§ 292. The objections raised against the adoption of the Constitution were of very different natures, and, in some instances, of entirely opposite characters. They will be found embodied in various public documents, in the printed opinions of distinguished men, in the debates of the respective State conventions, and in a still more authentic shape in the numerous amendments proposed by these conventions, and accompanying their acts of ratification. It is not easy to reduce them all into general heads; but the most material will here be enumerated, not only to admonish us of the difficulties of the task of framing a general government, but to prepare us the better to understand and expound the Constitution itself. § 293. Some of the objections were to the supposed defects and omissions in the instrument; others were to the nature and extent of the powers conferred by it; and others, again, to the fundamental plan or scheme of its organization. (1) It was objected, in the first place, that the scheme of government was radically wrong, because it was not a confederation of the States, but a government over individuals.1 It was said that the federal form, which regards the Union as a confederation of sovereign States, ought to have been preserved; instead of which the convention had framed a national government, which regards the Union as a consolidation of States.2 This objection was far from being universal; for many admitted that there ought to be a government over individuals to a certain extent but by no means to the extent proposed. It is obvious. that this objection, pushed to its full extent, went to the old question of the confederation, and was but a reargument of the point whether there should exist a national government adequate to the protection and support of the Union. In its mitigated form it was a mere question as to the extent of powers to be confided to the general government, and was to be classed accordingly. It was urged, however, with no inconsiderable force and emphasis; and its supporters predicted with confidence that a government so organized would soon become corrupt and tyrannical, "and absorb the legislative, executive, and judicial powers of the several States, and produce from their ruins one consolidated government which, from the nature of things, would be an 1 The Federalist, Nos. 38, 39; 2 Amer. Museum, 422; Id. 543, 546. 2 The Federalist, No. 39; Id. No. 38; 2 Pitk. Hist. 270, 272. iron-handed despotism." 1 Uniform experience, it was said, had demonstrated 2 "that a very extensive territory cannot be governed on the principles of freedom otherwise than by a confederacy of republics, possessing all the powers of internal government, but united in the management of their general and foreign concerns."3 Indeed, any scheme of a general government, however guarded, appeared to some minds (which possessed the public confidence) so entirely impracticable, by reason of the extensive territory of the United States, that they did not hesitate to declare their opinion that it would be destructive of the civil liberty of the citizens. (a) And others of equal eminence foretold that it would commence in a moderate aristocracy, and end either in a monarchy or a corrupt, oppressive aristocracy.5 It was not denied that, in form, the Constitution was strictly republican; for all its powers were derived directly or indirectly from the people, and were administered by functionaries holding their offices during pleasure, or for a limited period, or during good behavior; and in these respects it bore an exact similitude to the State governments, whose republican character had never been doubted." § 294. But the friends of the Constitution met the objection by asserting the indispensable necessity of a form of government like that proposed, and demonstrating the utter imbecility of a mere confederation, without powers acting directly upon individuals. They considered that the Constitution was partly federal and partly national in its character and distribution of powers. In its origin and establishment it was federal.7 In some of its relations it was federal, in others national. In the Senate it was federal; in the House of Representatives it was national; in the executive it was of a compound character; in the operation of its powers it was national; in the extent of its pow 1 Address of the Minority of Penn. Convention, 2 Amer. Museum, 542, 543. See also 2 Pitk. Hist. 272, 273. 22 Amer. Museum, 542. See also 2 Amer. Museum, 422, 423, 424. 4 Yates and Lansing's Letter, 3 Amer. Museum, 156, 157; Mr. Jay's Letter, 1787, 3 Amer. Muscum, 554, 562. The same objection is repeatedly taken notice of in the Federalist, as one then beginning to be prevalent. The Federalist, Nos. 1, 2, 9, 13, 14, 23. Mr. George Mason's Letter, 2 Amer. Museum, 534, 536. (a) Life of Samuel Adams, III. 251. 7 Id. ers federal. It acted on individuals, and not on States merely. But its powers were limited, and left a large mass of sovereignty in the States. In making amendments, it was also of a compound character, requiring the concurrence of more than a majority, and less than the whole of the States. So that on the whole their conclusion was, that "the Constitution is, in strictness, neither a national nor a federal Constitution, but a composition of both. In its foundation it is federal, not national; in the sources from which the ordinary powers of the government are drawn, it is partly federal and partly national; in the operation of these powers it is national, not federal; in the extent of them, again, it is federal, not national; and, finally, in the authoritative mode of introducing amendments it is neither wholly federal nor wholly national."1 § 295. Time has in this, as in many other respects, assuaged the fears and disproved the prophecies of the opponents of the Constitution. It has gained friends in its progress. The States still flourish under it with a salutary and invigorating energy; and its power of direct action upon the people has hitherto proved a common blessing, giving dignity and spirit to the government adequate to the exigencies of war, and