EXPEDITION INTO MISSISSIPPI. April 13, 1864. 247 On the day after the capture of Fort Pillow, Buford appeared before Columbus, and, in imitation of his chief, demanded an unconditional surrender, saying: "Should you surrender, the negroes now in arms will be returned to their masters. Should I be compelled to take the place by force, no quarter will be shown negro troops whatever." The demand was refused. Buford did not attack, but, with Forrest, retreated rapidly out of Tennessee, on hearing that General S. D. Sturgis (who had come down from East Tennessee), with a heavy force, was about to march from Memphis to intercept him. It was soon found that the practice of the indiscriminate slaughter of prisoners, which Forrest inaugurated for the purpose of intimidating the negroes and preventing their enlistment in the National armies, had an opposite effect, and was likely to react with fearful power; so it was abandoned. ⚫ April 30. June 10. He Sturgis did not move from Memphis in time to intercept Forrest. marched out to Bolivar with about twelve thousand men, but his intended prey had already escaped across the Wolf River, and was safe in Northern Mississippi with his plunder. Several weeks later, when it was known that Forrest was gathering a larger force than he had ever before commanded, for the purpose, it was supposed, of either making another raid into Tennessee and Kentucky, or re-enforcing Johnston, then contending hotly with Sherman in Northern Georgia, Sturgis started from Memphis with a force of nine thousand infantry and artillery, and three thousand cavalry under General Grierson (including a greater portion of General A. J. Smith's corps, lately returned from the Red River region), with instructions to hunt up and beat the bold cavalry leader. Sturgis pushed in a southeasterly direction, and struck the Mobile and Ohio railway near Gun Town. Grierson, in advance with the cavalry, there met a large force of Forrest's horsemen, and pushed them back to their infantry supports, when they took a strong position for battle on a commanding ridge. Grierson had sent back word to Sturgis, six miles in the rear, of the situation of matters at the front, when that commander pushed forward the infantry at double-quick, under a blazing sun, and with them a train of about two hundred wagons. Finding Grierson hotly engaged, the exhausted infantry, without being allowed time to rest, or be properly formed in battle order, were thrown into the fight directly in front, no attempt being made to turn the flank of the Confederates. The result was most disastrous. The whole National force were speedily routed, and their wagon-train, which had been parked within range of Forrest's guns, was captured and lost. The vanquished troops were driven in wild confusion over a narrow and ugly road, without supplies, and with no re-enforcements near, covered, as well as possible, by the Second Brigade, under Colonel Winslow, which formed the rear-guard. The pursuit was close and galling, until the fugitives crossed a stream at Ripley, where they turned upon the pursuers, and gave battle. The struggle was fierce for awhile, and was favorable to the Nationals; and thereafter the retreat was less fatiguing, because the chase was less vigorous and more cautious. When Sturgis returned to Memphis he found his army full three thousand five hundred less in number than when he left, and stripped of almost every thing but their arms. June 10. This disastrous failure produced alarm and indignation, and another 248 ⚫ July, 1864. ⚫ July 14. ⚫ August 4. FORREST DASHES INTO MEMPHIS. expedition was speedily fitted out for the purpose of wiping out the disgrace and accomplishing the object sought for. It was estimated that Forrest had about fourteen thousand troops under him, with his head-quarters in the neighborhood of Tupelo, and in that direction, from Salisbury, fifty miles east of Memphis, General A. J. Smith marched with about twelve thousand men, early in July. He met Forrest's cavalry at the outset, and skirmished with them nearly all the way to Tupelo, on the Mobile and Ohio railway, where the Confederate leader had made up his mind to give battle. The expedition arrived at Pontotoc, west of Tupelo, on the 12th,* and when moving forward the next morning, General Mower's train was attacked by a large body of cavalry. These were repulsed, and the expedition moved on, and when, the next day, it approached Tupelo, Forrest's infantry, in heavy numbers, attacked the line. They were repulsed, after a sharp battle. The assault was repeated on the same day,' with a similar result, when the Confederates were driven, leaving on the field a large number of their dead and badly wounded comrades. Smith pushed no farther southward at that time, but, after a pretty severe cavalry fight the next day at Old Town Creek, he retraced his steps, and encamped his troops not far from Memphis. There he allowed them to rest about three weeks, when, with ten thousand men, he again moved for Mississippi. He penetrated that State as far as the Tallahatchie, which he reached on the 17th, but found only a few Confederate cavalry to oppose him. Forrest's men were not there. Where could they be? was a perplexing question. The bold leader himself answered it, by dashing into Memphis at dawn on the morning of the 21st of August, and making directly for the Gayoso House, where, according to information furnished by spies, he might expect to find Generals