these were "questions which pertain to national sovereignty, and which every power must determine for itself and upon its own responsibility." s Mr. Fish reporting as Secretary of State to the President under date of July 14, 1870, in connection with his comments upon the similarity between the action of the United States in throwing off the sovereignty of Great Britain and the action of the Spanish American colonies in declaring their independence from the sovereignty of Spain, said: Thus the United States were forced into new lines of action, which, though apparently in some respects conflicting, were really in harmony with the line marked out by Washington. The avoidance of entangling political alliances, and the maintenance of our own independent neutrality became doubly important from the fact that they became applicable to the new republics as well as to the mother country. The duty of non-interference had been admitted by every President. The question came up in the time of the first Adams, on the occasion of the enlistment projects of Miranda. It appeared again under Jefferson (anterior to the revolt of the Spanish colonies) in the schemes of Aaron Burr. It was an ever present question in the administrations of Madison, Monroe, and the younger Adams, in reference to the questions of foreign enlistment or equipment in the United States, and when these new republics entered the family of nations, many of them very feeble, and all too much subject to internal revolution and civil war, a strict adherence to our previous policy and a strict enforcement of our laws became essential to the preservation of friendly relations with them.* In 1883-one of the periods when the controversy between Venezuela and Great Britain was particularly acute with reference to the boundary dispute between Venezuela and British Guiana-Secretary Frelinghuysen was urging upon the Venezuelan Government the desirability of arbitrating with Great Britain the question of the disputed boundary. Secretary Frelinghuysen said: So far as the U. S. can counsel and assist Venezuela, it believes it best to confine its reply to the renewal of the suggestion of arbitration, and the offer of all its good offices in that direction." Notwithstanding the foregoing rules of conduct with reference to the right of Europe to wage war against Latin American nations and the responsibilities of Latin American nations as independent sovereignties considered from the viewpoint of the principles of the Monroe Doctrine, yet the United States took the position during the administration of President Cleveland that the United States would not look with favor upon interference by European powers in revolutionary disturbances in Latin American countries. The posi 'MS., Instructions, Great Britain, vol. XVII, p. 195. tion was taken with reference to a revolution in Brazil which occurred in 1893 as to which President Cleveland, in his annual message of December 3, 1894, said: It appearing at an early stage of the insurrection that its course would call for unusual watchfulness on the part of this Government, our naval force in the harbor of Rio de Janeiro was strengthened. This precaution, I am satisfied, tended to restrict the issue to a simple trial of strength between the Brazilian Government and the insurgents and to avert complications which at times seemed imminent. Our firm attitude of neutrality was maintained to the end. In his message of December 3, 1901, President Roosevelt declared: This doctrine has nothing to do with the commercial relations of any American power, save that it in truth allows each of them to form such as it desires. We do not guarantee any state against punishment if it misconducts itself, provided that punishment does not take the form of the acquisition of territory by any non-American power.' This was said with reference to the proposed enforcement against Venezuela of the claims of Germany. 6 Messages and Papers of the Presidents (1917 ed.), vol. xii, p. 5956. 7 Ibid., vol. xv, p. 6663. THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE TO INTERVENTION IN LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES BY FOREIGN POWERS AND BY THE UNITED STATES The course of the United States does not seem to have been consistent with reference to its attitude toward its own intervention or the intervention of European powers in disputes between Latin American countries or between Latin American countries and Europe. As is pointed out in another section, the United States has repeatedly affirmed that the Monroe Doctrine did not protect Latin American countries from war with European countries nor among themselves. However, in almost every case in which the United States has affirmed this principle, it has coupled it with a reservation that the war must not lead to permanent occupation of any American territory by any European power. For example, in 1860 Secretary Cass when he informed the French Chargé d'Affaires regarding the attitude of the United States with reference to the right of France to compel Mexico even by force to do justice, added that "the permanent occupation of any part of the territory of Mexico by a foreign power, or an attempt in any manner forcibly to interfere in its internal concerns or to control its political destiny, would give great dissatisfaction to the United States," and that this policy which was known to all the powers would be "adhered to under all circumstances." 1 A little later (November 30, 1861) when the Ministers of Spain, France, and Great Britain invited the United States to join them in combined action against Mexico in order to redress the grievances which the various Governments had suffered at the hands of that country, the Secretary of State, communicating the views of the President, declared, after reciting the freedom of action of Spain, France, and Great Britain to resort to war against Mexico if they regarded this as necessary in order to redress their grievances: The United States have a deep interest which, however, they are happy to believe is an interest held by them in common with the high contracting powers and with all other civilized states, that neither of the sovereigns by whom the convention has been concluded shall seek or obtain any acquisition of territory or any advantage peculiar to itself, and not equally left open to the United States and every other civilized state, within the territories of Mexico, and especially that neither one nor all of the contracting parties shall, as a result or consequence of the hostilities to be inaugurated under the convention, exer cise in the subsequent affairs of Mexico any influence of a character to impair the right of the Mexican people to choose and