THE COMMANDER AT GOSPORT INSTRUCTED.

393 Merrimack and Germantown were in a condition to be speedily put to use. The Merrimack needed repairs, but the Germantown was nearly ready for sea.

Notwithstanding the importance of the Gosport Navy Yard as a military post, and the immense value of the property there, not only to the Government but to the insurgents, the late Administration, in its endeavors to avoid irritating the secessionists of Virginia, had left the whole exposed to seizure or destruction by them. The post was circumvallated by a low structure, incompetent to offer resistance to cannon. There was neither fort nor garrison to cover it in case of an assault. In fact, it was invitingly weak, and offered strong temptations for even a few bold men to attempt its seizure. The new Administration seemed to be equally remiss in duty prescribed by common prudence until it was too late. Finally, after the lapse of more than a month from its inauguration, and when it was resolved to give aid to Forts Pickens and Sumter, Commodore Charles S. McCauley, who was in command of the Gosport station, was admonished to exercise "extreme caution and circumspection." On the 10th of April, he was instructed to put the shipping and public property in condition to be moved and placed beyond danger, should it become necessary;" at the same time, he was warned to “take no steps that could give needless alarm."

991

Informed that with the workmen then employed on the engine of the steam-frigate Merrimack, it would take thirty days to repair it, and anxious for the safety of the vessel, the Government sent Engineer-in-chief B. F. Isherwood, who discredited the report, to put the machinery in order as quickly as possible. At the same time McCauley was directed to expedite the work, and Captain Alden was ordered to take charge of the vessel, and, when ready for sea, to go with it to Philadelphia. Isherwood arrived at the yard on Sunday morning, the 14th, and by applying labor night and day, he reported to McCauley on the 17th that the 1861. engine was ready for use.

• April,

In the mean time, Captain, now (1865) Rear-Admiral Paulding had arrived from Washington with instructions from the Secretary of the Navy for McCauley to lose no time in arming the Merrimack; "to get the Plymouth and Dolphin beyond danger; to have the Germantown in a condition to be towed out, and to put the more valuable property, ordnance stores, et cætera, on shipboard, so that they could, at any moment, be moved beyond danger." The Secretary also instructed him to defend the vessels. and other property committed to his charge "at any hazard, repelling by force, if necessary, any and all attempts to seize them, whether by mob violence, organized effort, or any assumed authority." On the same day, in accordance with advice offered by Paulding, the frigate Cumberland, which had been anchored below, with a full crew and armament on board, was moved up to a position so as to command the entire harbor, the Navy Yard, the cities of Norfolk and Portsmouth, and the channel through which they were approached. After seeing these précautionary arrangements completed, Paulding returned to Washington.

The Merrimack being ready for sea on the 17th, Mr. Isherwood proposed to have her fires lighted at once, that she might depart before other channel.

Secretary Welles to Commodore McCauley, April 10, 1561.

394

1861.

EFFECT OF TREACHERY AND WEAKNESS.

obstructions should be laid by the insurgents. "To-morrow morning will be in time," said the Commodore, and the lighting was deferred. At an early hour the next day," the fires were glowing, and soon every April 18, thing was in readiness for departure. Again the Commodore ------ proposed delay. "But the orders are peremptory," said Isherwood; and he suggested that, after another day's delay, it might be difficult to pass the obstructions which the secessionists were planting between Sewell's Point and Craney Island. But the vessel was kept back, and, to the astonishment of the Engineer-in-chief and other officers, the Commodore finally gave directions not to send the Merrimack away at all, and ordered the fires to be extinguished.' McCauley afterward asserted that he was influenced in his action at that time by the advice of several of his junior officers, born in Slave-labor States, believing that they were true to their flag. "How could I expect treachery on their part ?" he said. "The fact of their being Southern men was not surely a sufficient reason for suspecting their fidelity. Those Southern officers who have remained faithful to their allegiance are among the best in the service. No; I could not believe it possible that a set of men, whose reputations were so high in the Navy, could ever desert their posts, and throw off their allegiance to the country they had sworn to defend and protect. I had frequently received professions of their loyalty; for instance, on the occasion of the surrender of the Pensacola Navy Yard they expressed to me their indignation, and observed: 'You have no Pensacola officers here, Commodore; we will never desert you; we will stand by you to the last, even to the death."" Yet these men, false to every principle of honor, after having disgracefully deceived their commander, and accomplished the treasonable work of keeping the Merrimack and other vessels at the Navy Yard until it was too late for them to escape, offered their resignations on the 18th (the day after the Virginia Ordinance of Secession was passed), abandoned their flag, and joined the insurgents."

