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A DISCOURSE

O F THE

CONTESTS AND DISSENSIONS between the NOBLES and the COMMONS in Athens and Rome; with the Confequences they had upon both thofe States. *

-Si tibi vera videtur,

Dede manus; et, fi falfa eft, accingere contra.

IT

Written in the year 1701.

CHA P. I.

LUCRET.

Tis agreed, that in all government there is. an abfolute unlimited power, which naturally and originally seems to be placed in the whole body, wherever the executive part of it lies. This holds in the body natural; for, wherever we

place

*This difcourfe is a kind of remonstrance in behalf of King. William and his friends, against the proceedings of the House of Commons; and was published during the recefs of parliament in the fummer of 1701, with a view to engage them in milder measures when they should meet again.

At this time, Lewis XIV. was making large strides towards universal monarchy; plots were carrying on at St. Germains; the Dutch had acknowledged the duke of Anjou as king of Spain, and King William was made extremely uneafy, by the violence with which many of his ministers and chief favourites were purfued by the Commons. The King, to appease their refentment, had made several changes in his ministry, and removed some of

his

place the beginning of motion, whether from the head, or the heart, or the animal fpirits in general, the body moves and acts by a confent of all its parts. This unlimited power, placed funda-s mentally in the body of a people, is what the best legiflators of all ages have endeavoured, in their feveral schemes or inftitutions of government, to depofite in fuch hands as would preferve the people from rapine and oppreffion within, as well as violence from without. Moft of them feem to agree in this, that it was a truft too great to be committed to any one man or affembly, and therefore they left the right ftill in the whole body; but the adminiftration, or executive part, in the hands of the one, the few, or the many, into which three powers, all independent bodies of men,

feem

his most faithful fervants from places of the highest trust and dignity. This expedient, however, had proved ineffectual, and the Commons perfifted in their opposition; they began by impeaching William Bentink, Earl of Portland, groom of the stole; and proceeded to the impeachment of John Somers, Baron Somers of Evesham, first lord-keeper, afterwards lord chancellor; Edward Ruffel, Earl of Orford, lord treasurer of the navy, and one of the lords commiffioners of the admiralty; and Charles Montague, Earl of Halifax, one of the commiffioners of the treasury, and afterwards chancellor of the exchequer. Its general purport is, to damp the warmth of the commons, by fhewing, that the meafures they pursued, had a direct tendency to bring on the tyranny, which they profeffed to oppofe; and the particular cafes of the impeached lords are paralleled in Athenian characters. Hawkef.

This whole treatife is full of historical knowledge, and excellent reflections. It is not mixed with any improper fallies of wit, or any light airs of humour; and, in point of style and learning, is equal, if not superior, to any of Swift's political works. Orrery.

seem naturally to divide; for, by all I have read of those innumerable and petty commonwealths in Italy, Greece, and Sicily, as well as the great ones of Carthage and Rome, it seems to me, that a free people met together, whether by compact, or family-government, as foon as they fall into any acts of civil fociety, do of themselves divide into three powers. The first is that of fome one eminent fpirit, who, having fignalized his valour and fortune in defence of his country, or, by the practice of popular arts at home, comes to have great influence on the people, to grow their leader in warlike expeditions, and to prefide, after a fort, in their civil affemblies; and this is grounded upon the principles of nature and common reafon, which, in all difficulties or dangers, where prudence or courage is required, do rather incite us to fly for counsel or affistance to a single perfon, than a multitude. The fecond natural divifion of power, is of fuch men, who have acquired large poffeffions, and confequently dependencies, or defcend from ancestors who have left them great inheritances, together with an hereditary authority. These easily uniting in thoughts and opinions, and acting in concert, begin to enter upon measures for fecuring their properties, which are best upheld by preparing against invasions from abroad, and maintaining peace at home; this commences a great council or fenate of nobles, for the weighty affairs of the nation. The laft divifion is of the mass or body of the people, whose part of power is great and indifputable,

when

whenever they can unite either collectively, or by deputation, to exert it. Now, the three forms of government, fo generally known in the schools, differ only by the civil administration being placed in the hands of one, or fometimes two, (as in Sparta) who were called Kings; or in a fenate, who were called the Nobles; or in the people col.. lective or reprefentative, who may be called the Commons. Each of thefe had frequently the executive power in Greece, and fometimes in Rome : but the power, in the laft refort, was always meant by legiflators to be held in balance among all three. And it will be an eternal rule in politics, among every free people, that there is a balance of power to be carefully held by every ftate within itself, as well as among several states with each other.

The true meaning of a balance of power, either without or within a ftate, is beft conceived, by confidering what the nature of a balance is. It fuppofes three things: Firft, the part which is held, together with the hand that holds it; and then the two fcales, with whatever is weighed therein. Now, confider feveral ftates in a neighbourhood; in order to preferve peace between these states, it is neceffary they should be formed into a balance, whereof one or more are to be directors, who are to divide the reft into equal fcales, and, upon occafion, remove from one into the other, or elfe fall with their own weight into the lighteft; fo in a ftate within itself, the balance must be held by a third hand, who is to

deal

deal the remaining power with the utmost exactnefs into the several scales. Now, it is not neceffary, that the power fhould be equally divided between these three; for the balance may be held by the weakeft, who, by his addrefs and conduct, removing from either scale, and adding of his own, may keep the fcales duly poised. Such was that of the two kings of Sparta, the confular power in Rome, that of the kings of Media before the reign of Cyrus, as represented by Xenophon, and that of the feveral limited ftates in the Gothic inftitution.

When the balance is broken, whether by the negligence, folly, or weaknefs of the hand that held it, or by mighty weights fallen into either fcale, the power will never continue long in equal divifion between the two remaining parties, but, till the balance is fixed anew, will run entirely into one. This gives the trueft account of what is underflood in the moft ancient and approved Greek authors by the word tyranny, which is not meant for the feizing of the uncontrolled or abfolute power into the hands of a fingle perfon, (as many fuperficial men have grofly mistaken,) but for the breaking of the balance by whatever hand, and leaving the power wholly in one fcale; for tyranny and ufurpation in a state, are by no means confined to any number, as might eafily appear from examples enow; and, because the point is material, I fhall cite a few to prove it. The Romans, having fent to Athens, and the Greek

*

* Dionyf. Hal. lib. 10.

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