no resort to Force against the South Americans, whatever the result of the mediation might be. To this condition, France and Russia, after some hesitation, assented; but they proposed, that if the South Americans should reject the terms of accommodation to be offered them, with the sanction of the mediating Powers, they should prohibit all commercial intercourse of their subjects respectively with them. To this condition Great Britain declined giving her assent; her motive for which is sufficiently obvious, when it is considered that after the declaration of the United States, the practical operation of such a nonintercourse between the allies and the South Americans, would have been to transfer to the United States, the whole of the valuable commerce carried on with them by the merchants of Great Britain. As a last expedient it was proposed that the Duke of Wellington, should be sent to Madrid, with the joint powers of all the allied Sovereigns, to arrange with the Spanish Cabinet, the terms to be offered to the South Americans, which was again defeated by the Dukes insisting that if he should go, a previous entry should be made upon the protocol at Aix La Chapelle, that no force against the South Americans, was in any result of his Embassy, to be used. But Spain had always connected with the project of the mediation a demand that the allies should ultimately guarantee the restoration of her authority; and finding that this was not to be obtained, she declined accepting the interposition upon any other terms.

But while the Government of the United States have thus taken every occasion offered them in the course of events, to manifest their good wishes in favor of the South Americans, they have never lost sight of the obligations incumbent on them, as avowedly neutral to the contest between them and Spain."1

A little more than a year later, that is on July 5, 1820, Secretary Adams in an instruction to Mr. Middleton, our Minister to Russia, commented at some length upon the differences of European politics with reference to a league of peace. In the course of this instruction he affirmed that the political system of the United States "is also essentially extra-European" and "that for the repose of Europe as well as of America, the European and American political system should be kept as separate and distinct from each other as possible." This instruction is worth quoting at length since in a measure it gives the background which led Secretary Adams to the conclusions which he thus expressed to Mr. Middleton.

The present political system of Europe is founded upon the overthrow of that which had grown out of the French Revolution; and has assumed its shape from the body of Treaties, concluded at Vienna in 1814 and 15, at Paris towards the close of the same year 1815, and at Aix-La-Chapelle in the Autumn of 1818. Its general character is that of a compact between the five principal European Powers, Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia for the preservation of universal Peace. These Powers having then just emerged victorious from a long, portentous and sanguinary struggle against the oppressive predominancy of one of them, under Revolutionary sway, appear to have bent all their faculties, to the substitution of a system which should preserve them from that evil; the preponderancy of one Power by the subjugation, virtual if not nominal of the rest. Whether they perceived in its full extent, considered in its true colours, or provided by judicious arrangements for

"MS., Domestic Letters, vol. xvII, pp. 307-308.

the Revolutionary temper of the weapons by which they had so long been assailed and from which they had so severely suffered, is a question now in a course of solution. Their great anxiety appears to have been to guard themselves each against the other.

The league of Peace, so far as it was a covenant of organized Governments, has proved effectual to its purposes by an experience of five years-its only interruption has been in this hemisphere, though between Nations strictly European; by the invasion of the Portuguese on the territory claimed by Spain, but already lost to her, on the Eastern shore of the Rio de la Plata. This aggression too the European Alliance have undertaken to control; and in connection with it they have formed projects hitherto abortive of interposing in the revolutionary struggle between Spain and her South American colonies.

As a compact between Governments it is not improbable that the European Alliance will last as long as some of the States who are parties to it. The warlike Passions and propensities of the present age find their principal ailment, not in the enmities between nation and nation, but in the internal dissensions between the component parts of all. The war is between nations and their rulers.

The Emperor Alexander, may be considered as the principal patron and founder of the league of Peace. His interest is the most unequivocal in support of it. His Empire is the only party to the compact free from that internal fermentation which threatens the existence of all the rest. His territories are the most extensive, his military establishment the most stupendous, his country the most improvable and thriving of them all. He is therefore naturally the most obnoxious to the jealousy and fears of his Associates, and his circumstances point his policy, to a faithful adhesion to the general system, with a strong reprobation of those who would resort to special and partial alliances, from which any one member of the league should be excluded. This general tendency of his Policy, is corroborated by the mild and religious turn of his individual character. He finds a happy coincidence between the dictates of his conscience and the interest of his Empire and as from the very cir cumstance of his preponderancy, partial alliances might be most easily contracted by him, from the natural resort of the weak for succour to the strong; by discountenancing all such partial combinations, he has the appearance of discarding advantages entirely within his command, and reaps the glory of disinterestedness, while most efficaciously providing for his own security.

