588

SKIRMISH AT BLACKBURN'S FORD.

Ford, taking with him Richardson's brigade, a squadron of cavalry, and Ayres's battery, and holding Sherman's brigade in reserve. He found the Confederates in heavy force. Beauregard, who had been informed of all of McDowell's movements by spies and traitors,' was there, and had ordered up from Manassas some North Carolina and Louisiana troops, who had just arrived there on their way to Winchester. The woods were so thick that his forces were mostly concealed, as well as his batteries, excepting one on an open elevation. Hoping to draw their fire and discover their position, Ayres's battery was placed on a commanding eminence, and a 20-pound cannon, under Lieutenant Edwards, was fired at random. Only the battery in view responded, and grape-shot from it killed two cavalry horses and

wounded two men. Richardson now sent forward the Second Michigan regiment as skirmishers. They were soon engaged in a severe contest in the woods, on a level bottom near the Run. The Third Michigan, First Massachusetts, and Twelfth New York were pushed forward to support the advance, and these, too, were soon fighting severely. The cavalry and two howitzers were now sent forward, and were furiously assailed by musketry in the woods, and at the same time a severe enfilading fire came from a concealed battery on a ridge six hundred yards in front of the Ford. In the mean time, Longstreet had called up some re-enforcements from Early's

1 Washington City, as we have observed, was filled with spies and traitors. Even Cabinet secrets were made known to the Confederates. Information seemed to go out to them regularly from the head-quarters of the General-in-chief. For example, a military map of the region west of Washington had been completed at the War Department only two days before Tyler's advance on Centreville. When the Confederates left there in haste, they left many things behind them. Among these was a copy of that map, which was supposed to be known only to some of the higher officers in the Army.

2 This map shows a geographical plan of the country between Washington City and Manassas Junction. with the roads traversed by the troops, and the relative position of the opposing forces in the skirmish on the 18th of July.

EFFECT OF THE SKIRMISH.

589

brigade, and the Nationals, greatly outnumbered, withdrew behind Ayres's battery on the hill. In this movement, a part of the New York Twelfth were thrown into confusion, but were soon rallied. Just then, Sherman with his brigade came up, having Colonel Corcoran's New York Sixty-ninth in front, when Ayres's battery again opened fire, and an artillery duel was kept up for an hour, the Confederates responding gun for gun. It was now four o'clock in the afternoon. McDowell had just returned from his reconnoissance, satisfied that his plan for turning the Confederate

position was impracticable; and he ordered the whole body to fall back to Centreville.' This severe skirmish was called by the Confederates the BATTLE OF BULL'S RUN, and was claimed by them as a victory. The loss of the combatants was about equal, that of McDowell being seventy-three, and of Beauregard, seventy.'

The affair at Blackburn's Ford elated the Confederates and depressed the Nationals. The loss of life saddened the soldiers and the people at home. Yet the result of that reconnoissance was important and useful, in revealing the strength and excellent equipment of the Confederates, which had been much underrated, and caused that circumspection which prevented the Nationals from being allured, by the appearance of weakness and timidity on the part of their foes, into a fatal snare. It appears to have been a part of Beauregard's plan to entice McDowell, by skirmishes and retreats, across Bull's Run, and when he had placed that stream at the back of his antagonist, to fall upon him, front and flank. For this purpose, he carefully concealed his batteries.

McDowell felt the pressing necessity for an immediate and vigorous. attack on the Confederates. In the course of a few days he might lose full ten thousand of his best troops, in consequence of the expiration of their term of service, while Beauregard's army was daily increasing. He concentrated all of his forces at and around Centreville on the 18th, and made instant preparations for an advance. He had thirty thousand men there, and five thousand more, under Runyon, were within call, guarding his communications with Washington. He caused a thorough reconnoissance to be made on the 19th with the intention of attacking his foe on Saturday, the 20th.

1 Beauregard had made his head-quarters, during the engagement, at the house of Wilmer McLean, near McLean's Ford. Soon after this, when military occupation made that region almost untenable, Mr. McLean went with his family to another part of Virginia, near Appomattox Court House, hoping for quiet. There came the same armies, after a lapse of almost four years, and under his roof Grant and Lee signed articles of capitulation early in April, 1865, for the surrender of the Confederate forces under the latter.

