Domingo, all that could be asked of the Haytian Government would be a suspension of hostilities till fresh instructions could be obtained." When in 1860 (July) France and Great Britain invited the United States to join in sending an identic note to the Miramon and Juarez Governments in Mexico suggesting that they call a National Assembly to adjust the differences between them, Secretary Cass after consulting President Buchanan, sent to Lord Lyons, the British representative in Washington, a note which has been glossed and quoted by Mr. Moore as follows: 66 the general policy of the United States was opposed to any interference, especially the joint interference, of other powers in the domestic affairs of an independent nation;" that the motives of this policy were peculiarly strong in case of Mexico; that the President had recognized the Juarez Government as a constitutional one, which had in fact a far larger popular support than any other; that he would therefore be very unwilling to take any step which would appear to discredit the Juarez Government or put it on the same level as its opponent; that he could not see any practical good to result from the joint intervention, and that, while desiring the happiest results from the proposed action of England and France, he did not feel either disposed or authorized to make the United States a party to it." In 1866 (June 2) Mr. Seward instructing Mr. Kilpatrick, our Minister to Chile, regarding the war then waging between Chile and Spain, made the following observations: The policy of the United States in regard to the several Spanish American States, is, or ought to be well known now, after the exposition it has received during the last five years. We avoid in all cases giving encouragement to expectations which, in the varying course of events, we might find ourselves unable to fulfil; and we desire to be known as doing more than we promise rather than falling short of our engagements. On the other hand, we maintain and insist with all the decision and energy which is compatible with our existing neutrality, that the Republican system which is accepted by the people in any one of those States shall not be wantonly assailed, and that it shall not be subverted as an end of a lawful war, by European Powers. We thus give to those Republics the moral support of a sincere, liberal, and as we think it will appear, a useful friendship. We could claim from foreign States no concession to our own political, moral, and material principles or interests if we should not conform our own proceedings in the needful intercourse with foreign States to the just rules of the laws of nations. We, therefore, concede to every nation the right to make peace or war, for such causes other than political or ambitious as it thinks right and wise. In such wars as are waged between nations which are in friendship with ourselves, if they are not pushed like the French war in Mexico, to the political point before mentioned, we do not intervene, but remain neutral, conceding nothing to one belligerent that we do not concede to the other, and allowing to one belligerent what we allow to the other. We certainly thought that it was an act of friendship on our part that we obtained assurances from Spain, at the beginning, and at other stages of the present war, that, in any event her hostilities against Chile should not be prosecuted beyond the limits which I have before described. We understand ourselves now and henceforth ready to hold Spain to this agreement, if, contrary to our present expectations, it should be found necessary. In this we think we are acting a part, certainly not unfriendly to Chile. It was thought to be an act of friendship when we used our good offices with both parties to prevent the war. We have thought we were acting a friendly part using the same good offices to secure an agreement for peace without dishonor, or even damage to Chile. Those who think that the United States could enter as an ally into every war in which a friendly Republican State on this continent becomes involved, forget that peace is the constant interest and the unwavering policy of the United States. They forget the frequency and variety of wars in which our friends in this hemisphere engage themselves entirely independent of all control or counsel of the United States. We have no armies for the purpose of aggressive war; no ambition for the character of a regulator. Our Constitution is not an Imperial one, and does not allow the Executive Government to engage in war except upon the well considered and deliberate decree of the Congress of the United States. A federal government consisting of thirty-six equal States, which are in many respects self-governing, cannot easily be committed by its representatives to foreign wars, either of sympathy or of ambition. If there is any one characteristic of the United States which is more marked than any other, it is that they have from the time of Washington adhered to the principle of non-intervention, and have perseveringly declined to seek, or contract entangling alliances, even with the most friendly States." In 1860, Secretary Cass expressed himself with reference to a dispute between Spain and Venezuela, and in response to an intimation that Venezuela desired the interposition of the United States, as follows: it is the established policy of this Country not to interfere with the relations of foreign nations to each other and that it would be both improper and impossible for the United States to decide upon the course of conduct towards Venezuela which Spain may think required by her honor or her interests. But if this Government can by any informal action serve as a means of bringing about the reconciliation so much to be desired, it will be a subject of great satisfaction to the President to be instrumental for such a purpose.* The note of the Venezuelan Minister was therefore transmitted to the American Minister at Madrid, with instructions to tender his good offices to the Governments of Spain and Venezuela, if in his discretion he thought the opportunity favorable to an effort for a more friendly understanding between them, and if such offer could be made without offence to the Spanish Government. In 1881 Mr. Blaine declared to Mr. Morton, the American Minister to France (September 5) that it was inexpedient for the United 'MS., Instructions, Chile, vol. xv, pp. 334–337. 8 MS., Notes to Venezuela, vol. 1, p. 69; Moore, International Law Digest, vol. VI, pp. 530-531. States to unite with France and Great Britain in intervening to terminate hostilities between Chile and Peru." Mr. Moore records that on March 9, 1880 with reference to the possible renewal by France, Germany, and Great Britain of the project of intervention, which they had in contemplation in 1879, to bring about a settlement of the quarrel between Chile on the one hand and Peru and Bolivia on the other, the American ministers at Lima, La Paz, and Santiago were instructed, in case the pressure of the governments in question upon the combatants should tend to assume a coercive character, to preserve an attitude which would facilitate a joint and friendly resort to the good offices of the United States.10 Mr. Frelinghuysen instructing Mr. Logan, our Minister to Chile, on March 7, 1883, stated (this is glossed by Mr. Moore) that: The action of the American diplomatic representative at Lima, in February, 1883, in uniting with the representatives of France, Great Britain, and Italy in submitting to their respective governments a suggestion that they unite in an interference in the South American difficulties, was taken without authority and without previous communication with the Department of State, and was