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as his not contributing his contingent to the empire, whercof he is a member, was excufed by the preffures he lay under, having a confederacy to deal with.
In this war, the king of Sweden was victorious; and what dangers were we not then exposed to ? what fears were we not in? He marched into Saxony, and if he had really been in the French intereft, might at once have put us under the greatest difficulties. But the torrent turned another way; and he contented himself with imposing on his enemy the treaty of Alt Rastadt; by which K. Auguflus makes an absolute cession of the crown of Poland, renounc:s any title to it, acknowledges S:anislaus; and then, both he and the king of Sweden, join in defiring the guarantee of England and Holland. The Queen did not indeed give this guarantee in form; but, as a step towards it, the title of King was given to StanisJaus, by a letter from her Majesty; and the strongett assurances were given to the Swedish minister, in her Majesty's name, and a committee of council, that the guarantee should speedily be granted; and that, in the mean while, it was the same thing as if the forms were pafled.
In 1908, K. Auguftus niade the campaign in Flanders: what measures he might at that time take, or of what nature the arguments might be, that he inade use of, is not known: but, immediately after, he breaks through all that he had done, marches into Poland, and reafumes the crown. After this, we apprehended, that the peace of
the empire might be endangered; and therefore, entered into an act of guarantee, for the neutrality of it. The king of Sweden refused, upon several accounts, to submit to the terms of this treaty; particularly, because we went out of the empire, to cover Poland and Jutland, but did not go out of it to cover the territories of Sweden.
Let us therefore consider, what is our case at present. If the king of Sweden return, and get the better, he will think himself under no obligation of having any regard to the interests of the allies; but will naturally pursue, according to his own expression, his enemy wherever he finds him. In this case, the corps of the neutrality is obliged to oppose him; and so we are engaged in a fecond war, before the first be ended.
If the northern confederates succeed against Sweden, how shall we be able to preserve the balance of power in the north, fo effential to our trade, as well as in many other respects? What will become of that great support of the protestant interest in Germany, which is the footing that the Swedes now have in the empire? Or, who shall answer, that these princes, after they have settled the north to their minds, may not take a fancy to look fouthward, and make our peace with France according to their own schemes ?
And lastly, if the King of Prussia, the Elector of Hanover, and other princes, whose dominions ly contiguous, be forced to draw from those armies which act against France, we must live in hour. ly expectation of having those troops recalled, which they now leave with us; and this recal may happen in the midst of a fiege, or on the eve of a battle. Is it therefore our intereft, to toil on in a ruinous war, for an impracticable end, till one of these cases fhall happen, or to get under shelter before the storm ?
There is no doubt but the present ministry (provided they could get over the obligations of honour and conscience) might find their advantage in auvising the continuance of the war, as well as the last did, although not in the same degree, after the kingdom hath been so much exhausted. They might prolong it, till the parliament desire a peace; and, in the mean time, leave them in full possession of power. Therefore, it is plain, that their proceedings at present, are meant to serve their country directly against their private interest; whatever clamour may be raised by those, who, for the vileft ends, would remove heaven and earth to oppose their measures. But they think it infinitely better, to accept such terms as will fecure our trade, find a fufficient barrier for the States, give reasonable satisfaction to the Emperor, and restore the tranquillity of Europe, although without adding Spain to the empire ; rather than go on in a languishing way, upon the vain expectation of some improbable turn, for the recovery of that monarchy out of the Bourbon family; and at last be forced to a worfe peace, by some of the allies falling off, upon our utter ina-bility to continue the war.
REMARKS on the BARRIER-TREATY
between her Majesty and the States-General.
To which are added, The said BARRIER-TREA
TY, with the two separate articles ; Part of the counter-project: The sentiments of Prince Eugene and Count Sinzendorf upon the faiel treaty; and, A representation of the English merchants at Bruges.
Written in the year 1712.
'HEN I published the discourse, called, The
conduct of the Allies, I had thoughts, either of inserting, or annexing, the Barrier-treaty at length, with such observations as I conceived might be useful for public information : but that discourse taking up more room than I designed, after my utmost endeavours to abbreviate it, I. contented myself only with making some few reflections upon that famous treaty, sufficient, as I thought, to answer the design of my book. I - have since heard, that my readers in general seemed to wish I had been more particular, and have discovered an impatience to have that treaty made public, especially since it hath been laid before the House of Commons.
That I'may give some light to the reader, who is not well versed in those affairs, he may please to know, that a project for a treaty of Barrier with the States, was transmitted hither from Holland; but, being disapproved of by our court in several parts, a new project or scheme of a treaty was drawn up here, with many additions and alterations. This last was called the counter-project; and was the measure, whereby the Duke of Marlborough and my Lord Townshend were commanded and instructed to proceed in negociating a treaty of barrier with the States.
I have added a translation of this counter-project, in those articles where it differs from the barrier-treaty, that the reader, by comparing them together, may judge how punctually those negociators observed their instructions. I have likewise subjoined the sentiments of Prince Eugene of Savoy, and the Count de Sinzendorf, relating to this treaty, written, I suppose, while it was negociating. And lastly, I have added a copy of the representation of the British merchants at Bruges, fignifying what inconveniencies they already felt, and further apprehended from this barrier-treaty