falfe in fact. For as Chrift's perfon plainly appeared to be his perfon, after the pronunciation of the words before-mentioned, and not that vegetable called a vine; fo the piece of bread referred to plainly appeared to be a piece of bread, after the pronunciation of the words before mentioned, and not the body of Chrift; the body of Chrift being then as diftinct from it, and independent of it, as any two things in nature could be. Upon the whole of what I have observed, I think, it appears, that we ought to read the hiftories of Chrift's life and miniftry with care and caution; and not go haftily into the belief of every doctrine that

may be built upon the figurative language

which he used.

THE like care and caution must also be

used with respect to the preceptive parts of Chrift's difcourfes, for otherwife we are in danger of being misled by them in points of practice. Thus, in Chrift's fermon on the mount, he obferved, that it had been faid, an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth. To which he adds, by way of oppofition, feveral precepts of his own. But I fay unto you, that ye refift not evil, but whosoever Shall Jmite thee on thy right cheek, turn to VOL. II.

X

him.

him the other alfo. And if a man will fue thee at the law, and take away thy coat, let him have thy cloak alfo.

compel thee to go a mile,

And whosoever shall

go with him twain.

Give to him that asketh thee; and to him that would borrow of thee,

turn not thou away. Here, we fee, are feveral general precepts given, without any restriction or limitation; and in that view of them they are without any rule or reafon. For as a man may ask who ought to give, and borrow who ought to lend; fo to give, or lend to fuch a man, cannot be right, but wrong; as he is not the object of those favours, and as it ferves to gratify his covetous defires. Befides, breach for breach, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, feems to be a fair and equitable rule of civil refentment, * which was appointed by the Jewish law (Leviticus xxiv. 20.) and therefore, if by not refifting evil, which our Lord hath put in oppofition to it, be meant that all civil resentment

;

*The law, here referred to, was fo far equitable, as that it made the punishment to be the fame, both in kind and degree, as the injury done; but then, fome think that fuch equality was too mild and gentle to anfwer the end of punishment, viz. the reftraining men from being guilty of fuch offences; and therefore, the punishment ought to have been more fevere to make it anfwer that purpofe.

refentment fhould be laid afide, as fome of his followers have taught, and as his words may feem to imply; then this precept is greatly injurious to mankind, as it faps the foundations of civil fociety, and renders it in a great measure useless, by laying open the weak innocent part of our fpecies to the ravages of the more favage and powerful.. Moreover, as to thofe injunctions by which we are required to turn the left cheek, after our having been fmote upon the right; our being ready to part with another garment, after one has been taken from us; and of our going a fecond mile, after our having been compelled to go a first; we must of neceffity have recourse to a prior rule of action to understand and interpret those precepts by, otherwise we are in great danger of being misled by them. Evil is the proper object of our averfion, and as fuch we ought to avoid it; and therefore, if one evil be forced upon us, it cannot, I think, be our duty to be volunteers with regard to a fecond, which feems to be required here, thofe precepts being exprefs and pofitive. If our neighbour has done us an injury, this, furely, ought to put us upon our guard, in order to prevent him from repeating his ill

X 2

ufage

ufage of us (according to the advice given, Matt. x. 23. When they perfecute ye in one city, flee into another.). And not be a reafon to us voluntarily to offer ourselves to his infults, or any injurious treatment whatfoever. If a man's houfe fhould be broken into, and part of his goods to be conveyed off in one night; that, furely, cannot be a proper reafon for him to leave open his doors the next night, that fo the thief may carry off the rest of his goods with lefs trouble. Again, Chrift obferved that it had been faid, thou shalt love thy neighbour, and hate thine enemy. To which he added, by way of oppofition, feveral precepts But I fay unto you, love your enemies, bless them that curfe you, do good to them that hate you, and pray for them which defpitefully ufe you and perfecute you. Here by the term neighbour, I think, must be meant friend, or one who performs kind and friendly offices to a man, and not one who is neighbour with respect to the place of his abode; because with regard to the latter, the fame man may be both neighbour and enemy, and then the precept would require the loving and hating the fame perfon, which is not likely to be the cafe. Besides,

of his own.

the

the word neighbour, in the latter refpect, does not stand oppofed to enemy, but to ftranger, and then the precept, when properly expreffed, would ftand thus, [thou shalt Love thy neighbour, and hate the stranger ;] but this, I think, could not be the meaning of the precept, because the being a stranger does not render a man the proper object of our averfion or hatred; fo that the word neighbour, I think, is only applicable to a friend, like as he was a neighbour to the man that had fallen among thieves, (Luke x. 36, 37.) who had fhewed mercy to him, though with respect to his abode he was a stranger, as being an inhabitant of Samaria, or of fome country whereof Samaria was, or had been the metropolis. And in this view of the cafe, to love or take complacency in a person who had been our friend, and to hate or diflike a perfon who had caufelefly ufed us ill, is to follow nature, by placing our affections upon their proper objects; and confequently, fuch a precept must be, at all times, and under all difpenfations, fit and proper. And as to what is, or at least seems to be put in oppofition to this precept, I observe, that though it is our duty, at all times, to pity, and in confequence thereof, to defire