disapproved." In 1871, Mr. Fish in an instruction to General Schenck, American Minister to England, set out the attitude of the United States with reference to joint action with European powers against Latin American countries in the following language: Baron Gerolt (the German Envoy and Minister Plenipotentiary) yesterday enquired how the Government of the United States would receive the proposal contained in what he said was a Circular addressed by his Government to their Representatives at London, Madrid, Florence and Copenhagen, proposing a joint and concerted movement to urge on Venezuela a more orderly Government, better observance of her engagements, &c., &c. I failed to obtain from the Baron any definition of the precise nature of the proposed movement, or of the precise objects to be attained, or of the extent to which it was in contemplation either to advise or to coerce Venezuela, nor whether coercion was really in contemplation, although he made once an allusion to a "combined fleet" and "guns." The United States is among the creditors of Venezuela, so are France, Holland, Great Britain, Italy, Denmark and Spain. We are not aware that Germany is among the creditors of Venezuela, or that she has any special cause of complaint against that Government for any injuries to her people or commerce. "confiden Her movement therefore in this direction excites some surprise. Baron Gerolt stated that he was directed to make the inquiry tially," and that he was not to make the proposal to the United States unless it would be favorably received. He was told that we had a vivid recollection of a combined European movement against Mexico, a few years since, and that we would wish to know 'Foreign Relations of the United States, 1881, pp. 426-427. the causes of Germany's complaint, and the precise object and means which they proposed and the limits which they intended to prescribe, to their operations. That the United States could not look with indifference, upon any combination of European Powers, against an American State,—that if Germany or any other Power had just cause of war against Venezuela, this Government could interpose no objection to her resorting thereto. If the object of Germany be a united remonstrance to Venezuela against the anarchy and chronic revolutionary condition of that State, or an appeal to honesty in the observance of her engagements, this Government would not object, but would, of itself, make a similar remonstrance and appeal. If, however, the object be, a forcible demonstration of coercion, by a combination of European States, the United States could not regard it with indifference. You will inquire confidentially of Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether any proposal has been made, in behalf of the German Government to that of Great Britain on this subject, and ask whether the Government of Her Majesty has it in contemplation to unite therein. You will at the same time, delicately, but decidedly express the anxiety which the suggestion of the proposition has excited in this Government, and may say that the President hopes that the suggested proposal may not be carried to the extent of disturbing the sensibilities which would be aroused by a combination of European powers against one of the Republics of this Continent." This position was adopted by Mr. Bayard in his instruction to Mr. Scott, the American Minister to Venezuela, on October 14, 1886, in a correspondence which is quoted and glossed by Mr. Moore as follows: 66 66 The minister of the United States at Caracas having, in conversations with the British minister at that capital, reached the conclusion that "great and good results would accrue to both American and English claimants" if the two Governments would make a "joint representation" and employ their "joint cooperation" in securing from Venezuela a settlement of claims, Mr. Bayard replied that the policy of the United States was distinctly opposed to joint action with other powers in the presentation of claims, even when they may arise from an act equally invading the common rights of American citizens and the subjects of another state residing in the country to whose government complaint is made." The United States, said Mr. Bayard, was ready to secure any advantage which might be derived from "a coincident and even identical representation with other powers with regard to matters of common concern, but was averse to joint presentation as the term is strictly understood." A truly joint demand might involve a joint enforcement, and the United States was "indisposed to contemplate such entanglement of its duties and interests with those of another power." It was entirely proper for an American minister so to act "in concert" with his colleagues as to secure the benefit of cooperative action without "the ultimate embarrassments to which united action may be liable." When, in 1871, the German Government had proposed to certain European cabinets the adoption of joint measures to urge upon Venezuela a more orderly government and better observance of her obligations, the United States "took occasion to deprecate such a resort on the ground that a combination to present and enforce such demands by the European powers against an American state could only be observed by the United States with the greatest concern.' 12 99 13 MS., Instructions, Great Britain, vol. xxii, p. 471. 1 International Law Digest, vol. vI, pp. 532-533. In 1851, M. de Sartiges, Minister from France, informed (October 8) the Acting Secretary of State that the French Government had instructed its ships of war in the West Indies "to give assistance to Spain and to prevent by force the adventurers of any nation from landing with hostile intent on the island of Cuba.14 A few days prior to this time the British Chargé d'Affaires at Washington officially advised the Government of the United States that the Government of Great Britain had given similar orders to its naval forces in those waters. The Acting Secretary of State, Mr. Crittenden, commenting upon these interviews, stated (as glossed by Mr. Moore): the President regarded this action of the two powers as a matter of grave importance. The orders had no doubt been occasioned by the then recent unlawful expedition of less than 500 men which had evaded the vigilance of the United States and escaped from New Orleans. The expedition was landed by the steamer Pampero, in Cuba, where it was soon captured, and many of its members were executed. The President did not regard this accident as a sufficient basis for the combined action of the two great European powers. Their object could hardly be accomplished without claiming a dangerous power of visit and search; but, apart from this, there was another point of view in which the intervention of France and England could not be viewed with indifference by the President. The geographical position of Cuba was such that it would become, in the hands of any European nation, an object of just jealousy and apprehension to the people of the United States. The Government of France and other European nations had long been officially apprised that the United States could not see without concern the island transferred by Spain to any other European state. Moreover, the people of the United States were "naturally jealous of European interference in American affairs." "5 In an instruction dated December 2, 1858, Mr. Cass informed Mr. Dodge, our Minister to Spain, with respect to the proposed Spanish operation against Mexico, to take advantage of the opportunity to say to the Spanish Minister, that the United States considered Mexico's "freedom from foreign control" to be "essential to the true policy of the independent states of America.” 16 |