not in another? when the fame end is to be answered thereby. If an honest upright Papift may deceive, may give a falfe tef timony to promote the interest of religion; then why may not an honeft upright Protestant act the same part, to answer the fame end? According to St. Paul's practice, I think, it is plain, that veracity and truth may give place to diffimulation, when the cause of God and religion requires it; then proclamation of a miracle wrought may be made and attefted, if it can be done with fafety, when it may serve to work the conviction of unbelievers; tho', in fact there had been no fuch thing; I fay, according to St. Paul's conduct, this may be done, at leaft, the question is, why should it not? seeing the fame end is ferved in both, veracity and truth are equally violated in both, and one is not more mischievous and hurtful than the other. However, fome of the miracles faid to be wrought by the Church of Rome are not only allowed to have been well attefted, by having men of honesty and integrity for their vouchers; but the facts or miracles themselves are allowed by fome to have been wrought, confonant to fuch atteftation; and thus Popery feems to be

proved,

proved, by the evidence of miracles, to be truth and true religion, whilst it stands condemned as Antichriftian. But then, to avoid this unlucky confequence, and to prevent miracles from being proper evidences in the present cafe, they have been distinguished into miracles of truth and miracles of a lye, which feems to render them ufelefs as evidences. For as no mark attends miracles, by which they may be diftinguished, and certainly known whether they be connected with truth, or falfhood; so no evidence can arife from any miracle for one or the other; and in confequence, the very argument drawn from miracles becomes abortive. From what has been obferved, I think, the miracles faid to be wrought fince the second century, either prove too much, by proving popery to be truth and true Christianity; or else they prove too little, viz. nothing at all in the cafe before us.

UPON the whole of this argument, I obferve, that if miracles are admitted as proper evidences of the truth and divinity of doctrines or propofitions; then they must be fuch evidences to all doctrines and propofitions that have been promulged by the rator, at least, all that have been promulged

ope

by

by him after the excrcife of fuch power. For as miraculous power is not more connected with, relative to, or dependent upon one doctrine or propofition, than upon another; therefore, it feems to follow, that if miracles are proper evidences of the truth and divinity of one doctrine or propofition which hath been promulged by the operator, they, of courfe, become fuch evidences to all other doctrines or propofitions that may be promulged by him. And if this be really the cafe, then whoever works a miracle, does, from that inftant, become both infallible and impeccable, he can neither err himfelf, nor impofe upon others; I fay, this, of neceffity, muft be the cafe. For were it to be admitted, that he who works a miracle, is, after the operation, both fallible and peccable, is liable to err himself, and to impose upon others, then the miracle wrought cannot be a test of truth, because it is not a pledge of the fuperior knowledge and veracity of the promulger, in the cafe to which it is applied, but these must be trufted to, and relied upon, the fame as if no miraculous power had been exercifed at all. exercife of miraculous power does not shew, in the leaft, that the operator has more know

The

ledge

ledge, or is more worthy to be trusted, after the exercise of it than before, or that he is more fo than other men. If it should be faid, that though every miracle-worker is fallible, and therefore is liable to err; yet it may well be expected, that he who is invefted with miraculous or divine power, is invested with fuperior or divine knowledge alfo. Answer: this expectation, according to St. Paul, is groundless; because to one is given the word of knowledge, and to another the working of miracles; fo that the knowledge of him who works a miracle may be as much limited and contracted as the knowledge of other men. The gift of knowledge and the gift of working miracles, as they are diftinct and different in themselves; fo they do not usually, much lefs always, take place in the fame perfon; for to one is given the word of knowledge, to another the working of miracles, faith St. Paul, 1 Cor. xii. 8. 10. If it should be faid, though after the working of a miracle the operator is peccable and liable to impofe; yet God will not suffer miraculous power to be misapplied, because were that the cafe, mankind would be in a most unguarded state, as being thereby greatly expofed to impofition. To

which it may be answered, that when a miracle is once wrought, it must and will be at the option of the operator to apply that power as he pleafes, either well or ill; nor can the Deity otherwise prevent it than by deftroying his being or his agency; and therefore, if this kind of reafoning proves any thing, it proves too much, viz. that miraculous power will not be trufted in human hands, because men shall not have it in their power to impofe upon each other thereby. Befides, the miracles referred to were not confidered to be a teft of truth, at the time when they were wrought; feeing many parties and controverfies took place among Chriftians, whilft (according to the hiftory). the power of working miracles was mightily prefent with them; and yet miracles were not appealed to, nor were thofe controverfies determined thereby, which might eafily have been done, had miracles then been judged to have the nature and force of evidence as aforefaid. One of the principal controverfies that took place among Chrif tians in the apoftolic age was, whether Christianity was a fupplement to Judaism, and was to be grafted upon it; or whether Judaism was to be abolished by the intro$ 2

duction