"tion in these points, his putting an indignity "and affront on her Majefty and kingdoms, by "declaring the pretended Prince of Wales K. of "England," &c. Which laft was the only perfonal quarrel we had in the war; and even this was pofitively denied by France, that king being willing to acknowledge her Majefty.

I think it plainly appears by both declarations, that England ought no more to have been a principal in this war, than Pruffia, or any other pow er, who came afterwards into that alliance. Holland was first in danger, the French troops being at that time juft at the gates of Nimeguen. But the complaints made in our declaration, do all, except the last, as much, or more, concern almost every prince in Europe.

For, among the feveral parties who came firft or laft into this confederacy, there were few, but who, in proportion, had more to get or to lofe, to hope or to fear, from the good or ill fuccefs of this war, than we. The Dutch took up arms to defend themfelves from immediate ruin; and, by a fuccefsful war, they propofed to have a larger extent of country, and a better frontier against France. The Emperor hoped to recover the monarchy of Spain, or some part of it, for his younger fon, chiefly at the expence of us and Holland. The king of Portugal had received intelligence, that Philip defigned to renew the old pretenfions of Spain upon that kingdom, which is furrounded by the other on all fides, except towards the fea; and could therefore only be de

fended

fended by maritime powers. This, with the advantageous terms offered by K. Charles, as well as by us, prevailed with that prince to enter into the alliance. The Duke of Savoy's temptations and fears were yet greater: the main charge of the war, on that fide, was to be supplied by England, and the profit to redound to him. In cafe Milan fhould be conquered, it was ftipulated, that his Highnefs fhould have the dutchy of Montferrat, belonging to the duke of Mantua, the provinces of Alexandria, Valencia, and Lomellino, with other lands between the Po and Tanaro, together with the Vigevenasco, or, in lieu of it, an equivalent out of the province of Navara, adjoining to his own ftate; befides whatever elfe could be taken from France, on that fide, by the confederate forces. Then be was in terrible apprehenfions of being furrounded by France, who had fo many troops in the Milanefe, and might have easily swallowed up his whole dutchy.

The reft of the allies came in purely for fubfidies, whereof they funk confiderable fums into their own coffers, and refused to fend their contingent to the Emperor, alledging their troops were already hired by England and Holland.

Some time after the Duke of Anjou's fucceeding to the monarchy of Spain, in breach of the partition treaty, the question here in England was, whether the peace fhould be continued, or a new war begun? Those who were for the former, alledged the debts and difficulties we laboured un

der;

der; that both we and the Dutch had already acknowledged Philip for king of Spain; that the inclinations of the Spaniards to the houfe of Auftria, and their averfion from that of Bourbon, were not fo furely to be reckoned upon, as fome would pretend that we thought it a piece of infolence, as well as injuftice, in the French, to offer putting a king upon us; and the Spaniards would conceive we had as little reafon to force one upon them that it was true, the nature and genius of those two people differed very much, and fo would probably continue to do, as well under a king of French blood, as one of Auftrian; but that if we should engage in a war for dethroning the Duke of Anjou, we should certainly effect what, by the progrefs and operations of it, we endeavoured to prevent; I mean, an union of intereft and affections between the two nations; for the Spaniards muft of neceffity call in French troops to their affiftance; this would introduce French counsellors into king Philip's court, and this by degrees would habituate and reconcile the two nations that to affift king Charles by Englifh and Dutch forces, would render him odious to his new fubjects, who have nothing in fo great abomination as those whom they hold for heretics: that the French would, by this means, become mafters of the treasures in the Spanish Weft-Indies that in the laft war, when Spain, Cologne, and Bavaria, were in our alliance, and, by a modest computation, brought fixty thousand men into the field against the common enemy; when Flan

:

:

ders,

1

ders, the feat of war, was on our fide, and his Majefty, a prince of great valour and conduct, at the head of the whole confederate army; yet we had no reason to boast of our fuccefs: how then should we be able to oppofe France, with thofe powers against us, which would carry fixty thousand men from us to the enemy; and fo make us, upon the balance, weaker by one hundred and twenty thousand men at the beginning of this war, than of that in 1688 ?

On the other fide, thofe, whofe opinion, or fome private motives, inclined them to give their advice for entering into a new war, alledged how dangerous it would be for England, that Philip fhould be king of Spain; that we could have no fecurity for our trade, while that kingdom was fubject to a prince of the Bourbon family, nor any hopes of preferving the balance of Europe; because the grandfather would in effect be king, while his grandfon had but the title, and thereby have a better opportunity than ever, of purfuing his defign for univerfal monarchy. These, and the like arguments, prevailed; and fo, without offering at any other remedy, without taking time to confider the confequences, or to reflect on our own condition, we haftily engaged in a war, which hath coft us fixty millions ; and, after repeated, as well as unexpected fuccefs in arms, hath put us and our pofterity in a worse condition, not only than any of our allies, but even our conquered enemies themselves.

The part we have acted in the conduct of this

whole

whole war, with reference to our allies abroad, and to a prevailing faction at home, is what I fhall now particularly examine; where, I presume, it will appear, by plain matters of fact, that no nation, was ever so long or so scandalously abused, by the folly, the temerity, the corruption, and the ambition of its domeftic enemies; or treated with fo much infolence, injuftice, and ingratitude, by its foreign friends.

This will be manifeft, by proving the three following points:

Firft,That againft all manner of prudence or common reason, we engaged in this war as principals, when we ought to have acted only as auxiliaries.

Secondly, That we spent all our vigour in purfuing that part of the war, which could leaft an. fwer the end we propofed by beginning it; and made no efforts at all, where we could have moft weakened the common enemy, and, at the fame time, enriched ourselves.

Laftly, That we fuffered each of our allies to break every article in thofe treaties and agreements by which they were bound, and to lay the burthen upon us.

Upon the first of these points, that we ought to have entered into this war only as auxiliaries, let any man reflect upon our condition at that time: Juft come out of the most tedious, expenfive, and unfuccefsful war that ever England had been engaged in ;* finking under heavy debts,

*

of

I was then lean, being just come out of a fit of sickness. John Bull, part 2. chap. 6. Vol. VII.