the enemy was best able to hold us at a bay; where we could propofe no manner of advantage to ourselves; where it was highly impolitic to enlarge our conqueft; utterly neglecting that part, which would have faved and gained us many millions, which the perpetual maxims of our government teach us to pursue; which would have foonest weakned the enemy, and must either have promoted a speedy peace, or enabled us to continue the war. Those who are fond of continuing the war, cry up our conftant fuccefs at a moft prodigious rate, and reckon it infinitely greater, than, in all human probability, we had reafon to hope. Ten glorious campaigns are paffed, and now at laft, like the fick man, we are juft expiring, with all forts of good fymptoms. Did the advisers of this war fuppofe it would continue ten years, without expecting the fuccefs we have had; and yet, at the fame time, determine, that, France muft be reduced, and Spain fubdued, by employing our whole ftrength upon Flanders? Did they believe, the laft war left us in a condition to furnish fuch vaft fupplies, for fo long a period, without involving us, and our pofterity, in inextricable debts? If, after fuch miraculous doings, we are not yet in a condition of bringing France to our terms, nor can tell when we fhall be fo, although we should proceed without any reverse of fortune; what could we look for, in the ordinary courfe of things, but a Flanders war of at least twenty years longer? Do they, indeed, think, a town taken taken for the Dutch, a fufficient recompenfe to us for fix millions of money; which is of fo little confequence to determine the war, that the French may yet hold out a dozen years more, and afford a town every campaign at the fame price? I fay not this, by any means, to detract from the army, or its leaders. Getting into the enemy's lines, paffing rivers, and taking towns, may be actions attended with many glorious circumftances; but, when all this brings no real folid advantage to us; when it hath no other end, than to enlarge the territories of the Dutch, and increase the fame and wealth of our General; I conclude, however it comes about, that things are not as they should be; and that, furely, our forces and money might be better employed, both towards reducing our enemy, and working out fome benefit to ourselves. But, the cafe is still much harder; we are deftroying many thousand lives, exhaufting our fubftance, not for our own intereft, which would be but common prudence; not for a thing indifferent, which would be fufficient folly, but, perhaps, to our own deftruction; which is perfect madness. We may live to feel the effects of our own valour more fenfibly, than all the confequences we imagine from the dominions of Spain, in the Duke of Anjou. We have conquered a noble territory for the States, that will maintain fufficient troops to defend itself, and feed many hundred thousand inhabitants; where all encouragement will be given, to introduce and improve manufactures, which was was the only advantage they wanted; and which, added to their fkill, induftry, and parfimony, will enable them to under-fell us in every market of the world. Our fupply of forty thousand men, according to the firft ftipulation, added to the quotas of the Emperor and Holland, which they were obliged to furnish, would have made an army of near two hundred thoufand, exclufive of garrifons: enough to withstand all the power that France could bring against it; and we might have employed the reft much better, both for the common caufe, and our own advantage. The war in Spain must be imputed to the credulity of our minifters, who fuffered themfelves to be perfuaded by the Imperial court, that the Spaniards were fo violently affected to the houfe of Auftria, as, upon the firft appearance there with a few troops under the Archduke, the whole kingdom would immediately revolt.. This we tried; and found the Emperor to have deceived either us or himself. Yet, there we drove on the war, at a prodigious difadvantage, with great expence; and, by a most corrupt management, the only General, who, by a course of conduct and fortune almoft miraculous, had nearly put us into poffeffion of that kingdom, was left wholly unsupported, exposed to the envy of his rivals, disappointed by the caprices of a young unexperienced prince, under the guidance of a rapacious German ministry, and at last call The Earl of Peterborough. ed ed home in difcontent. By which, our armies, both in Spain and Portugal, were made a facrifice to avarice, ill conduct, or treachery. In common prudence, we fhould either have pufhed that war with the utmoft vigour, in fo fortunate a juncture; especially, fince the gaining that kingdom, was the great point, for which we pretended to continue the war; or, at least, when we had found, or made that design impracticable, we fhould not have gone on in fo expenfive a management of it; but we have kept our troops on the defenfive in Catalonia, and pursued fome other way more effectual for diftreffing the common enemy, and advantaging ourselves. And, what a noble field of honour and profit had we before us, wherein to employ the beft of our ftrength; which, against all maxims of British policy, we fuffered to ly wholly neglected! I have fometimes wondered how it came to país, that the ftyle of maritime powers, by which our allies, in a fort of contemptuous manner, ufually couple us with the Dutch, did never put us in mind of the fea; and, while fome politicians were fhewing us the way to Spain by Flanders, others to Savoy or Naples, that the Weft-Indies fhould never come into their heads. With half the charge we have been at, we might have maintained our original quota of forty thousand men in Flanders; and, at the fame time, by our fleets and naval forces, have fo diftreffed the Spaniards in the north and fouth feas of America, as to prevent any returns of money from thence, except in our own bottoms. This is what best became us to do, as a maritime power; this, with any common degree of fuccefs, would foon have compelled France to the neceffities of a peace, and Spain to acknowledge the Archduke. But, while we, for ten years, have been squandering away our money upon the continent, France hath been wifely engroffing all the trade of Peru, going directly with their fhips to Lima, and other ports, and there receiving ingots of gold and filver for French goods, of little value; which, befides the mighty advantage to their nation at prefent, may divert the channel of that trade for the future, fo beneficial to us, who used to receive annually fuch vaft fums at Cadiz for our goods fent thence to the Spanish Weft-Indies. All this we tamely faw and suffered, without the leaft attempt to hinder it; except what was performed by fome private men at Briftol; who, inflamed by a true fpirit of courage and industry, did, about three years ago, with a few veffels fitted out at their own charge, make a most succefsful voyage into those parts; took one of the Acapulco ships, very narrowly miffed the other, and are lately returned, laden with unenvied wealth, to fhew us what might have been done with the like management by a public`undertaking. At least, we might eafily have prevented thofe great returns of money to France and Spain, although we could not have taken it ourfelves. And if it be true, as the advocates for war would have it, that the French are now fo impoverished, in |