preserving us from domestic dissensions and unreasonable burdens in times of peace. § 296. (2) If the original structure of the government was, as has been shown, a fertile source of opposition, another objection of a more wide and imposing nature was drawn from the nature and extent of its powers. This, indeed, like the former, gave rise to most animated discussions, in which reason was employed to demonstrate the mischiefs of the system, and imagination to portray them in all the exaggerations which fear and prophecy could invent. Looking back, indeed, to that period with the calmness with which we naturally review events and occurrences which are now felt only as matters of history, one is surprised at the futility of some of the objections, the absurdity of others, and the overwrought coloring of almost all, which 1 The Federalist, No. 39. See also 1 Tucker's Black. App. 145, 146. The whole reasoning contained in the 39th number of the Federalist (of which the above is merely a summary) deserves a thorough examination by every statesman. See also on the same subject, Dane's App. § 14, p. 25, &c.; § 35, p. 44, &c.; 1 Tucker's Black. Comm. App. 146, &c.; the Federalist, No. 9; 3 Dall. R. 473. were urged on this head against the Constitution. That some of them had a just foundation need not be denied or concealed; for the system was human, and the result of compromise and conciliation, in which something of correctness of theory was yielded to the interests or prejudices of particular States, and something of inequality of benefit borne for the common good. With § 297. The objections from different quarters were not only of different degrees and magnitude, but often of totally opposite natures. With some persons the mass of the powers was a formidable objection; with others the distribution of those powers. With some the equality of vote in the Senate was exceptionable; with others the inequality of representation in the House. some the power of regulating the times and places of elections was fatal; with others the power of regulating commerce by a bare majority. With some the power of direct taxation was an intolerable grievance; with others the power of indirect taxation by duties on imports. With some the restraint of the State legislatures from laying duties upon exports and passing ex post facto laws was incorrect; with others the lodging of the executive power in a single magistrate. With some the term of office of the senators and representatives was too long; with others the term of office of the President was obnoxious to a like censure, as well as his re-eligibility.2 With some the intermixture of the legislative, executive, and judicial functions in the Senate was a mischievous departure from all ideas of regular government; with others the non-participation of the House of Representatives in the same functions was the alarming evil. With some the powers of the President were alarming and dangerous to liberty; with others the participation of the Senate in some of those powers. With some the powers of the judiciary were far too extensive; with others the power to make treaties even with the consent of two-thirds of the Senate. the power to keep up a standing army was a sure introduction to despotism; with others the power over the militia.3 With some the paramount authority of the Constitution, treaties, and laws of the United States was a dangerous feature; with others. 1 2 Amer. Museum, 534, 536, 540; Id. 427, 435; Id. 547, 555. With some 2 3 Amer. Museum, 62; 2 Pitk. Hist. 283, 284; The Federalist, Nos. 71, 72. 8 See 2 Amer. Museum, 422, &c.; Id. 435; Id. 434; Id. 540, &c., 543, &c.; Id. 553; 3 Amer. Museum, 62; Id. 157; Id. 419, 420, &c. the small number composing the Senate and the House of Representatives was an alarming and corrupting evil.1 § 298. In the glowing language of those times the people were told, "that the new government will not be a confederacy of States, as it ought, but one consolidated government, founded upon the destruction of the several governments of the States. The powers of Congress, under the new Constitution, are complete and unlimited over the purse and the sword, and are perfectly independent of and supreme over the State governments, whose intervention in these great points is entirely destroyed. By virtue of their power of taxation, Congress may command the whole or any part of the properties of the people. They may impose what imposts upon commerce, they may impose what land taxes, and taxes, excises, and duties on all instruments, and duties on every fine article that they may judge proper. "Congress may monopolize every source of revenue, and thus indirectly demolish the State governments; for without funds they could not exist." "As Congress have the control over the time of the appointment of the President, of the senators, and of the representatives of the United States, they may prolong their existence in office for life by postponing the time of their election and appointment from period to period, under various pretences." "When the spirit of the people shall be gradually broken, when the general government shall be firmly established, and when a numerous standing army shall render opposition vain, the Congress may complete the system of despotism in renouncing all dependence on the people, by continuing themselves and their children in the government." 2 § 299. A full examination of the nature and extent of the objections to the several powers given to the general government will more properly find a place when those powers come successively under review in our commentary on the different parts of the Constitution itself. The outline here furnished may serve to show what those were which were presented against them as an aggregate or mass. It is not a little remarkable that some of the most formidable applied with equal force to the Articles 1 Many of the objections are summed up in the Federalist, No. 38, with great force and ability. 2 Address of the Minority in the Pennsylvania Convention, 2 Amer. Museum, 536, 543, 544, 545. See also the Address of Virginia, 2 Pitk. History, 334. |