the people to new attempts, which it was, nơ doubt, the clergy's duty to endeavour to prevent; though fome of them, for want of knowledge in temporal affairs, and others, perhaps, from a worfe principle, proceeded upon a topic, that, ftrictly followed, would enflave all mankind.

It

Among other theological arguments made ufe of in thofe times, in praise of monarchy, and juftification of abfolute obedience to a prince, there feemed to be one of a fingular nature. was urged, That heaven was governed by a monarch, who had none to control his power, but was abfolutely obeyed: then it followed, that earthly governments were the more perfect, the nearer they imitated the government in heaven. All which I look upon as the strongest argument against defpotic power that ever was offered; fince no reafon can poffibly be affigned, why it is beft for the world, that God Almighty hath such a power, which doth not directly prove, that no mortal man fhould ever have the like.

But though a church-of-England man thinks every fpecies of government equally lawful, he does not think them equally expedient; or for every country indifferently. There may be fomething in the climate naturally difpofing men towards one fort of obedience; as it is manifest all over Afia, where we never read of any commonwealth, except fome fmall ones on the western coafts, established by the Greeks. There may be a great deal in the fituation of a country, and

in

in the present genius of the people. It hath been obferved, that the temperate climates ufually run into moderate governments, and the extremes into defpotic power. It is a remark of Hobbes, that the youth of England are corrupted in their principles of government, by reading the authors of Greece and Rome, who writ under commonwealths. But it might have been more fairly of fered for the honour of liberty, that, while the reft of the known world was over-run with the arbitrary government of fingle perfons, arts and fciences took their rife, and flourished, only in thofe few small territories where the people were free. And, though learning may continue after liberty is loft, as it did in Rome, for a while, upon the foundations laid under the commonwealth, and the particular patronage of fome emperors, yet it hardly ever began under a tyranny in any nation: because flavery is, of all things, the greateft clog and obftacle to fpeculation. And, indeed, arbitrary power is but the firft natural ftep from anarchy, or the favage life; the adjusting power and freedom, being an effect and confequence of maturer thinking: and this is no where fo duly regulated as in a limited monarchy; because I believe it may pafs for a maxim in ftate, That the adminiftration cannot be placed in too few hands, "nor the legislature in too many. Now, in this ma terial bint, the conftitution of the English government far exceeds all others at this time on the earth; to which the prefent establishment of

the

the church doth fo happily agree, that, I think, whoever is an enemy to either, muft, of neceffity, be fo to both.

He thinks, as our monarchy is conftituted, an bereditary right is much to be preferred before election; because the government here, especially by fome late amendments, is fo regularly difpofed, in all its parts, that it almoft executes itself: and, therefore, upon the death of a prince among us, the adminiftration goes on without any rub or interruption. For the fame reafons, we have. lefs to apprehend from the weakness or fury of our monarchs, who have fuch wife councils to guide the firft, and laws to reftrain the other. And, therefore, this hereditary right should be kept fo facred, as never to break the fucceffion, unless where the preferving it may endanger the conftitution; which is not from any intrinfic merit or unalienable right in a particular family, but to avoid the confequences that ufually attend the ambition of competitors, to which elective kingdoms are exposed; and which is the only obstacle to hinder them from arriving at the greateft perfection that government can poffibly reach. Hence appears the abfurdity of that diftinction between a king de facto, and one de jure, with refpect to For every limited monarch is a king de jure; because he governs by the confent of the whole, which is authority fuflicient to abolish all precedent right. If a king come in by conqueft, he is no longer a limited monarch; if he afterwards

us.

confent:

consent to limitations, he becomes immediately king de jure, for the fame reason.

The great advocates for fucceffion, who affirm it ought not to be violated upon any regard or confideration whatsoever, do infift much upon one argument, that feems to carry little weight. They would have it, that a crown is a prince's birthright, and ought, at leaft, to be as well fecured to him and his pofterity, as the inheritance of any private man; in fhort, that he has the fame title to his kingdom, which every individual has to his property. Now, the confequence of this doctrine must be, that, as a man may find feveral ways to wafte, mifpend, or abuse his patrimony, without being anfwerable to the laws; fo a king may, in like manner, do what he will with his own; that is, he may fquander and mifapply his revenues, and even alienate the crown, without being called to an account by his fubjects. They allow fuch a prince to be guilty, indeed, of much folly and wickednefs; but for these he is anfwerable to God, as every private man must be, that is guilty of mismanagement in his own concerns. Now, the folly of this reasoning will best appear, by applying it in a parallel cafe. Should any man argue, that a physician is fuppofed to understand his own art beft; that the law protects and encourages bis profeffion; and, therefore, although he should manifeftly prefcribe poiJon to all his patients, whereof they should immediately die, he cannot be justly punished, but is

anfwerable

anfwerable only to God: or fhould the fame be offered in behalf of a divine, who would preach against religion and moral duties; in either of these two cafes, every body would find out the fophiftry, and presently answer, That although common men are not exactly skilled in the compofition or application of medicines, or in prefcribing the limits of duty; yet the difference between poisons and remedies is eafily known by their effects; and common reason foon diftinguishes between virtue and vice: and it must be neceffary to forbid both these the further practice of their profeffions, because their crimes are not purely perfonal to the phyfician or the divine, but deftructive to the public. All which is infinitely ftronger in respect to a prince, in whofe good or ill conduct the happiness or misery of a whole nation is included; whereas, it is of fmall confequence to the public, farther than example, how any private person manageth his property.

But, granting that the right of a lineal fucceffor to a crown were upon the fame foot with the property of a subject; ftill it may at any time be transferred by the legislative power, as other properties frequently are. The fupreme power in a ftate can do no wrong; becaufe, whatever that doth, is the action of all: and, when the lawyers apply this maxim to the king, they must understand it only in that fense, as he is administrator of the fupreme power; otherwife it is not univerfally true, but may be controlled in feveral inftances, eafy to produce.

And