other members of the Cabinet, being conspirators yet hidden from public view, opposed the measure. This opposition, and the threats of the South Carolina delegation in Congress, as we have observed,' caused the President to refuse such order. It was on account of that refusal that Cass withdrew, after which the Cabinet was almost a unit in sentiment for December 14, about a fortnight, when, as we shall observe presently, there was a grand disruption of the ministry. For this patriotic act, the Charleston Mercury, ungrateful for the steady support which Mr. Cass had given to the policy of the Southern leaders during Buchanan's administration, denounced him as a "hoary-headed trickster and humbug," who' December 19. had retired from the Cabinet "because war was not made on South Carolina."

1860.

Anderson found it necessary for him to assume grave responsibilities, for he was evidently abandoned to his fate by his Government. Ile sent engineers and workmen to repair Castle Pinckney, and, as vigorously as possible, he pushed on the labor of strengthening Fort Moultrie.

When the Ordinance of Secession was passed, still more menacing became the actions of the South Carolinians. Anderson knew that commissioners had been appointed to repair to Washington, to demand the surrender of the forts in Charleston harbor; and he was conscious that preparations for seizing them, the very moment when the expected refusal to surrender should be made known, were in active progress. He knew, too, that if he should remain in Moultrie, their efforts would be successful; and two days after the passage of that ordinance, he wrote to the Department, December 22. saying: "I have heard from several sources that, last night and

the night before, a steamer was stationed between this island and Fort

hundred millions of dollars, several campaigns, and many a bloody siege. Had Scott been able to have got these forts in the condition he desired them to be, the Southern Confederacy would not now exist."

1 See page 102.

2 The President offered as a reason for his refusal to give orders for the re-enforcement of Major Anderson the fear of giving offense to the South Carolinians, and bringing on a collision. Apparently unsuspicious that the politicians of other States were equally determined to commence a rebellion at a favorable moment, he professed to believe that if the Government did not begin actual hostilities, South Carolinians would keep the peace, for fear of provoking the other Cotton-producing States. If, on the contrary, the Government should provoke the South Carolinians to strike, those of the other States would join them. Mr. Buchanan also offered as a reason, that there were not sufficient troops at command, at any time, to garrison the forts. His mistake is apparent when we consider the ease with which Forts Sumter, Pickens, Taylor, and Jefferson held out with very small garrisons against all the forces that the insurgents could bring. Anderson could have held out in Sumter for a long time with less than one hundred men, if he had possessed food and water for them,

* A public banquet was given to Secretary Floyd at Richmond, on the 11th of January, 1861, and, in an afterdinner speech, he stated some interesting matters concerning the proceedings of the Cabinet in relation to the forts in Charleston harbor. He said the President was at first anxious to send re-enforcements. "I would rather be at the bottom of the Potomac," he said, "than that these forts should be in the hands of those who intend to take them. It will destroy me-it will cover your [Floyd's] name with infamy, for you will never be able to show that you had not some complicity in it." Floyd called in to his aid Jefferson Davis, James M. Mason, and R. M. T. Hunter, with other patriots, Northern and Southern." The President yielded, and said. "I am content with your policy-we will send no more troops to the harbor of Charleston." But General Cass was firm. "These forts," he said, "must be strengthened. I demand it." The President replied, “I am sorry to differ with the Secretary of State, but the interests of the country do not demand a re-enforcement of the forts at Charleston. I cannot do it. I take the responsibility." This was on the 13th of December-General Cass resigned the next day.-Report of Floyd's Speech in the Richmond Exquire", January 12, 1961.

128

ANDERSON CONTEMPLATES REMOVAL.

Sumter. I am certain that the authorities of South Carolina are determined to prevent, if possible, any troops from being placed in that fort; and that they will seize upon that most important work as soon as they think there is any reasonable ground for a doubt whether it will be turned over to the State. I think that I could, however, were I to receive instructions to do so, throw my garrison into that work; but I should have to sacrifice the greater part of my stores, as it is now too late to attempt their removal. Once in that work with my garrison, I could keep the entrance of this harbor open until they constructed works outside of me, which might, I presume, prevent vessels from coming into the outer harbor. . . . No one can tell what will be done. They may defer action until their commissioners return from Washington; or, if assured by the nature of the debates in Congress

that their demand will not probably be acceded to, they may act without waiting for them. I do not think we can rely upon any assurances, and wish to God I only had men enough here to man fully our guns. Our men are perfectly conscious of the dangerous position they are placed in, but are in as fine spirits as if they were certain of victory.""

To this letter no response came. Hour after hour the danger seemed to Anderson more threatening. Watch-boats were out continually, spying his movements, and ready to report the approach of a relief vessel of any kind. Four days had passed, and no word came from his Government. He had resolved to save the forts if possible, and he would wait no longer for instructions. He was commander of all the forts in the harbor, and might occupy

1 Anderson's MS. Letter-book.

OCCUPATION OF FORT SUMTER,

129

whichever he pleased.' He resolved to assume the responsibility, for the public good, of abandoning the weaker and occupying the stronger.