Hurlbut, Washburne, and Buckland, it being their quarters. He failed to secure his hoped-for prizes. but seized and carried away several of their staff-officers, and about three hundred soldiers as prisoners. He hoped to open the doors of the prison there, in which Confederate captives were confined, but pressing necessity made his stay too short to perform that achievement, and within an hour after entering the city he was driven out of it, carrying away his prisoners and some plunder, but losing there, and in a sharp skirmish a short distance from the town, about two hundred men. His exploit was a bold and brilInformed that Smith was in Mississippi looking for him, and believing that Memphis was nearly bare of troops, he flanked the National force with three thousand of his best horsemen, performed the feat here recorded, and then retreated to his starting-place, notwithstanding there were about six thousand troops in and around Memphis. And so it was that For rest performed his prescribed duty in keeping re-enforcements from the National army in Northern Georgia, in the spring and summer of 1864. liant one. As we have from time to time, in these pages, noticed the employment of negro troops, and in this chapter have observed how the Confederates were disposed to treat them, it seems to be an appropriate place here to give, in a few sentences, a history of the measure. During the white-heat of patriotic zeal that immediately succeeded the attack on Fort Sumter, and the massacre of troops in Baltimore, a few col ored men in New York City, catching inspiration from the military move ORGANIZATION OF NEGRO TROOPS. 249 ments around them, hired a room and began to drill, thinking their services might be wanted. The Superintendent of Police found it necessary, because of threats made by sympathizers with the insurgents, to order the colored people to desist, lest their patriotism should cause a breach of the public peace. So they waited until called for. More than a year later, General Hunter, as we have seen,' directed the organization of negro regiments in his Department of the South. It raised a storm of indignation in Congress, and Wickliffe, of Kentucky, asked the Secretary of War, through a resolution of the House of Representatives, several questions touching such a measure, and, among others, whether Hunter had organized a regiment composed of fugitive slaves, and whether he was authorized to do so by the Government. The Secretary answered that he was not authorized to do so, and allowed General Hunter to make explicit answers.' Yet a few weeks later Secretary Stanton, by special order, directed General Rufus Saxton, Military Governor of the sea-coast islands, to "arm, uniform, equip, and receive into the service of the United States, such number of volunteers of African descent, not exceeding five thousand," as he might deem expedient to guard that region and the inhabitants from injury by the public enemy a • Aug. 25, 1862. July 30. Then followed a proposition from General G. W. Phelps to General Butler, his chief, to organize negro regiments in Louisiana, to be composed of the fugitive slaves who were flocking to his camp at Carrollton, near New Orleans. Receiving no reply, he made a requisition' for arms and clothing for "three regiments of Africans," to be employed in defending his post. Butler had no authority to comply, and told Phelps to employ them in cutting trees and constructing abatis. "I am not willing to become the mere slave-driver you propose, having no qualifications that way," Phelps replied, and, throwing up his commission, returned to Vermont. Not long afterward, General Butler, impressed with the perils of his isolated situation, called for volunteers from the free colored men in New Orleans, and within a fortnight a full regiment was organized. A second was soon in arms, and very speedily a third; and these were the colored troops whom Butler turned over to his successor, General Banks, as we have observed on page 352, volume II. Another year passed by, and yet few of the thousands of negroes freed by the President's Proclamation were found in arms. There was a universal prejudice against them. Yet, as the war was assuming vaster proportions, and a draft was found to be inevitable, that prejudice, which had been growing weaker for a long time, gave way entirely, and, when Lee invaded Pennsylvania, the Government authorized the enlistment of colored troops in the Free-labor States, as we have observed. Congress speedily authorized the President to accept them as volunteers, and prescribed that "the enrollment of the militia shall in all cases include all able-bodied male citizens," &c., without distinction of color. Yet 1 Page 185. * July 16, 1863. 2 General Hunter said: "To the first question, I reply, that no regiment of 'fugitive slaves' has been or is being organized in this Department. There is, however, a fine regiment of persons whose late masters are fugitive rebels-men who everywhere fly before the appearance of the National flag, leaving their servants behind them to shift as best they can for themselves." See note 1, page 91. 