of a nature and degree never heard of by us or our ancestors; the bulk of the gentry and people heartily tired of the war, and glad of a peace, although it brought no other advantage but itfelf; no fudden profpect of leffening our taxes, which were grown as neceffary to pay our debts as to raise armies; a fort of artificial wealth of funds and ftocks in the hands of those who, for ten years before, had been plundering the public; many corruptions, in every branch of our government, that needed reformation. Under thefe difficulties, from which twenty years peace, and the wisest management, could hardly recover us, we declared war against France, fortified by the acceffion and alliance of thofe powers I mentioned before, and which, in the former war, had been parties in our confederacy. It is very obvious, what a change must be made in the balance, by fuch weights taken out of our fcale, and put into theirs; fince it was manifeft, by ten years experience, that France, without thofe additions of ftrength, was able to maintain itself against us. So that human probability ran, with mighty odds, on the other fide; and, in this cafe, nothing under the most extreme neceffity, should force any ftate to engage in a war. We had already acknowledged Philip for king of Spain; neither does the Queen's declaration of war take notice of the duke of Anjou's fucceffion to that monarchy, as a fubject of quarrel, but the French King's governing it as if it were his own; his feizing Cadiz, Milan,. and the Spanish Low VOL. II. Countries, H h Countries, with the indignity of proclaiming the pretender. In all which, we charge that prince with nothing directly relating to us, excepting the laft and this, although, indeed, a great affront, might eafily have been redreffed, without a war; for the French court declared, they did not acknowledge the pretender, but only gave him the title of king, which was allowed to Auguftus by his enemy of Sweden, who had driven him out of Poland, and forced him to acknowledge Stanislaus. It is true, indeed, the danger of the Dutch, by fo ill a neighbourhood in Flanders, might affect us very much, in the confequences of it; and the lofs of Spain to the house of Auftria, if it fhould be governed by French influence, and French politics, might, in time, be very pernicious to our trade. It would, therefore, have been prudent, as well as generous and charitable, to help our neighbour; and fo we might have done, without injuring ourselves; for, by an old treaty with Holland, we were bound to affift that republic with ten thousand men, whenever they were attacked by the French; whofe troops, upon the king of Spain's death, taking possession of of Flanders, in right of Philip, and securing the Dutch garrifons till they would acknowledge him, the States-General, by memorials from their envoy here, demanded only the ten thoufand men we were obliged to give them, by virtue of that treaty.. And I make no doubt, but the Dutch would have exerted themselves fo vigorously, as to be able, with that affiftance alone, ་ ་ lone, to defend their frontiers; or, if they had been forced to a peace, the Spaniards, who abhor difmembering their monarchy, would never have suffered the French to poffefs themfelves of Flanders. At that time, they had none of those endearments to each other, which this war hath created; and, whatever hatred and jealousy were natural between the two nations, would then have appeared. So that there was no fort of neceffity for us to proceed further, although we had been in a better condition. But, our po liticians, at that time, had other views; and a new war must be undertaken, upon the advice of thofe, who, with their partifans and adherents, were to be the fole gainers by it. A grand alliance was therefore made between the Emperor, England, and the States-General; by which, if the injuries complained of from France, were not remedied in two months, the parties concerned were obliged mutually to affift each other with their own ftrength. Thus we became parties in a war, in conjunction with two allies, whofe fhare in the quarrel was beyond all proportion greater than ours. However, I can see no reason from the words of the grand alliance, by which we were obliged to make those prodigious expences we have fince been at. By what I have always heard and read, I take the whole ftrength of a nation, as understood in that treaty, to be, the utmost that a prince can raise annually from his fubjects. If he be forced to mortgage and borrow, whether at home Hh 2 home or abroad, it is not, properly speaking, his own firength, or that of the nation, but the entire fubftance of particular perfons; which, not being able to raise out of the annual income of his kingdóm, he takes upon fecurity, and can only pay the intereft. And, by this method, one part of the nation is pawned to the other, with hardly a poffibility left of being ever redeemed. Surely, it would have been enough for us to have fufpended the payment of our debts contracted in the former war, and to have continued our land and malt tax, with those others, which have fince been mortgaged: thefe, with fome additions, would have made up fuch a fum, as, with prudent management, might, I fuppofe, have maintained an hundred thousand men by fea and land; a reafonable quota, in all confcience, for that ally, who apprehended leaft danger, and expected leaft advantage. Nor can we imagine, that either of the confederates, when the war began, would have been fo unreafonable, as to refufe joining with us upon fuch a foot, and expect that we fhould every year go betwen three or four millions in debt (which hath been our cafe) because the French could hardly have contrived any offers of a peace fo ruinous to us as fuch a war. Pofterity will be at a lofs to conceive, what kind of fpirit could poffefs their ancestors, who, after ten years suffering by the unexampled politics of a nation maintaining war by annually pawning itself; and during a fhort peace, while they were looking back with horror on the heavy loads loads of debts they had contracted; univerfally condemning those pernicious counfels which had occafioned them; racking their invention for fome remedies or expedients to mend their fhattered condition; I fay, that these very people, without giving themselves time to breathe, fhould again enter into a more dangerous, chargeable, and expenfive war, for the fame, or perhaps a greater period of time, and without any apparent neceffity. It is obvious in a private fortune, that whoever annually runs out, and continues the fame expences, muft every year mortgage a greater quantity of land than he did before; and as the debt doubles and trebles upon him, fo doth his inability to pay it. By the fame proportion, we have fuffered twice as much by this last ten years war, as we did by the former; and if it were poffible to continue it five years longer, at the fame rate, it would be as great a burthen as the whole twenty. This computation being so easy and trivial, that it is almoft a fhame to mention it, pofterity will think, that those who first advised the war, wanted either the fenfe or the honefty to confider it. And as we have wafted our strength and vital fubftance in this profufe manner, fo we have fhamefully mifapplied it to ends at leaft very different from thofe, for which we undertook the war, and often to effect others, which, after a peace, we may feverely repent. This is the fecond article I propofed to examine. We have now, for ten years together, turned the whole force and expence of the war where Hh3 the |