* Report of Colonel Richardson to General Tyler, July 19, 1861; Report of General Tyler to General McDowell, July 27, 1861; Report of General Beauregard to Adjutant-General Cooper, August, 1861; The C. S. A. and The Battle of Bull's Run: a Letter to an English Friend: by Major J. G. Barnard, who was with Tyler's division. The Nationals lost nineteen killed, thirty-eight wounded, and twenty-six missing; the Confederates lost, according to Beauregard's Report, fifteen killed, fifty-three wounded (several of them mortally), and two missing.

590

PREPARATIONS FOR BATTLE.

But his needful supplies did not arrive until Friday night, and he was compelled to remain at Centreville a day longer than he expected to. On that evening, his army began to melt away. The term of service of the Fourth Pennsylvania and Varian's battery of the New York Eighth expired that day, and neither the persuasions of the Commanding General, nor those of the Secretary of War, who was at head-quarters, could induce them to remain. They turned their faces homeward that evening, and a few hours later they heard the thunders of the battle at their backs, in which their brave companions were engaged. On the evening of the 20th, McDowell's force consisted of about twenty-eight thousand men and forty-nine cannon.

The reconnoissance on the 19th satisfied McDowell that an attack on the Confederate front would not be prudent, and he resolved to attempt to turn their left, drive them from the Stone Bridge, where they had a strong battery, force them from the Warrenton Turnpike, and, by a quick movement, seize the Manassas Gap Railway, and thus sever the most important connection between Beauregard and Johnston. For this purpose, Tyler was to move along the Warrenton Turnpike, and open fire on the Confederate left at the Stone Bridge, while Hunter and Heintzelman, with about fifteen thousand men, should make a circuit by a forest road, cross Bull's Run at fords near Sudley Church, and fall upon the flank and rear of the Confederates at the Stone Bridge, where Colonel Evans was in command, with his head-quarters at Van Pelt's. In the mean time, Richardson's brigade was to be temporarily attached to Miles's division, which was left, as a reserve, at Centreville, with orders to strengthen the intrenchments there, and see that the Confederates did not cross Bull's Run, and, by a flank movement, capture the supplies and ammunition of the Nationals there, and cut off their line of retreat. Richardson kept almost the exact And body position occupied by him on the 18th during the artillery duel.

a July 20,
1861.

The

Fully informed of McDowell's force and position by spies and traitors, Beauregard was contemplating an attack upon the Nationals at Centreville at the same time. orders for an advance and attack by McDowell and Beauregard were dated on the same day. The latter ordered the brigades of Ewell and Holmes to cross Bull's Run at Union Mill Ford, to be ready to support the attack on Centreville. The brigades of Jones and Longstreet were directed to cross at McLean's Ford, for the same purpose; while those of Bonham and Bartow were to cross at Mitchell's Ford, and those of Cocke and Evans at the Stone Bridge, and make the direct attack on Centreville. The brigades of Bee and Wilcox, with Stuart's cavalry (among whom was a dashing corps known as the Grayson Dare-devils), with the whole of Walton's New Orleans Battery, were to form a reserve, and to cross at Mitchell's Ford when called for. Confident of success, Beauregard ordered the Fourth

MCDOWELL'S PLAN OF ATTACK.

591

. July, 1861.

and Fifth Divisions of his army "to advance to the attack of Fairfax Court House by way of the Old Braddock Road," "after the fall of Centreville." McDowell issued specific orders on the 20th, for the advance and method of attack by the three divisions chosen for the work. The troops were supplied with three days' rations. The columns were to move at about two o'clock in the morning of Sunday, the 21st. Tyler was to be in position at four o'clock, or daybreak, to menace the Corfederate left at the Stone Bridge, while the real attack was to be made by Hunter and Heintzelman, about two hours later. Every thing was in readiness by midnight. The camp-fires of forty regiments were burning dimly all around Centreville. The full moon was shining brightly. The air was fresh and still. Never was there a midnight more calm and beautiful; never did a Sabbath morning approach with gentler aspect on the face of nature.