250 NEGROES EMPLOYED IN THE WAR. opposition to the enlistment of negro soldiers was very strong. It was illustrated by the fact that, when, in May, 1863, the Fifty-fourth (colored) Massachusetts, which performed such gallant acts at Fort Wagner under Colonel Shaw,' was ready to start for South Carolina, the Superintendent of the Police of New York declared, in answer to a question, that they could not be protected from insult in that city, if they should attempt to pass through it. So they sailed directly from Boston for Port Royal. But there was soon a change of public sentiment on the subject there, a few months later, as we have observed,' when a regiment of colored troops, bearing a flag presented by the women of the city and cheered by thousands, marched through its streets for the battle-field. From that time such troops were freely enlisted everywhere, and as freely used; and the universal testimony of experts is, that as soldiers they were equal to the white men. Nearly two hundred thousand of them fought for the preservation of our free institutions, in which their own race was deeply involved. Their brethren in bondage had been freely used by the Confederates from the beginning of the war, not as soldiers, but as laborers, as we have observed. We frequently saw notices of their enrollment into the military service of the Conspirators, but arms were never put into their hands. It would have been a fatal experiment, and the Oligarchy knew it. They were organized into companies, under white leaders, but were always "armed and equipped with shovels, axes, spades, pickaxes, and blankets." Such employment of the colored race by the Confederates, in carrying on the war, was well known, yet the Opposition in Congress and elsewhere most strenuously opposed their enlistment as soldiers; but the Government went steadily forward in the path of prescribed duty, and in March, 1863, Adjutant-General Thomas was sent to the Mississippi Valley for the express purpose of promoting the enlistment of colored troops. In that work he labored zealously. He visited Memphis, Helena, Vicksburg, and other places where large numbers of colored people were gathered, and he addressed them on the subject of emancipation, their duties as citizens, and the importance of their doing all in their power to assist the Government in its struggle for life against the common enemy of both. He also addressed the National officers and soldiers in favor of the employment of colored troops, reminding them that the strength of the Confederate cause lay, in a large measure, in the employment of negroes in the cultivation of the soil while the white people were in the army, and showing that it was policy in every way, either by enlisting the negroes in our armies, or otherwise employing them, to deprive the enemies of the Government of the labor of these men. "All of you," he said, "will some day be on picket-duty, and I charge you all, if any of this unfortunate race come within your lines, that you do not turn them away, but receive them kindly and cordially. They are to be encouraged to come to us; they are to be received with open arms; they are to be fed and clothed; they are to be armed." 1 See page 204 See page 91 THE RED RIVER EXPEDITION. 251 CHAPTER IX. THE RED RIVER EXPEDITION. ET us now look across the Mississippi River and see what was occurring there in 1864. • Jan. 28, 1864. We left General Banks at New Orleans, after his failure to "repossess "Texas in the autumn and early winter of 1863, engaged in planning another expedition to that State, the first important work to be the capture of Galveston. While so engaged he received a dispatch from General Halleck, dated the 4th of January, informing him that it was proposed to operate against Texas by the line of the Red River, that route having "the favor of the best military opinions of the generals of the West." Halleck proposed to have the expedition to consist of the forces of Banks and Steele, and such troops as Grant might spare for the winter, to act in combination or in co-operation, together with gun-boats. He informed Banks that both Grant and Steele had been written to, and instructed him to communicate with them upon the subject. The grand object was the capture of Shreveport, on the Red River, near the boundary between Louisiana and Texas; the capture or dispersion of the Confederates in that region, then under General E. Kirby Smith,' as commander of the Trans-Mississippi Department, and then the recovery of Texas and the opening of the way for trade in the immense supplies of cotton in the latter State. The objections to this route, which Banks had hitherto urged, still existed, and he had apprehensions of disastrous results in a campaign without a unity of command and purpose. But so often had this inland route been urged upon him by Halleck, as the most feasible way for winning a conquest of Texas, that he did not feel at liberty to offer serious opposition again; so he promptly replied, on the day when he received Halleck's dispatch, that with the forces proposed the expedition might be successful and important, and that he should cordially co-operate in the movement. He thought it proper, however, to send to the General-in-Chief a memorial prepared by his chief engineer (Major D. C. Houston), on the proposed expedition, in which was explicitly stated the obstructions to be encountered and the measures necessary to accomplish the objects in view. It recommended as indispensable to success: (1.) Such complete preliminary organization as would avoid the least delay in movements after the campaign had opened; (2.) That a line of supply be established from the Mississippi, independent of water-courses, because these would become unmanageable at certain seasons of the year; See page 501, volume IL |