Such is accordingly the constant indication of the Russian policy, since the Peace of Paris in 1815. The neighbours of Russia which have the most to dread from her overshadowing and encroaching power, are Persia, Turkey, Austria and Prussia, the two latter of which are members of the European and even of the Holy Alliance, while the two former are not only extra-European in their general policy, but or Religions, which excluded them from ever becoming parties, if not from ever deriving benefit from that singular compact.

The political system of the United States is also essentially Extra-European. To stand in firm and cautious independence of all entanglement in the European system, has been a cardinal point of their policy under every administration of their Government from the Peace of 1783 to this day. If at the original adoption of their system there could have been any doubt of its justice or its wisdom, there can be none at this time. Every year's experience rivets it more deeply in the principles and opinions of the Nation. Yet in proportion as the importance of the United States as one of the members of the general Society of civilized Nations increases in the eyes of the others, the difficulties

of maintaining this system, and the temptations to depart from it increase and multiply with it. The Russian Government has not only manifested an inclina tion that the United States should concur in the general principles of the European league, but a direct though inofficial application has been made by the present Russian Minister here, that the United States should become formal parties to the Holy Alliance. It has been suggested as inducement to obtain their compliance, that this compact bound the parties to no specific engagement of any thing-That it was a pledge of mere principles-That its real as well as its professed purpose was merely the general preservation of Peace and it was intimated that if any question should arise between the United States and other Governments of Europe, the Emperor Alexander desirous of using his influence in their favour, would have a substantial motive and justification for interposing, if he could regard them as his Allies, which as parties to the holy alliance he would.

It is possible that overtures of a similar character may be made to you; but whether they should be or not it is proper to apprize you of the light in which they have been viewed by the President. No direct refusal has been signified to Mr. Poletica. It is presumed that none will be necessary. His instructions are not to make the proposal in form unless with a prospect that it will be successful. It might perhaps be sufficient to answer that the organization of our Government is such as not to admit of our acceding formally to that compact. But it may be added that the President approving its general principles, and thoroughly convinced of the benevolent and virtuous motives which led to the conception and presided at the formation of this system by the Emperor Alexander, believes that the United States will more effectually contribute to the great and sublime objects for which it was concluded, by abstaining from a formal participation in it, than they could as stipulated members of it. As a general declaration of principles, disclaiming the impulses of vulgar ambition and unprincipled aggrandizement and openly proclaiming the peculiarly christian maxims of mutual benevolence and brotherly love to be binding upon the intercourse between Nations no less than upon that of individuals, the United States not only give their hearty assent to the Articles of the holy alliance, but will be among the most earnest and conscientious in observing them. But independent of the prejudices which have been excited against this instrument in the public opinion, which time and an experience of its good effects will gradually wear away, it may be observed that for the repose of Europe as well as of America, the European and American political systems, should be kept as separate and distinct from each other as possible. If the United States, as members of the Holy Alliance could acquire a right to ask the influence of its most powerful member in their controversies with other States; the other members must be entitled in return to ask the influence of the United States, for themselves or against their opponents. In the deliberations of the league they would be entitled to a voice, and in exercising their right must occasionally appeal to principles, which might not harmonize with those of any European member of the Bond. This consideration alone would be decisive for declining a participation in that league, which is the President's absolute and irrevocable determination, although he trusts that no occasion will present itself render. ing it necessary to make that determination known by an explicit refusal."?

On September 4, 1821, the Emperor Alexander issued an imperial ukase which in its pertinent part reads as follows:

"MS., Instructions to United States Ministers, vol. Ix, pp. 19–21.

Observing from Reports submitted to us, that the trade of our subjects on the Aleutian Islands and on the north-west coast of America, appertaining unto Russia, is subject, because of secret and illicit traffic, to oppression and impediments; and finding that the principal cause of these difficulties is the want of rules establishing the boundaries for navigation along these coasts, and the order of naval communication, as well in these places as on the whole of the eastern coast of Siberia and the Kurile Islands, we have deemed it necessary to determine these communications by specific Regulations, which are hereto attached."

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The rules attached to this ukase provided:

1. The pursuits of commerce, whaling, and fishery, and of all other industry on all islands, posts, and gulfs, including the whole of the north-west coast of America, beginning from Behring Straits to the 51° of northern latitude, is exclusively granted to Russian subjects.