General Taliaferro, the commander of all the forces in southeastern Virginia, arrived at Norfolk with his staff on the evening of the 18th, and at once took measures for the seizure of the Navy Yard and the ships of war. The naval officers who had abandoned their flag joined him, and the secessionists of Norfolk were eager for the drama to open. On the following day, the workmen in the yard, who had been corrupted by the disloyal

1 Report of the Secretary of the Navy, July 4, 1861. "The cause of this refusal to remove the Merrimack," said the Secretary of the Navy, "has no explanation other than that of misplaced confidence in his juntor officers, who opposed it."

2 Letter of Commodore McCauley in the National Intelligencer, May 5, 1862, in reply to the Committee on the Conduct of the War, cited by Duyckinck in his History of the War for the Union, i. 157.

3 Among the naval officers who resigned at about this time was Lieutenant M. F. Maury, a Virginian, who for several years was the trusted superintendent of the National Observatory at Washington. The records of that office, it is said, disclosed the fact that he had impressed upon the minds of the scientific bodies in Europe that the dissolution of the Union and the destruction of the Republic were inevitable. So said the New York World. The career of Maury, after he abandoned his flag and joined its enemies, was peculiarly dishonorable. Before he resigned, and while he was yet trusted and honored by his countrymen, he was perfidiously working to overthrow the Government. He went to Europe, and there used every means in his power, by the grossest misrepresentations, to injure the character of his Government. Finally, on the 25th of May, 1865, when the rebellion was crushed, he wrote a note at sea," to Rear-Admiral S. W. Godon, then at Havana, saying:-" in peace, as in war, I follow the fortunes of my native State, Virginia:" and expressed his willingness to accept a parol on the terms granted to General Lee. He went to Mexico; and, in the autumn of 1865, Maximilian appointed him "Imperial Commissioner of Colonization," to promote immigration from the Southern States of our Republic.

STIRRING EVENTS AT NORFOLK.

395

officers, were absent from roll-call, yet the day passed without any hostile demonstrations. But on Saturday, the 20th, Norfolk was fearfully excited by conflicting rumors. One was that the yard was to be attacked, when the Cumberland would doubtless fire on the town; another, that she was about to leave, with valuable property belonging to the Government, and that the other vessels were to be scuttled; and still another, that the yard was to be destroyed. The military companies of Norfolk and Portsmouth were called out and paraded under arms. Four companies of riflemen and infantry had arrived from Petersburg, numbering in all four hundred men, and on that day were joined by two hundred more. The Richmond Grays had also arrived that morning, bringing with them fourteen pieces of heavy rifled cannon, and an ample stock of ammunition. With these re-enforcements, Taliaferro felt certain of success. McCauley felt equally certain that he could not withstand an assault from the insurgent force, so large and so well armed, and at noon he sent Taliaferro word that not one of the vessels should be moved, nor a shot fired, excepting in self-defense. This quieted the people.

Not doubting that an immediate attack would be made upon the vessels, McCauley gave orders, on the return of his flag from Norfolk, for the scuttling of all of them, to prevent their falling into the hands of the insurgents. This was done at four o'clock in the afternoon. The Cumberland only was spared. This work had been just accomplished when Captain Paulding again appeared. As soon as the Secretary of the Navy heard of the detention of the Merrimack-that

"fatal error," as he called it-he dispatched Paulding in the Pawnee with orders to relieve McCauley, and, with "such officers and marines as could be obtained, take command of all the vessels afloat on that station, repel force by force, and prevent the ships and public property, at all hazards, from passing into the hands of the insurrectionists." Paulding added to his crew, at Washington, one hundred marines; and at Fortress Monroe he took on board three hundred and fifty Massachusetts volunteers, under Colonel David W. Wardrop, the first regiment detailed for service from that

HIRAM PAULDING.

State, who had arrived that day. He reached Norfolk just as the scuttling of the vessels was completed. But for that act every vessel afloat might have been saved.

