of forty thousand was to be the confederate army against Spain on the Portugal fide. This treaty was ratified by all the three powers. But in a short time after, the Emperor declared himself unable to comply with his part of the agreement, and fo left the two-thirds upon us; who very generously undertook that burthen, and, at the fame time, two-thirds of the fubfidies for maintenance of the Portuguese troops. But neither is this the worst part of the ftory; for although the Dutch did indeed send their own quota of four thoufand men to Portugal (which, however, they would not condition that the other twoagree to, but upon thirds fhould be fupplied by us); yet they never took care to recruit them: for in the year 1706, the Portuguese, British, and Dutch forces, having marched with the Earl of Galway into Caftile, and, by the noble conduct of that general, being forced to retire into Valencia, it was found neceffary to raise a new army on the Portugal fide: where the Queen hath, at feveral times, encreafed her eftablishment to ten thousand five hundred men; and the Dutch never replaced one fingle man, nor paid one penny of their fubfidies to Portugal, in fix years.

The Spanish army, on the fide of Catalonia, is, or ought to be, about fifty thousand men, exclufive of Portugal. And here the war hath been. carried on almost entirely at our coft. For this whole army is paid by the Queen, excepting only feven battalions and fourteen fquadrons of Dutch and Palatines; and even fifteen hundred of these are likewise in our pay; besides the fums

given to King Charles for fubfidies and the maintenance of his court. Neither are our troops at Gibraltar included within, this number. - And further, we alone have been at all the charge of tranfporting the forces firft fent from Genoa to Barcelona; and of all the imperial recruits from time to time. And have likewise paid vaft fums as levy-money for every individual man and horfe fo furnished to recruit; although the horses were fcarce worth the price of transportation. But this hath been almost the conftant misfortune of our fleet during the present war; inftead of being employed on fome enterprize for the good of the nation, or even for the protection of our trade, to be wholly taken up in transporting foldiers.

We have actually conquered all Bavaria, Ulm, Augsbourg, Landau, and a great part of Alface, for the Emperor: and by the troops we have furnished, the armies we have paid, and the diverfions we have given to the enemies forces, have chiefly contributed to the conquefts of Milan, Mantua, and Mirandola, and to the recovery of the dutchy of Modena. The laft Emperor drained the wealth of thofe countries into his own coffers, without increasing his troops against France by fuch mighty acquifitions, or yielding to the most reasonable requests we have made.

Of the many towns we have taken for the Dutch, we have confented, by the barrier treaty, that all those which were not in the poffeffion of Spain, upon the death of the Catholic King, fhall be part of the States dominions; and that

they

they shall have the military power in the most confiderable of the reft; which is in effect to be the abfolute fovereigns of the whole. And the Hollanders have already made fuch good use of their time, that, in conjunction with our General, the oppreffions of Flanders are much greater than ever.

And this treatment, which we have received from our two princip 1 allies, hath been pretty well copied by mof other princes in the confederacy, with whom we have any dealings. For inftance: feven Portuguese regiments, after the battle of Almanza, went off with the reft of that broken army to Catalonia; the King of Portugal faid, he was not able to pay them, while they were out of his country; the Queen confented, therefore, to do it herself, provided the King would raise as many more to fupply their place. This, he engaged to do, but never performed.. Notwithstanding which, his fubfidies were conftantly paid him by my Lord Godolphin, før almoft four years, without any deduction upon account of those seven regiments; directly contrary to the seventh article of our offenfive alliance with that crown, where it is agreed, that a deduction fhall be made out of thofe fubfidies, in proportion to the number of men wanting in that complement which the King is to maintain. But, whatever might have been the reafons for this proceeding, it feems they are above the understanding of the prefent Lord Treasurer; * who, not entering into thofe refinements of paying the pub

*Earl of Oxford.

lic

lic money upon private confiderations, hath been fo uncourtly as to ftop it. This disappointment, I fuppofe, hath put the court of Lisbon upon other expedients, of raifing the price of forage, fo as to force us, either to leffen our number of troops, or be at double expence in maintaining them; and this, at a time, when their own product, as well as the import of corn, was never greater; and of demanding a duty upon the foldiers clothes we carried over for those troops, which have been their fole defence against an inveterate enemy; and whofe example might have infufed courage, as well as taught them difcipline, if their spirits had been capable of receiving either.

In order to augment our forces every year, in the fame proportion as thofe for whom we fight diminish theirs, we have been obliged to hire troops, from several princes of the empire, whose minifters and refidents here, have perpetually importuned the court with unreasonable demands, under which our late minifters thought fit to be paffive. For thofe demands were always backed with a threat to recal their foldiers; which was a thing not to be heard of, because it might difcontent the Dutch. In the mean time, those princes never fent their contingent to the Emperor, as, by the laws of the empire they are obliged to do; but gave, for their excufe, that we had already hired all they could poffibly fpare.

But, if all this be true; if, according to what I have affirmed, we began this war, contrary to reafon; if, as the other party themselves, upon all

occafions,

occafions, acknowledge, the fuccefs we have had, was more than we could reasonably expect; if, after all our fuccefs, we have not made that use of it, which, in reason, we ought to have done; if we have made weak and foolish bargains with our allies, fuffered them tamely to break every article, even in those bargains, to our disadvantage, and allowed them to treat us with infolence and contempt, at the very instant when we were gaining towns, provinces, and kingdoms for them, at the price of our ruin, and without any prospect of intereft to ourselves; if we have confumed all our ftrength, in attacking the enemy on the ftrongeft fide, where (as the old Duke of Schomberg expreffed it) to engage with France, was to take a bull by the horns; and left, wholly unattempted, that part of the war, which could only enable us to continue or to end it; if all this, I fay, be our case, it is a very obvious question to ask, by what motives, or what management, we are thus become the dupes and bubbles of Europe? Sure, it cannot be owing to the ftupidity arifing from the coldness of our climate; fince thofe among our allies, who have given us moft reafon to complain, are as far removed from the fun as ourselves.

If, in laying open the real causes of our present mifery, I am forced to speak with fome freedom, I think it will require no apology. Reputation is the smallest facrifice those can make us, who have been the inftruments of our ruin; because it is that for which, in all probability, they have the leaft value. So that, in expofing the actions

of