And these are the topics we muft proceed upon, to justify our exclufion of the young pretender in France; that of his fufpected birth being merely popular, and therefore not made ufe of, as I remember, fince the revolution, in any fpeech, vote, or proclamation, where there was occafion to mention him.

As to the abdication of King James, which the advocates on that fide look upon to have been forcible and unjust, and consequently void in itfelf, I think a man may observe every article of the English church, without being in much pain about it. It is not unlikely, that all doors were laid open for his departure, and, perhaps, not without the privity of the prince of Orange; as reasonably concluding, that the kingdom might better be fettled in his absence. But, to affirm he had any cause to apprehend the same treatment with his father, is an improbable scandal, flung upon the nation by a few bigotted French fcribblers, or the invidious affertion of a ruined party at home, in the bitternefs of their fouls; not one material circumftance agreeing with those in 1648; and the greatest part of the nation having preserved the utmost horror for that ignominious murder. But whether his removal were caufed by his own fears, or other mens artifices, it is manifeft to me, that, fuppofing the throne to be vacant, which was the foot the nation went upon, the body of the people was thereupon left at liberty to chufe what form of government they pleased, by themselves, or their representatives.

The

The only difficulty of any weight against the proceedings at the revolution, is an obvious objection, to which the writers upon that fubje& have not yet given a direct or fufficient anfwer; as if they were in pain at fome confequences, which they apprehend those of the contrary opinion might draw from it. I will repeat this objection, as it was offered me fome time ago, with all its advantages, by a very pious, learned, and worthy gentleman of the nonjuring party.

The force of his argument turned upon this, That the laws made by the supreme power, cannot, otherwife than by the fupreme power, be annulled That this confifted, in England, of a King, Lords, and Commons, whereof each have a negative voice; no two of them can repeal or enact a law, without confent of the third; much lefs may any one of them be entirely excluded from its part of the legislature, by a vote of the other two That all these maxims were openly violated at the revolution; where an affembly of the nobles and people, not fummoned by the King's writ, (which was an effential part of the conftitution,) and confequently no lawful meeting, did, merely upon their own authority, declare the King to have abdicated, the throne vacant; and gave the crown by a vote to a nephew, when there were three children to inherit; though, by the fundamental laws of the realm, the next heir is

* Mr. Nelson, author of the feasts and fasts of the church of England.

is immediately to fucceed. Neither doth it appear, how a prince's abdication can make any other fort of vacancy in the throne, than would be caused by his death; fince he cannot abdicate for his children, (who claim their right of fucceffion by act of parliament,) otherwife than by his own confent, in form, to a bill from the two houses.

And this is the difficulty that feer's chiefly to flick with the moft reasonable of those, who, from a mere fcruple of conscience, refuse to join with us upon the revolution-principle; but the reft are, I believe, as far from loving arbitrary government as any others can be, who are born under a free conftitution, and are allowed to have the leaft fhare of common good sense.

In this objection, there are two questions included. First, Whether, upon the foot of our conftitution, as it ftood in the reign of the late King James, a king of England may be depofed? The fecond is, Whether the people of England, convened by their own authority, after the king had withdrawn himself in the manner he did, had power to alter the fucceffion ?

As for the first, it is a point I fhall not prefume to determine; and fháll, therefore, only fay, that, to any man who holds the negative, I would demand the liberty of putting the cafe as strongly as I please. I will fuppofe a prince limited by laws like ours, yet running into a thousand caprices of cruelty, like Nero or Caligula; I will fuppofe him to murder his mother and his wife; VOL. II. L

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to commit inceft, to ravish matrons, to blow up the fenate, and burn his metropolis; openly to renounce God and Chrift, and worship the devil: these, and the like exorbitancies, are in the power of a fingle perfon to commit, without the advice of a ministry, or affiftance of an army. And, if fuch a king as I have defcribed, cannot be depofed but by his own confent in parliament, I do not well fee how he can be refifted; or what can be meant by a limited monarchy; or what fignifies the people's confent, in making and repealing laws, if the perfon who adminifters, hath no tie but confcience, and is anfwerable to none but God. I defire no ftronger proof, that an opinion must be false, than to find very great abfurdities annexed to it; and there cannot be greater than in the prefent cafe: for it is not a bare fpeculation, that kings may run into fuch enormities as are above mentioned; the practice may be proved by examples, not only drawn from the firft Cæfars, or later Emperors, but many modern princes of Europe; fuch as, Peter the Cruel, Philip II. of Spain, John Bafilovits of Muscovy; and, in our own nation, king John, Richard III. and Henry VIII. But there cannot be equal abfurdities fuppofed in maintaining the contrary opinion; because it is certain, that princes have it in their power to keep a majority on their fide by any tolerable administration, till provoked by continual oppreffions: no man, indeed, can then anfwer where the madness of the people will stop.

As

As to the fecond part of the objection, Whether the people of England, convened by their own authority, upon king James's precipitate departure, had power to alter the fucceffion?

In answer to this, I think it is manifeft from the practice of the wifeft nations, and who feem to have had the trueft notions of freedom, that when a prince was laid afide for maleadminiftration, the nobles and people, if they thought it neceffary for the public weal, did refume the adminiftration of the fupreme power, (the power itself having been always in them,) and did not only alter the fucceffion, but often the very form.

government too; because they believed there was no natural right in one man to govern another, but that all was by inftitution, force, or confent. Thus, the cities of Greece, when they drove out their tyrannical kings, either chose others from a new family, or abolished the kingly government, and became free ftates. Thus the Romans, upon the expulfion of Tarquin," found it inconvenient for them to be fubject any longer to the pride, the luft, the cruelty and arbitrary will of fingle perfons; and, therefore, by general confent, entirely altered the whole frame of their government. Nor do I find the proceedings of either, in this point, to have been condemned by any hiftorian of the fucceeding ages.

But a great deal hath been already faid by other writers upon this invidious and beaten subject; therefore I fhall let it fall; though the point

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