Paulding saw at a glance the fatal error, if error it was, of McCauley, and also that much more than scuttling must be done to render the ships useless to the insurgents. He also perceived that with only the Pawnee and Cumberland, and the very small land force at his command, he could not defend the Navy Yard; so, using the discretionary power with which he was clothed, he at once prepared to burn the slowly sinking ships, destroy the cannon, and commit to the flames all the buildings and public property in

396

BURNING OF THE GOSPORT NAVY YARD.

the Navy Yard, leaving the insurgents nothing worth contending for. One hundred men were sent, under Lieutenant J. H. Russell, with sledge-hammers, to knock off the trunnions of the cannon; Captain Charles Wilkes was intrusted with the destruction of the Dry-dock; Commanders Allen and Sands were charged with the firing of the ship-houses, barracks, and other buildings; and Lieutenant Henry A. Wise was directed to lay trains upon the ships and to fire them at a given signal. The trunnions of the Dahlgren guns resisted the hammers, but those of a large number of the old pattern guns were destroyed. Many of the remainder were spiked, but so indifferently that they were soon repaired. Commander Rogers and Captain Wright, of the Engineers, volunteered to blow up and destroy the Drydock.

a April 21,

1861.

At about two o'clock in the morning," every thing was in readiness. The troops, marines, sailors, and others at the yard, were taken on board the Pawnee and Cumberland, leaving on shore only as many as were required to start the conflagration. At three o'clock, the Yankee, Captain Germain, took the Cumberland in tow; and twenty minutes later Paulding sent up a rocket from the Pawnee, which was the signal for the incendiaries to apply the match. In a few minutes a grand and awful spectacle burst upon the vision of the inhabitants of Norfolk and Portsmouth, and of the country for leagues around. The conflagration, starting simultaneously at different points, became instantly terrific. Its

BURNING OF THE VESSELS AT THE GOSPOET NAVY YARD.1

roar could be heard for miles, and its light was seen far at sea, far up the James and York Rivers, and Chesapeake Bay, and far beyond the Dismal Swamp. The ships and the ship-houses, and other large buildings in the Navy Yard, were involved in one grand ruin. To add to the sublimity of the fiery tempest, frequent discharges were heard from the monster ship-ofthe-line Pennsylvania, as the flames reached her loaded heavy guns.

When the conflagration was fairly under way, the Pawnee and the Cumberland, towed by the Yankee, went down the river, and all who were

This view shows the position of some of the vessels on Sunday morning, the 21st of April. The large vessel on the right is the Pennsylvania. On the extreme left is seen the bow of the United States. In the center is seen the Pawnee steam-frigate, and the Cumberland with the Yankee at her side. This is from a picture in Harper's Weekly, May 11, 1961.

EFFECTS OF THE CONFLAGRATION.

397

left on shore, excepting two, reaching their boats in safety, followed by the light of the great fire, and overtook the Pawnee off Craney Island, where the two vessels broke through the obstructions and proceeded to Hampton Roads. The two officers left behind were Commander Rogers and Captain Wright, who failed to reach the boats. They were arrested after day-dawn and were taken to Norfolk as prisoners of war.

The great object of the conflagration was not fully accomplished. The attempt was, in fact, a failure. The Dry-dock was very little injured. The mechanics' shops and sheds, timber-sheds, ordnance building, foundries, saw

mill, provisions, officers' quarters, and all other buildings in the yard, were saved, excepting the immense ship-houses, the marine barracks, and riggers, sail, and ordnance lofts. The insurgents immediately took possession of all the spared buildings and machinery, the Dry-dock, and the vast number of uninjured cannon, and proceeded at once to make use of them in the work of rebellion. Several of the heavy Dahlgren guns were mounted in battery

along the river-bank, at the Navy Yard, and other places near; and soon afterward the fortifications in the Slave-labor States were supplied with heavy guns from this post. The gain to the insurgents and loss to the National Government, by this abandonment of the Gosport Navy Yard at that time, was incalculable.' The mere money value of the property

1 This picture is from a large sketch made by a young artist, Mr. James E. Taylor, a member of a New York regiment, and kindly placed at my disposal by him.

This picture is also from a sketch by Mr. Taylor. It is a view of a three-gun battery, placed so as to command the approach to the Navy Yard by the Suffolk road.

3 William H. Peter, appointed by the Governor of Virginia a commissioner to make an inventory of the property taken from the National Government at this time, said, that he deemed "it unnecessary to speak of the vast importance to Virginia, and to the entire South, of the timely acquisition of this extensive naval dépôt, since the presence at almost every exposed point on the entire Southern coast, and at numerous inland intrenched