freely to constitute the form of its own government. During 1850 and 1851 there existed between Santo Domingo and Haiti a war which was characterized by Sir Henry Bulwer in his instruction to Mr. Usher, the British Consul at Port au Prince asbarbarous hostilities hostilities abhorrent to humanity, destructive to commerce, and threatening, by the possibility of jealousies or differences arising out of the intervention or supposed desire of intervention of one or other of the great powers interested in this question, to disturb the general good understanding which at present prevails between all such powers and Great Britain." On February 22, 1850, a circular letter was addressed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Dominican Republic to the American, British, and French Consuls at Santo Domingo City, soliciting the mediation of the three powers for bringing peace between the Empire of Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Mr. Webster, approving the instructions of the British Foreign Office to its Consul, Mr. Usher-which instructions the French Government also adopted-stated that he expected Mr. Walsh would be governed by those instructions, and then added: On arriving at Port au Prince you will accordingly seek a conference with Mr. Usher and the consul of France upon the subject of your mission, and particularly with a view of inducing the Emperor Soulouque to consent to a lengthened truce, or a permanent peace with the Dominicans. As in cooperating for this end the three governments are actuated by philanthropic views, to which they believe any material interests which all or either may have in the question are quite subordinate, you will endeavor, in all your communications with your colleagues, and with either the Dominican or the Haytien governments, to keep your mind free from any prejudice resulting from color or forms of government. You will not deny justice to the Emperor Soulouque because he and his subjects are of African extraction and his government professes to be monarchical; and you will not be partial in your judgments in favor of the Dominican government because its officers are supposed to be for the most part of the Castilian race, and because it claims to be republican in its form. The material interests of the three countries, however, are largely involved in the restoration and preservation of peace between the contending parties in St. Domingo. France is a creditor of the government of the Emperor Soulouque to a large amount. She can not hope for a discharge of her debt when the resources of his country, instead of being developed by pacific pursuits and in part, at least, applied to that purpose, are checked in their growth and wasted in a war with a conterminous state. Great Britain and France are both interested in securing that great additional demand for their productions which must result from the impulse to be expected for industry in Hayti and the Dominican Republic from a termination of the war; and the "H. Ex. Doc. No. 100, 37th Cong., 2d sess., p. 188. 8 Moore, ibid., p. 511. United States have a similar interest, both from the augmentation of their trade with the island which would then ensue and from the consideration that their commercial prosperity is intimately connected with that of both France and Great Britain. When, therefore, you shall have held free and full conferences with your colleagues and shall have ascertained the reciprocal claims of the parties to the war, if the Emperor Soulouque shall insist upon maintaining a belligerent attitude until all his demands shall have been satisfied by the opposite party, you will unite with your colleagues in remonstrating against this course on his part. If the remonstrance should prove to be unavailing, you will signify to the Emperor that you shall give immediate notice to your government, that the President, with the concurrence of Congress, may adopt such measures, in coöperation with the governments of England and France, as may cause the intervention of the three powers to be respected; and you will lose no time in communicating the result to this department. The Emperor should be made properly aware of the dangers which he and his country may encounter, if he should be unfortunately advised to reject reasonable terms of pacification; but you will stop at remonstrance until further orders. If, however, your joint and concurrent representations should induce the Emperor Soulouque to make an abatement of his demands, which you and your colleagues may deem reasonable, you will, in concert with them, make this known to the Dominican Government, and will recommend their adoption of a peace on that basis. You will, however, give a patient hearing to any objections which that government may advance, and if you and your colleagues should deem those objections solid, you will communicate them to the minister for foreign affairs of Hayti and will require from him an answer to them. If this answer should not be given within a reasonable time, or if when given it should not prove to be satisfactory, you will then, conjointly with your colleagues, require the Emperor to conclude a permanent peace with the Dominican government, upon the basis which you may jointly prescribe to him, or to consent to a truce with that government of not less than ten years. You will write to the department as frequently as opportunities may permit, in order that, if further instructions should be necessary, they may, after consultation with the ministers of Great Britain and France, be transmitted accordingly." As to the measures of force which might be taken against the Empire of Haiti should that country prove recalcitrant and refuse any mediation, Mr. Moore glosses the British instructions as follows: Should the Government of Hayti persist in refusing the "mediation," the Emperor was to be menaced, as a last resort, with the determination of the powers to have the terms proposed adopted in the main, or at all events not to allow the war to continue or to recommence till other terms had been "submitted by the mediating powers in lieu thereof." The measures of coercion which England and France would be willing to adopt were at the moment confined to a blockade of Haytian ports, such as Port au Prince, Jacmel, Aux Cayes, Gonaives; but, if it should seem that a blockade would not suffice to obtain the object in view, the menace of force, if made at all, should be made in such vague terms as would not commit Her Majesty's Government to employ force, till it should learn what species of force would be necessary. In the unforeseen contingency of a plan acceptable to Hayti being rejected by Santo 'S. Doc. No. 113, 32d Cong., 1st sess., pp. 3-4. |