Great caution and circumspection were essential to success. There were vigilant eyes upon Anderson on every side. There was wide-spread disaf fection everywhere among Southern-born men. Whom can I trust? was a question wrung almost hourly from loyal men in public station. Anderson had lately been promoted to his present command, and had been so little with his officers and men, that his acquaintance with them was extremely limited. He revealed his secret intentions only to Captain (afterward MajorGeneral) John G. Foster, his second in command, and two or three other officers.

Anderson's first care was to remove the women and children, with a supply of provisions, to Fort Sumter. To do so directly and openly would invite an immediate attack. He resolved on strategy. He would give out that they were going to Fort Johnson, on James Island. Wherefore? would be asked by the watchful Charlestonians. His reply might properly be: Because I know you are about to attack me. I cannot hold out long. I wish to have the helpless ones, with food, in safety.

This was substantially the course of events. On Wednesday, the 26th of December, the women and children in Fort Moultrie, and ample provisions, were placed in vessels, and sent to Fort Johnson. The commandant there had been instructed to detain them on board until evening, under a pretext of a difficulty in finding quarters for them. The firing of three guns at Moultrie was to be the signal for them all to be conveyed immediately to Fort Sumter, and landed. The expected question was asked, and the plausible answer was given. The people of Charleston, as Anderson desired, talked about his movement as a natural and prudent measure. They now felt sure of their speedy possession of the forts. All suspicion was allayed. The stratagem was successful.

Just at the close of the evening twilight, when the almost full-orbed moon was shining brightly in the Southern sky, the greater portion of the little garrison at Fort Moultrie embarked for Fort Sumter. The three signal-guns were fired soon afterward, and the women and children were taken from before Fort Johnson to the same fortress. Captain Foster, Surgeon Crawford, and two or three other officers were left at Fort Moultrie, with a few men, with orders to spike the great guns, destroy their carriages, and cut down the flag-staff, that no “banner with a strange device" should be flung out from the peak from which the Stars and Stripes had so long fluttered. That accomplished, they were to follow the garrison to Sumter.

The movement was successful. The garrison departed. The voyage was short, but a momentous one. A guard-boat had been sent out from Charleston just as the last vessel left Sullivan's Island. At the same time a steamtug was seen towing a vessel in from sea. She might have revealed the secret. Providentially, the moon shone full in the faces of her people when looking in the direction of the flotilla, and they could not see them. Sumter

In the instructions communicated to Anderson by Buell, on the 11th of December, he was authorized, as the smallness of his force would not permit him to occupy more than one of the three forts, to put his command In either of them, in case he should be attacked, or if there should be attempts made to take possession of either

one of them.

VOL. I.-9

130

1860.

RAISING THE FLAG OVER SUMTER.

was gained. The soldiers and their families, and many weeks' provisions, were safe within its walls, and at eight o'clock the same evening," • December 26, Major Anderson wrote to the Adjutant-General from his snug quarters, nearly over the sally-port :-"I have the honor to report that I have just completed, by the blessing of God, the removal to this fort, of all my garrison except the surgeon, four North Carolina officers, and seven men." Electricity, speedier than steam, conveyed intelligence of the movement to the War Department from the Charleston conspirators, long before Anderson's message reached the National Capital. It fell among the disunionists in that capital like an unlooked-for thunderbolt, and the wires December 27. flashed back from the dismayed Floyd these angry words:"Intelligence has reached here this morning that you have abandoned Fort Moultrie, spiked your guns, burnt the carriages, and gone to Fort Sumter. It is not believed, because there is no order for any such movement. plain the meaning of this report."

Ex

Anderson calmly replied by telegraph:-" The telegram is correct. I abandoned Fort Moultrie because I was certain that if attacked my men must have been sacrificed, and the command of the harbor lost. I spiked the guns and destroyed the carriages to keep the guns from being turned against us. If attacked, the garrison would never have surrendered without a fight."

When this last dispatch was written, the flag of the Union had been floating over Sumter for four hours. It had been flung to the breeze at meridian, after impressive religious services. The commander, a devout man, took that opportunity to impress upon the garrison, then entering upon a

season of great trial, the important truth, that to God alone they must look for strength to bear it. His companions were anxious to hoist the National ensign before the dawn of the 27th, but the Major would not consent to the act before the return of the chaplain. He came at noon; and around the flag-staff, not not far from the great columbiad, mounted on the parade of the fort, all the inmates of Sumter were congregated. The commander, with the halliards in hand, knelt at the foot of it. The chaplain prayed earnestly for encouragement, support, and mercy; and when his supplications ceased, an impressive "Amen!" fell from the lips of many

1 Anderson's MS. Letter-book,

2 The same.

This 10-inch columbiad was designed to throw shells into Charleston, if necessary. See Chapter XII.