too difficult or doubtful for us to comprehend or determine, there, confcience is not concerned; because it cannot advise in what it doth not understand, nor decide where it is itself in doubt: but, by God's great mercy, thofe difficult points are never of abfolute neceffity to our falvation. There is likewise another evil, that men often fay, a thing is against their confcience, when really it is not. For instance, ask any of those who differ from the worship established, why they do not come to church? they will fay, they diflike the ceremonies, the prayers, the habits, and the like: and therefore, it goes against their confcience. But they are mistaken; their teacher hath put thofe words into their mouths; for a man's confcience can go no higher than his knowledge; and therefore, till he has thoroughly examined, by fcripture, and the practice of the ancient church, whether thofe points are blameable or no, his conscience cannot poffibly direct him to condemn them. Hence have likewife arifen those mistakes about what is ufually called liberty of conscience; which, properly fpeaking, is no more than a liberty of knowing our own thoughts; which liberty no one can take from us. But -those words have obtained quite different meanings. Liberty of confcience is now-a-days not only understood to be the liberty of believing what men pleafe, but also of endeavouring to pro-. pagate that belief as much as they can, and to overthrow the faith which the laws have already established, and to be rewarded by the public for thofe Q 2. thofe wicked endeavours: and this is the liberty of confcience which the Fanatics are now, openly in the face of the world, endeavouring at with their utmost application. At the fame time, it cannot but be obferved, that thofe very perfons, who, under pretence of a public spirit, and tenderness towards their Chriftian brethren, are fo zealous for fuch a liberty of confcience as this, are, of all others, the leaft tender to those who differ from them in the fmallest point relating to government; and I wish I could not fay, that the majefty of the living God may be offended with more security than the memory of a dead prince. But the wisdom of the world, at prefent, feems to agree with that of the Heathen emperor, who faid, If the gods were offended, it was their own concern, and they were able to vindicate themfelves. But although confcience hath been abused to thofe wicked purposes which I have already related, yet a due regard to the directions it plainly gives us, as well as to its accufations, reproaches, and advices, would be of the greatest use to mankind, both for their prefent welfare and future happiness. Therefore my difcourfe, at this time, fhall be directed to prove to you, that there is no folid, firm foundation for virtue, but on a confcience which is guided by religion. In order to this, I fhall first fhew you the weaknefs and uncertainty of two false principles, which many many people fet up in the place of confcience, for a guide to their actions. The first of these principles, is what the world ufually calls moral honesty. There are some people, who appear very indifferent as to religion, and yet have the repute of being just and fair in their dealings; and these are generally known by the character of good moral men. But now, if you look into the grounds and the motives of such a man's actions, you fhall find them to be no other than his own ease and intereft. For example, you trust a moral man with your money, in the way of trade; you truft another with the defence of your caufe at law; and, perhaps, they both deal juftly with you. Why? not from any regard they have for juftice, but because their fortune depends upon their credit; and a stain of open public dishonesty, must be to their disadvantage. But, let it confift with fuch a man's interest and safety to wrong you, and then it will be impoffible you can have any hold upon him; because there is nothing left to give him a check, or to put in the balance against his profit. For, if he hath nothing to govern himself by, but the apinion of the world; as long as he can conceal his injustice from the world, he thinks he is. fafe. Befides, it is found, by experience, that thofe men who set up for morality, without regard to religion, are generally virtuous but in part: they will be juft in their dealings between man and man; but, if they find themfelves difpofed to. O 3 pride, pride, luft, intemperance, or avarice, they do not think their morality concerned, to check them in any of thefe vices; because it is the great rule of fuch men, that they may lawfully follow the dictates of nature, wherever their fafety, health, and fortune are not injured. So that, upon the whole, there is hardly one vice which a mere moral man may not, upon fome occafions, allow himself to pra&ife. The other falfe principle, which some men fet up in the place of confcience, to be their director in life, is what thofe, who pretend to it, call bo nour. This word is often made the fanction of an oath; it is reckoned a great commendation to be a man of ftrict honour; and it is commonly understood, that a man of honour can never be guilty of a base action. This is usually the style of military men, of perfons with titles, and of others who pretend to birth and quality. It is true, indeed, that, in ancient times, it was univerfally understood, that honour was the reward of virtue; but, if fuch honour as is now-a-days going, will not permit a man to do a base action, it must be allowed, there are very few fuch things. as base actions in nature. No man of honour, as that word is ufually understood, did ever pretend, that his honour obliged him to be chaste or temperate, to pay his creditors, to be ufeful to his country, to do good to mankind, to endeavour to be wife or learned, to regard his word, his promife, or his oath: or, if he hath any of these virtues, virtues, they were never learned in the catechifm' of honour; which contains but two precepts ; the punctual payment of debts contracted at play,. and the right understanding the feveral degrees of an affront, in order to revenge it by the death of an adverfary. But, fuppofe this principle of honour, which fome men fo much boaft of, did really produce more virtues than it ever pretended to; yet, fince the very being of that honour depended upon the breath, the opinion, or the fancy of the people, the virtues derived from it could be of no long or certain duration. For example, fuppofe a man, from a principle of honour, fhould refolve to be juft, or chafte, or temperate, and yet the cenfuring world should take a humour of refufing him those characters, he would then think the obligation at an end. Or, on the other fide, if he thought he could gain honour by the falfeft and vileft action, (which is a cafe that very often happens,) he would then make no fcruple to perform it. And God knows, it would be an unhappy state, to have the religion, the liberty, or the property of a people, lodged in such hands; which, however, hath been too often the cafe. What I have faid upon this principle of honour, may perhaps be thought of small concernment to most of you who are my hearers: however, a caution was not altogether unneceffary; fince there is nothing by which, not only the vulgar, but the honeft tradesman, hath been so much deceived, |