very

what is fit to be done, without inquiring whether it be fit for Caius, or Titius to do it: Which is a ftrange Omiffion in them. All that these general Fitnesses mean, is, that they are good for Mankind, and that the Obfervance of them promotes the common Happiness: And yet it is certain that every Man may, muft, and cannot but pursue his own Happiness, and flee Mifery as fuch. It is fitting, and reasonable, and juft, that a Man fhould love and ferve himself, equally at least with others: And it is unfitting, unreasonable, and unjuft (were it practicable) for a Man to love his Neighbour better than himfelf. There is no Wisdom, or Virtue, in being wife for others only, and not for one's felf alfo, firft or laft: Neither can any Man be obliged to it. Well then, let us imagine Fitnesses to be the Rule to go by, and no Deity at the Head of them,to bind and inforce them *: It may be fit for a Man to obferve them as far as is confiftent, or co-incident with his Temporal Happiness: And that will be no Virtue, nor Duty,but Self-Intereft only, and Love of theWorld. But if he proceeds farther to facrifice his own

tem

Ifthæc porrò præcepta, etfi manifeftam habeant utilitatem, tamen ut eadem vim Legis obtineant, neceffum eft præfupponi Deum effe, & fua providentia omnia regere; eundemque Mortalium generi injunxiffe, ut ifta rationis dictamina tanquam Leges, ab ipfo, vi congeniti Luminis promulgatas, obfervent. Aliàs enim poffent ea quidem fortaffe obfervari intuitu utilitatis, (ficut quæ à medicis regendæ valetudini præfcribuntur) non autem tanquam Leges; quippè quæ neceffario ponunt fuperiorem, & quidem talem qui alteriùs gubernationem actu fufceperit.

Puffendorf. de Offic. Hom. &c. Lib. i. c. 3. p. 22,

temporal Happiness to the Public, that indeed will be Virtue and Duty on the Supposition that God requires it, but without it, it is Folly and Madness. There is neither Prudence, nor good Senfe, and confequently no Virtue, in preferring the Happiness of others abfolutely to our own; that is to fay, without Profpect of a future Equivalent. But if God commands us to poftpone our present Intereft, Honour, or Pleasure to publick Confiderations, it is then fitting and reasonable fo to do; because God by engaging us to it, becomes our Security that we fhall not finally, or in the last Result, be Lofers by it. What would otherwise be Folly, now commences Duty and Virtue, and puts on Obligation. If God commands it, He binds us, He obliges us to it, by connecting our true and certain Happiness with it. When we fubmit to temporal Pains, Self-Denials, Reftraints, Loffes, Damages, &c. for the publick Good, this is properly Virtue: And yet this is not Virtue unless God commands it, because That alone can make it, in our Circumstances, rational, fitting,or fafe,to do it. In God all Happiness centers: Him we can wisely follow and obey, because in Him we have all, and he cannot deceive us. Here is a Foundation for real Virtue, which without him is bare. ly nominal, or notional *, and indeed no Virtue,

Without the Divinity, Duty, Obligation, Right, are, to fpeak the Truth, but fine Ideas which may please the Mind, but will never touch the Heart; and which in themfelves confidered,

can

were it practicable. From these Principles it follows, that Virtue and Religion are but two Names for the fame Thing: And Both of them refolve into Obedience to God*: The Neceffity of which, or Obligation thereto, refolves into the Neceffity we are under, as rational, and thinking Beings, to pursue our own most true, and lafting Happiness.

How well this tallies with the Scripture Account of Virtue, is very evident. Our Lord himself has frequently obferved, that all good Offices done to others, for temporal Ends only, have no Virtue in them. To do Good to those that will do Good to us, and to lend to thofe of whom we hope to receive, what is it but Traffick, and Merchandife? To pray, or to give Alms, and the like, only to be heard and feen of Men, what is it but to feek Honour of Men? There is no Virtue in thefe Things, however serviceable the outward Acts are to the World. Heathens and Publicans can do thus: It is Pagan Morality, which

can never lay us under an indifpenfable Neceffity of acting or not acting after a certain Manner. To give these Ideas all the Force they are capable of, to make them able to keep their Ground against the Paffions, and private Interefts, it is neceffary there fhould be a fuperior Being more powerful than we are, which may compel us to conform our felves to them invariably in our Conduct, that may bind us fo, that it may not be in our Power to difengage our felves at Pleafure; in a Word, that may lay us under an Obligation properly fo called, to follow the Light of our own Reason. Barbeyrac's Spirit of Ecclefiaft. p. 2, 3.

* Certainly, to obey the Law which the Author of his Being has given him, is Religion: And to obey the Law which he has given or revealed to him, by making it to refult from the right Ufe of his natural Faculties, must be to him his natural Religion. And its trueft Definition is, The Pursuit of Happiness by the Pras nice of Region and Truth. Wollaflon's Relig of Nat. p. 52.

which perhaps rarely rifes higher. But Virtue is quite another Thing, looks beyond this World, and refts in God alone. It is fubmitting to prefent Restraints and Self-denials, and trufting in God only for our Recompence. Accordingly, all the bright Examples of Virtue recorded in facred Story, are reprefented as terminating in Faith and Hope towards God: See particularly, the eleventh Chapter of the Epistle to the Her brews, where this Doctrine is fo plain, that nothing can be more fo. I fay then, that the Love of God is Virtue, and is Duty, and the Sum-total of Both. Any other pretended Virtue not centring in that, is either unintelligible, or impracticable. It is in vain then to talk of obligatory Fitneffes, previous to divine Laws. The Fitnefs of every Action depends upon the right adjusting of all Circumstances, and particularly the Circumstances which the Agent himself is under. It is fit for God alone, it is his pecuPrerogative and Perfection, to adhere constantly to the Rules of Truth and Goodness, without Obligation, without Law. He is out of the Reach of Pain and Misery; and his Happiness can never interfere with the common Felicity. But Creatures may run Rifques (all Creatures, more or lefs) and want both to be bound by Law, and to be fecured by the fame, as often as their temporal Happiness may interfere with the publick Intereft. In fuch Cafes, the Rules of Virtue would be no Rules to Them, because not rea-. fonable in their Circumstances, till God by an

nexing Happiness and Misery to the Obfervance and Non-obfervance of them, turns the Scale, and makes them eligible, fit to be practis'd in all Circumftances whatever. Thus Virtue is rendered obligatory to all Creatures, and indeed is made Virtue to them (as I have before hinted) when it would be otherwife Folly and Distraction. Having, I prefume, thus competently fix'd our Principles, and fet Morality upon its true Bafis, Objections to the contrary, being founded in falfe Principles, fall of Course. But fill, rather than be wanting in any Thing that may serve to clear up this important Point to the meanest Capacities, I fhall confider and answer the principal Objections, and then take leave of this Article.

1. It is objected, that the Confequence of our Doctrine is, that it was the arbitrary Will of God, whether even Vice, with all its Deformities, might not have been equally valued by Him, as Virtue is.* As wide a Confequence as ever was drawn. Obligation arifes not merely from Command (for every Command would not make it) but from the Command of fo great and fo good a Being, in whom all Happiness is fuppofed to center. If he could command me to be falfe, he might himself be false alfo, and not be what he is; and then his Command would have no Weight in it, nor carry any Obligation with it, because I could not truft or confide in him.

*Defence of the Anfwer, p. 12)

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