*

cafion whatsoever, is little lefs than to make use of the whole power; that is, to declare an opinion to be law, which has always been contefted, or, perhaps, never ftarted at all, before such an incident brought it on the ftage. Not to confent to the enacting of fuch a law, which has no view befides the general good, unless another law fhall at the fame time pafs, with no other view but that of advancing the power of one party alone; what is this, but to claim a pofitive voice, as well as a negative? To pretend, that great changes and alienations of property have created new and great dependencies, and confequently new additions of power, as some reasoners have done, is a moft dangerous tenet. If dominion must follow property, let it follow in the fame place; for, change in property, through the bulk of a nation, makes flow marches, and its due power always attends it. To conclude, that, whatever attempt is begun by an assembly, ought to be purfued to the end, without regard to the greatest incidents that may happen to alter the cafe; to count it mean, and below the dignity of a boufe, to quit a profecution; to refolve upon a conclufion, before it is poffible to be apprised of the premises: to act thus, I fay, is to affect not only abfolute power, but infallibili

ty

This feems to allude to a practice of the house of Commons, called Tacking: when they fufpected that a favourite bill would be rejected, they tacked it to a money-bill; and, as it was not poffible to proceed without the fupply, and as it became neceffary to reject or receive both the bills thus tacked together, this expedient perfectly answered its purpose. Hawkef.

ty too. Yet, fuch unaccountable proceedings as thefe, have popular assemblies engaged in, for want of fixing the due limits of power and privilege.

Great changes may, indeed, be made in a government, yet the form continue, and the balance be held: but large intervals of time must pass between every fuch innovation, enough to melt down and make it of a piece with the conftitution. Such, we are told, were the proceedings of Solon, when he modelled anew the Athenian commonwealth; and what convulfions in our own, as well as other ftates, have been bred by a neglect of this rule, is fresh and notorious enough it is too foon, in all confcience, to repeat this error again.

Having fhewn, that there is a natural balance of power in all free ftates, and how it hath been divided, fometimes by the people themselves, as in Rome, at others by the inftitutions of the legiflators, as in the several states of Greece and Sicily; the next thing is, to examine, what methods have been taken to break or overthrow this balance, which every one of the three parties hath continually endeavoured, as opportunities have ferved; as might appear from the ftories of moft ages and countries: for abfolute power, in a particular ftate, is of the fame nature with universal monarchy in several states adjoining to each other. So endless and exorbitant are the defires of men, whether confidered in their perfons or their states, that they will grasp at all, and can form no scheme of perfect happiness with

lefs.

lefs. Ever fince men have been united into governments, the hopes and endeavours after univerfal monarchy, have been bandied among them, from the reign of Ninus to this of the Most Chriflian King; in which purfuits, commonwealths have had their fhare, as well as monarchs: fo the Athenians, the Spartans, the Thebans, and the Achaians, did feveral times. aim at the universal monarchy of Greece; fo the commonwealths of Carthage and Rome affected the univerfal monarchy of the then known world. In like manner, hath abfolute power been pursued by the feveral parties of each particular ftate; wherein fingle perfons have met with most fuccefs, though the endeavours of the few and the many have been frequent enough; yet, being neither fo uniform in their defigns, nor fo direct in their views, they neither could manage nor maintain the power they had got; but were ever deceived by the popularity and ambition of fome fingle perfon. So that it will be always a wrong step in policy, for the Nobles or Commons to carry their endeavours after power fo far, as to overthrow the balance; and it would be enough. to damp their warmth in fuch purfuits, if they could once reflect, that, in fuch a course, they will be fure to run upon the very rock that they meant to avoid; which, I fuppofe, they would have us think, is the tyranny of a fingle perfon.

Many examples might be produced, of the endeavours of each of these three rivals after abfolute power; but I fhall fuit my difcourfe to the

time I am writing in, and relate only fuch diffenfions in Greece and Rome, between the Nobles and Commons, with the confequences of them, wherein the latter were the aggreffors.

I shall begin with Greece, where my obfervations fhall be confined to Athens, though feveral instances might be brought from other states thereof.

CHA P. II.

Of the diffenfions in ATHENS, between the few and

TH

the many.

HESEUS is the first, who is recorded, with any appearance of truth, to have brought the Grecians from a barbarous manner of life, among scattered villages, into cities; and to have eftablished the popular state in Athens, affigning to himself the guardianship of the laws, and chief command in war. He was forced, after fome time, to leave the Athenians to their own meafures, upon account of their feditious temper, which ever continued with them, till the final diffolution of their government by the Romans. It seems, the country about Attica was the moft barren of any in Greece; through which means it happened, that the natives were never expelled by the fury of invaders, (who thought it not worth a conqueft) but continued always Aborigines; and therefore, retained, through all revolutions, a tincture of that turbulent fpirit, wherewith their government began. This inftitution

of

of Thefeus, appears to have been rather a fort of mixed monarchy, than a popular ftate, and, for aught we know, might continue fo during the series of kings till the death of Codrus. From this laft prince, Solon was faid to be defcended; who, finding the people engaged in two violent factions of the poor and the rich, and in great confufion thereupon; refufing the monarchy, which was offered him, chofe rather to caft the government after another model, wherein he made due provisions for fettling the balance of power, chufing a Senate of four hundred, and difpofing the magiftracies and offices according to mens estates; leaving to the multitude their votes in electing, and the power of judging certain proceffes by appeal. This council of four hundred was chofen, one hundred out of each tribe, and seems to have been a body representative of the people, though the people collective referved a share of power to themselves. It is a -point of history perplexed enough; but thus much is certain, that the balance of power was provided for; elfe Pififtratus, called by authors the tyrant of Athens, could never have governed fo peaceably as he did, without changing any of Solon's laws. * These feveral powers, together with that of the archon or chief magiftrate, made up the form of government in Athens, at what time it began to appear upon the fcene of action and story.

The first great man bred up under this inftitu

tion,

*Herodot. lib. I.