McDowell, fearful of unforeseen obstacles, proposed to make a part of the march toward Bull's Run on the evening of the 20th, but he was, unfortunately, overruled by the opinions of others. He was satisfied that Beauregard's army, on the 19th, was inferior to his own; and he had no information of his having been re-enforced. He believed Patterson was holding Johnston at Winchester; and whilst he felt extremely anxious under the weight of responsibility laid upon him, he did not

permit himself to entertain a doubt of his success, if his orders as to time and place should be promptly executed.

But important circumstances, of which McDowell was ignorant, had occurred. When he advanced to Fairfax Court House on the 17th, Beauregard informed the Confederate War Department of the fact, and orders were immediately telegraphed to Johnston for the Army of the Shenandoah to join that of the Potomac at Manassas at once. Johnston received the dispatch at one o'clock on the morning of the 18th. It was necessary to fight and defeat General Patterson or to elude him. The latter was accomplished, and Johnston, with six thousand infantry, reached Manassas Junction at about noon on the 20th. His whole army, excepting about two thousand of his sick and a guard of militia, who had been left at Winchester, had marched by the way of Millwood through Ashby's Gap to Piedmont," whence the infantry were conveyed by railway, while the cavalry and artillery, because of a lack of rolling stock on the road, were compelled to continue their march as before. Johnston's six thousand made Beauregard's army stronger

JOSEPHI E JOHNSTON.

1 Beauregard's special and confidential orders, dated "Head-Quarters Army of the Potomac, July 20, 1861." 2 See map on page 586.

* See map on page 586. Beauregard sent Colonel Chisholm, one of his aids, to meet Johnston, and suggest the propriety of his sending down a part of his force by the way of Aldie, to fall upon the flank and rear of the Nationala at Centreville. Lack of transportation prevented that movement. See Beauregard's Report, August 26, 1861. 4 This technical term means the engines and cars, with their appurtenances.

592

MOVEMENTS OF THE OPPOSING ARMIES.

than McDowell's by at least four thousand men. He was the senior officer, and took the chief command of the army. He approved of Beauregard'splan for an attack on the left wing of the Nationals; and both generals, before daybreak on the morning of the 21st, made active preparations for its execution. A few hours later the Confederates, instead of being the aggressors, were fighting on the defensive on their side of Bull's Run. The general disposition of the Confederate army on the 21st was nearly the same as on the 18th.' The arrival of re-enforcements, and preparations for the attack on the National left, had made some changes. The detachments of the brigades of Bee of South Carolina, and Bartow of Georgia, that came from the Shenandoah Valley with Johnston, about three thousand in number, had been placed in reserve between McLean's and Blackburn's Fords; and Colonel Cocke's brigade, with which were connected two companies of cavalry and a battery of four 6-pounders, occupied a line in front of Bull's Run, below the Stone Bridge, to guard Island, Ball's, and Lewis's Fords. Three hundred of Stuart's

a July 1861.

cavalry, of the Army of the Shenandoah, and

wow two companies of Radford's cavalry, were in

FOURTEENTH VIRGINIA CAVALRY.

reserve not far from Mitchell's Ford. Near them was a small brigade under General Holmes, and some cavalry."

1861.

The three divisions of the National army moved from Centreville in the bright moonlight at the appointed hour. They advanced slowly, for raw troops were diffi6 July 21, cult to handle. After crossing Cub Run, Hunter and Heintzelman turned into the road to the right that led through the "Big Woods," whilst Tyler moved along the Warrenton turnpike directly toward the Stone Bridge, with the brigades of Schenck and Sherman, leaving Keyes to watch the road that came up from Manassas, and Richardson to co-operate with Miles in keeping ward over Blackburn's Ford and vicinity, on the extreme

left. Tyler's division was accompanied by the batteries of Ayres and Carlisle; and its first business was to make a feigned attack near the bridge at dawn, to deceive the foe and divert his attention until Hunter and Heintzelman should fall upon the flank and rear of his left wing. McDowell, who was ill, had followed the columns from Centreville in a carriage, and he took a position at the junction of the turnpike and the forest road, where he might be in quick communication with all his forces.

These movements were all much slower than had been calculated upon, and the mistake in not making an advance the previous evening was soon painfully apparent. The advantage of a surprise was lost. It was half-past six o'clock, when the sun had been shining on the Stone Bridge nearly two hours, before Tyler was ready to open fire on the Confederates there; and

1 See note 2 on page 585.

? Beauregard's Report, Angust 26, 1861.