2. It is therefore prohibited to all foreign vessels not only to land on the coasts and islands belonging to Russia as stated above, but also, to approach them within less than 00 Italian miles. The transgressor's vessel is subject to confiscation along with the whole cargo."

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On February 25, 1822, Secretary Adams, writing to Chevalier de Poletica regarding this ukase, said:

I am directed by the President of the United States to inform you that he has seen with surprise, in this edict, the assertion of a territorial claim on the part of Russia, extending to the fifty-first degree of north latitude on this continent, and a regulation interdicting to all commercial vessels other than Russian, upon the penalty of seizure and confiscation, the approach upon the high seas within 100 Italian miles of the shores to which that claim is made to apply. The relations of the United States with His Imperial Majesty have always been of the most friendly character; and it is the earnest desire of this Government to preserve them in that state. It was expected, before any act which should define the boundary between the territories of the United States and Russia on this continent, that the same would have been arranged by treaty between the parties. To exclude the vessels of our citizens from the shore, beyond the ordinary distance to which the territorial jurisdiction extends, has excited still greater surprise.

This ordinance affects so deeply the rights of the United States and of their citizens that I am instructed to inquire whether you are authorized to give explanations of the grounds of right, upon principles generally recognized by the laws and usages of nations, which can warrant the claims and regulations contained in it."

The British Government had already, under date of January 18, 1822, made a protest against the ukase of September 4, 1821, through a communication from the Marquis of Londonderry to Count Lieven, the representative of Russia, in which the following language was used:

The Undersigned is directed, till such friendly explanations can take place between the two Governments as may obviate misunderstanding upon so deli

"Alaskan Boundary Tribunal: Appendix to the Case of the United States, vol. I, p. 25.

“Ibid., p. 32.

cate and important a point, to make such provisional protest against the enactments of the Ukase as may fully serve to save the rights of His Majesty's Crown, and may protect the persons and properties of His Majesty's subjects from molestation in the exercise of their lawful callings in that quarter of the globe.

The Undersigned is commanded to acquaint Count Lieven that it being the King's constant desire to respect, and cause to be respected by his subjects in the fullest manner, the Emperor of Russia's just rights, His Majesty will be ready to enter into amicable explanations upon the interests affected by this instrument, in such manner as may be most acceptable to His Imperial Majesty.

In the meantime, upon the subject of this Ukase generally, and especially upon the two main principles of claim laid down therein, viz., an exclusive sovereignty alleged to belong to Russia over the territories therein described, as also the exclusive right of navigating and trading within the maritime limits therein set forth, his Britannic Majesty must be understood as hereby reserving all his rights, not being prepared to admit that the intercourse which is allowed on the face of this instrument to have hitherto subsisted on those coasts, and in those seas, can be deemed to be illicit, or that the ships of friendly Powers, even supposing an unqualified sovereignty was proved to appertain to the Imperial Crown in these vast and very imperfectly occupied territories, could, by the acknowledged law of nations, be excluded from navigating within the distance of 100 Italian miles as therein laid down from the coast, the exclusive dominion of which is assumed (but, as His Majesty's Government conceive, in error) to belong to His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias."

On August 8, 1822, Mr. Middleton, reporting to Secretary Adams, stated:

For some time past I began to perceive that the provisions of the ukase would not be persisted in. It appears to have been signed by the Emperor without sufficient examination, and may be fairly considered as having been surreptitiously obtained. There can be little doubt, therefore, that with a little patience and management it will be molded into a less objectionable shape."

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On April 12, 1823, Baron Tuyll wrote to Secretary Adams suggesting that the differences between the two Governments regarding the northwestern coast of the United States should be "terminated by means of friendly negotiation," and added that Russia had already persuaded the British Government to adopt this course.

On May 7 Secretary Adams acknowledged the communication from Baron Tuyll and observed:

Penetrated with these sentiments, and anxiously seeking to promote their perpetuation, the President readily accedes to the proposal that the minister of the United States at the court of His Imperial Majesty should be furnished with powers for negotiating, upon principles adapted to those sentiments, the adjustment of the interests and rights which have been brought into collision

75

Alaskan Boundary Tribunal: Appendix to the Case of the United States, vol. II, p. 105.

76 Ibid., p. 42.