us begin then at the Head, and fo may we fet every Virtue, and every Grace in its due Order.

*

I CANNOT here help observing of Archbishop Tillotson, whofe Objection I am now answering, That that great and good Man, and, for the moft part, excellent Divine, was not altogether fo accurate in his Notions of the Inftrumentality of fome Virtues to others, as might have been with'd. He has a pointed Saying in one of his Sermons: To feparate Goodness and Mercy from God, Compaffion and Charity from Religion, is to make the two beft Things in the World, God and Religion, good for nothing. He has another near akin to it, a little lower in the fame Page. What is Religion good for, but to reform the Manners and Difpofitions of Men, to refrain Human Nature from Violence and Cruelty, from Falfbood and Treachery, from Sedition and Rebellion ? The Thought is free and bold, and, probably, in fome measure shocking to many a serious Reader, who may fufpect there is something amifs in it, though it is not presently perceived where the Fault lies. The Truth is, there is an ύσερον, πρότερον, there is a fubjecting the Laws of the first to the Laws of the Second Table; there lies one Impropriety: And further, God the ultimate End of all, and to whom all Things are to be ultimately referred, is confidered here as fubfervient to Man, or to the Creatures, as if they were the End, and God was to be referred to them. I cannot say but

Tillotson's Serm. xix. Vol.i. p.206. fol.

the

the Turn is pretty, and furprizing, as an úμ gov: But it might as well have been spared in fo ferious a Subject, where it much concerns us to have strict and juft Notions, and not to confound Ideas. The Love of God is the Root of all Virtue, and into that all Virtue refolves. Piety is not inftrumental to focial Virtues, but it is the Source and Fountain from whence they flow. We are to be trained up to focial Virtues here, in order to a focial Life both in this World and the next: But the Head of all Society is God. The Duties that directly terminate in him, are the prime Duties: And then focial Virtues towards Men, fpringing from the other, and fubordinate alfo to the other, follow in their Place. God may in, fome fpecial Cafes, dispense with our immediate Services to him, to give us Leifure to serve Mankind, and may accept it in fuch Circumstances, as the most valuable Service: But still abfolutely speaking, his immediate Service is first in Order, and first in Dignity, and firft in Obligation, because all the reft depend upon it, and are wrapped up in it. I have spent the more Pains in anfwering this first Objection, because it is in a Manner all; for the reft are little more than feveral Changes upon it. But I pafs on.

2. Ir is pleaded in the Answer to the Remarks, That Moral Virtues are the exact Imitation of God bimfelf: And what can make a reasonable Creature acceptable to God, but the Imitation of

Anfwer, &c. p. 72.

G

God?

God? But there is fomething previous to the imitating of God, and more acceptable to him, which is obeying him: Otherwife the Duties of the firft Table would be fet behind the fecond. We may endeavour, faintly to imitate God in our Benevolence towards Man; but the Love of God, and all the Duties which a Creature owes immediately to his Creator, are the prime Duties: And they are more strictly and properly the Business of every Creature, than imitating God. To imitate his Example, is paying him a dutiful Respect; but submitting to his Authority in all Things, is most highly honouring him, and fhews the profoundest Reverence, Refignation, and Humility.

3. I HAVE met with a more direct and a clofer Argument, for giving the Preference to moral Duties above pofitive, and it is this: That pofitive Duties have Command only to inforce them, but moral Duties are founded upon Command as well as the other, and upon eternal Reafons too. To which I anfwer, that I know not whether many, or any pofitive Duties are fo founded upon mere Command as the Objection fuppofes. Indeed the Command makes the Obligation upon us; but who knows what Reasons infinite Wisdom may have for it, or what weighty Confequences may hang upon it? Befides, the Reafons of many moral Duties, ftrictly speaking, terminate in this Life, as the Duties themfelves do, feeding the Hungry, cloathing the Naked, &c. Only

Only the general Reasons, or Duties, Love of God, and Love of Man, abide for ever: And into these general Reasons all Obedience to pofitive as well as to moral Precepts, refolves. To this I may add, that Obedience to either, equally, or indifferently, qualifies a Man for the Enjoyment of God, equally cherishes good Difpofitions, equally perfects Man's Nature, and is fitted to raise Men up to an eternal and heavenly State; fo that Obedience to pofitive Duties is plainly founded in eternal Reasons, though the Matter of them be in itself indifferent. For it is an eternal Principle that God must be obey'd in every Thing.

4. ANOTHER Argument of like kind occurs in a late thoughtful Writer, whom I have before mention'd, and it is thus: * Our Obligation by the Laws of Nature and Reafon, are founded on the Nature of God and our felves, and the neceffary Relation between him and us, which renders the Matter of them neceffarily good; whereas our Obligation by pofitive Precepts is founded on the free Pleasure of God, commanding Things which had no moral Goodness in themselves, but were of an indifferent Nature. But the ingenious Author mistakes in thinking that any Actions as to their Matter, have any moral Goodness in them. They have a natural Tendency to promote the common Happiness, which natural Goodness, or Use rather, they retain when performed by Hypocrites, without any moral Goodnefs at all. Moral Goodnefs, in us, is chufing and performing those bene

G 2

*Colliber of Revealed Religion, p. 150.

ficial

ficial Actions upon a Principle of Obedience, and out of Love to God. And there is just the fame moral Goodness in obeying God, though the Matter of it be otherwife indifferent: And the eternal or unchangeable Obligation that every Creature lies under to obey his Creator in every Thing, makes it as neceffary for him to obey in one Case as in the other: And then all the Question is, which of the two Precepts, in the present Circumstances, God most infists upon, or which, upon the Whole carries the most diffufive and durable Good in it. God's Authority is a tender Point; and if that may be more hurt by disobeying a pofitive Precept (as in fome Cafes it may) than by disobeying a moral One, the common Good will fuffer more by the former, than it would by the latter. I grant we are in all Cafes to be determined by the Importance of the Precept; but then, as I have often faid, the Importance is to be judged of, not by a Precept being moral or pofitive, but by a due Confideration of all Circumftances, upon a serious and an extended View of what relates both to this World and the other.

HAVING thus finished what I intended upon the general Queftion, relating to pofitive and moral Institutions at large, I may now proceed to the particular Questions which concern the two Sacraments,

CHAP.