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« tion in these points, his putting an indignity “ and affront on her Majesty and kingdoms, by “ declaring the pretended Prince of Wales K. of “ England," &c. Which laft was the only personal quarrel we had in the war; and even this was positively denied by France, that king being willing to acknowledge her Majesty.
I think it plainly appears by both declarations, that England ought no more to have been a principal in this war, than Prussia, or any other power, who came afterwards into that alliance. Holland was first in danger, the French troops being at that time just at the gates of Nimeguen. But the complaints made in our declaration, do all, except the last, as much, or more, concern almost every prince in Europe.
For, among the several parties who came first or last into this confederacy, there were few, but who, in proportion, had more to get or to lose, to hope or to fear, from the good or ill success of this war,
than The Dutch took up arms to defend themselves from immediate ruin ; and, by a succefsful war, they proposed to have a larger extent of country, and a better frontier against France. The Emperor hoped to recover the monarchy of Spain, or some part of it, for his younger son, chiefly at the expence of us and Holland. The king of Portugal had received intelligence, that Philip designed to renew the old pretensions of Spain upon that kingdom, which is surrounded by the other on all Gides, except towards the fea; and could therefore only be de
fended by maritime powers. This, with the ad. vantageous terms offered by K. Charles, as well as by us, prevailed with that prince to enter into the alliance. The Duke of Savoy's temptations and fears were yet greater : the main charge of the war, on that fide, was to be fupplied by England, and the profit to redound to him. In case Milan should be conquered, it was stipulated, that his Highness should have the dutchy of Montferrat, belonging to the duke of Mantua, the provinces of Alexandria, Valencia, and Lomellino, with other lands between the Po and Tanaro, together with the Vigevenasco, or, in lieu of it, an equivalent out of the province of Navara, adjoining to his own ftate ; besides whatever else could be taken from France, on that side, by the confederate forces. Then be was in terrible apprehensions of being surrounded by France, who had so many troops in the Milanese, and might have eafily swallowed up * his whole dutchy.
The rest of the allies came in purely for fubGdies, whereof they sunk considerable sums into their own coffers, and refused to send their contingent to the Emperor, alledging their troops were already hired by England and Holland.
Some time after the Duke of Anjou's succeeding to the monarchy of Spain, in breach of the partition treaty, the question here in England was, whether the peace should be continued, or a new war begun ? Those who were for the former, alledged the debts and difficulties we laboured un
der ; that both we and the Dutch had already acknowledged Philip for king of Spain; that the inclinations of the Spaniards to the house of Auftria, and their aversion from that of Bourbon, were not so surely to be reckoned upon, as some would pretend : that we thought it a piece of infolence, as well as injustice, in the French, to offer putting a king upon us ; and the Spaniards would conceive we had as little reason to force one upon them : that it was true, the nature and genius of those two people differed very much, and so would probably continue to do, as well under a king of French blood, as one of Austrian ; but that if we should engage in a war for dethroning the Duke of Anjou, we should certainly effect what, by the progress and operations of it, we endeavoured to prevent; I mean, an union of interest and affections between the two nations ; for the Spaniards must of necessity call in French troops to their assistance; this would introduce French counsellors into king Philip's court, and this by degrees would habituate and reconcile the two nations: that to aflift king Charles by English and Dutch forces, would render him odious to his new subjects, who have nothing in so great abomination as those whom they hold for heretics : that the French would, by this means, become masters of the treasures in the Spanish Weft-Indies: that in the last war, when Spain, Cologne, and Bavaria, were in our alliance, and, by a modeft computation, brought fixty thousand men into the field against the common enemy; when Flan
ders, ders, the seat of war, was on our side, and his Majesty, a prince of great valour and conduct, at the head of the whole confederate army; yet we had no reason to boast of our success : how then should we be able to oppose France, with those powers against us, which would carry fixty thousand men from us to the enemy; and so make us, upon the balance, weaker by one hundred and twenty thousand men at the beginning of this war, than of that in 1688 ?
On the other side, those, whose opinion, or fome private motives, inclined them to give their advice for entering into a new war, alledged how dangerous it would be for England, that Philip should be king of Spain; that we could have no security for our trade, while that kingdom was subject to a prince of the Bourbon family, nor any hopes of preserving the balance of Europe ; because the grandfather would in effect be king, while his grandson had but the title, and thereby have a better opportunity than ever, of pursuing his design for universal monarchy. These, and the like arguments, prevailed ; and so, without offering at any other remedy, without taking time to consider the consequences, or to reflect on our own condition, we haftily engaged in a war, which hath cost us sixty millions ; and, after repeated, as well as unexpected success in arms, hath put us and our posterity in a worse condition, not only than any of our allies, but even our conqucred enemies themselves. The part we have acted in the conduct of this
whole war, with reference to our allies abroad, and to a prevailing faction at home, is what I shall now particularly examine; where, I prefume, it will appear, by plain matters of fact, that no nation, was ever so long or so scandalously abused, by the folly, the temerity, the corruption, and the ambition of its domestic enemies ; or treated with so much infolence, injustice, and ingratitude, by its foreign friends.
This will be manifest, by proving the three following points:
First, That against all manner of prudence or common reason, we engaged in this war as principals, when we ought to have acted only as auxiliaries.
Secondly, That we spent all our vigour in pursuing that part of the war, which could least answer the end we proposed by beginning it; and made no efforts at all, where we could have moft weakened the common enemy, and, at the same time, enriched ourselves.
Lastly, That we suffered each of our allies to break every article in those treaties and agreements by which they were bound, and to lay the burthen upon us.
Upon the first of these points, that we ought to have entered into this war only as auxiliaries, let any man reflect upon our condition at that time : Just come out of the most tedious, expenfive, and unsuccessful war that ever England liad been engaged in ;* finking under heavy debts,
of * I was then lean, being just come out of a fit of sickness. John Bull, part 2. chap. 6. Vol. VII.