carry it on with great vigour, a grand alliance. formed, wherein the ends, propofed to be obtained, are plainly and diftinctly laid down, as I have already quoted them. It pleafed God, in the course of this war, to bless the arms of the allies with remarkable fucceffes; by which we were foon put into a condition of demanding and expecting fuch terms of peace, as we proposed to ourfelves when we began the war. But, instead of this, our victories only ferved to lead us on to further visionary profpects; advantage was taken of the fanguine temper, which so many fucceffes had wrought the nation up to; new romantic views were proposed; and the old, reasonable, fober defign was forgot.

This was the artifice of those here, who were fure to grow richer, as the public became poorer; and who, after the refolutions which the two houses were prevailed upon to make, might have carried on the war with fafety to themfelves, till malt and land were mortgaged, till a general excife was established, and the dixieme denier raised by collectors in red coats. And this was juft the circumftance, which it fuited their interefts to be in.

The house of Auftria approved this fcheme, with reafon; fince, whatever would be obtained by the blood and treasure of others, was to acerue to that family; while they only lent their name to the cause.

The Dutch might perhaps have grown refty under their burthen; but care was like wife taken of that, by a barrier-treaty made with the States,

which deferveth fuch epithets as I care not to beflow; but may perhaps confider it, at a proper occafion, in a Difcourfe by itself. *

By this treaty, the condition of the war, with refpect to the Dutch, was wifely altered; they fought no longer for fecurity, but for grandeur; and we, inflead of labouring to make them fafe, muft beggar ourselves to make them formidable.

Will any one contend, that if, at the treaty of Gertruydenburgh, we could have been satisfied with fuch terms of a peace as we propofed to ourfelves by the grand alliance, the French would not have allowed them? It is plain they offered many more, and much greater, than ever we thought to infift on when the war began; and they had reason to grant, as well as we to demand them; fince conditions of peace do certainly turn upon events of war. But, furely, there is fome measure to be observed in this: thofe, who have defended the proceedings of our negotiators at the treaty of Gertruydenburgh, dwell very much upon their zeal and patience in endeavouring to work the French up to their demands; but fay nothing to juftify thofe demands, or the probability that France would ever accept them. Some of the articles in that treaty were so very extravagant, that, in all human probability, we could not have obtained them by a fuccessful war of forty years. One of them was inconfiftent with common reafon; wherein the confederates reserved to themselves full liberty of demanding

* Which Difcourfe follows next in this volume.

demanding what further conditions they should think fit; and in the mean time, France was to deliver up feveral of their ftrongest towns in a month. These articles were very gravely figned by our plenipotentiaries, and thofe of Holland; but not by the French, although it ought to have been done interchangeably; nay, they were brought over by the fecretary of the embaffy; and the minifters here, prevailed on the Queen to execute a ratification of articles, which only one part had figned. This was an absurdity in form, as well as in reason; because the ufual form of a ratification is with a preamble, fhewing, That whereas our minifters, and thofe of the allies, and of the enemy, have figned, &c. We ratify, &c. The perfon* who brought over the articles, faid in all companies, (and perhaps believed) that it was a pity we had not demanded more; for the French were in a difpofition to refufe us nothing we would afk. One of our plenipotentiaries affected to have the fame concern; and particularly, that we had not obtained fome further fecurity for the empire on the Upper Rhine.

What could be the defign of all this grimace, but to amuse the people, and to raise ftocks for their friends in the fecret to fell to advantage? I have too great a refpect for the abilities of thofe, who acted in this negotiation, to believe they hoped for any other iffue from it, than that we found by the event. Give me leave to suppose, the continuance of the war was the thing at heart among

* Horatio Walpole, Secretary to that embaffy.

among those in power, both abroad and at home; and then I can easily fhew the confiftency of their proceedings, otherwife they are wholly unaccountable and abfurd. Did those, who infifted on fuch wild demands, ever fincerely intend a peace? Did they really think, that going on with the war was more eligible for the country, than the leaft abatement of thofe conditions? Was the fmalleft of them worth fix millions a year, and an hundred thousand mens lives? Was there no way to provide for the fafety of Britain, or the fecurity of its trade, but by the French king's turning his arms to beat his own grandfon out of Spain? If these able ftatefmen were fo truly concerned for our trade, which they made the pretence of the war's beginning, as well as continuance; why did they so neglect it in those very preliminaries, where the enemy made fo many conceffions, and where all that related to the advantage of Holland, or the other confederates, was exprefly settled? But whatever concerned us was to be left to a general treaty; no tariff agreed on with France or the Low-Countries; only the Scheld was to remain fhut, which must have ruined our commerce with Antwerp. Our trade with Spain was referred the fame way; but this, they will pretend to be of no confequence, because that kingdom was to be under the house of Austria, and we have already made a treaty with K. Charles. I have indeed heard of a treaty made by Mr. Stanhope with that prince, for fettling our commerce with Spain: but whatever it were, there was another between VOL. II.

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us and Holland, which went hand in hand with it, I mean that of barrier, wherein a clause was inferted, by which all advantages propofed for Britain, are to be in common with Holland.

Another point, which, I doubt, those have not confidered, who are against any peace without Spain, is, that the face of affairs in Chriftendom, fince the Emperor's death, hath been very much changed. By this accident, the views and interefts of feveral princes and ftates in the alliance, have taken a new turn; and I believe it will be found, that ours ought to do so too. We have fufficiently blundered once already, by changing our measures, with regard to a peace, while our affairs continued in the fame pofture; and it will be too much, in confcience, to blunder again, by not changing the firft, when the others are fo much altered.

To have a prince of the Auftrian family on the throne of Spain, is undoubtedly more defireable than one of the house of Bourbon; but, to have the Empire and Spanish monarchy united in the fame perfon, is a dreadful confideration, and directly oppofite to that wife principle on which the eighth article of the alliance is founded.

To this, perhaps, it will be objected, that the indolent character of the Auftrian princes, the wretched œconomy of that government, the want of a naval force, the remote distance of their feveral territories from each other, would never fuffer an emperor, although, at the fame time, king of Spain, to become formidable; on the contrary, that his dependence muft continually be