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(3) Any interposition, by any European power, for the purpose of oppressing or controlling in any other manner the destinies of the Latin American Governments "who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have on great consideration and just principles acknowledged."
(4) Noninterference by the United States with the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power.
(5) Policy of leaving Spanish American colonies and Spain to themselves in the hope that other powers will pursue the same
Behind the Doctrine, though not expressly stated in words by President Monroe, is the principle of the complete political separation of Europe and the Americas, or, as Jefferson put it, "Our first and fundamental maxim should be, never to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe; our second, never to suffer Europe to intermeddle with cis-Atlantic affairs." (October 24, 1823.)
The principles of the nonextension of the European political system to this hemisphere and interposition in the affairs of Latin American Republics, are mere corollaries of the political separation of Europe and America.
The Memorandum shows that each of these essential principles of the Doctrine had been understood, announced, and invoked as between ourselves and Europe, years before the framing of Monroe's declaration was contemplated.
Jefferson, in 1793, seems clearly to have visualized an America with no European political affiliation.
Washington in his Farewell Address (1796) declared we should have "as little political connection as possible" with Europe; that Europe had a "set of primary interests" with which we had "none or a very remote relation," wherefore Europe "must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns"; "Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambition, rivalship, interest, humor, or caprice? It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world."
Adams (1797) in a message to Congress declared, "We ought not to involve ourselves in the political system of Europe, but to keep ourselves always distinct and separate from it."
King, our Minister to Great Britain, reported (1798) intimations that Great Britain desired, with our cooperation, to separate South America from Spain-Britain not wishing France to secure the resources of these colonies-and King intimated to British officers that, as to Louisiana, we should be unwilling "it should pass into the hands of new proprietors."
King (1801) speaking of the Floridas, told Hawkesbury should be unwilling to see them transferred except to ourselves." Madison, Secretary of State (1801), informed Pinckney at Madrid that the United States never had favored and could never favor the transfer to Great Britain of the Spanish possessions on the Mississippi, and this instruction had the assent of President Jefferson.
Jefferson himself writing to Livingston at Paris (1802) declared the cession of the Floridas and Louisiana "works most sorely on the United States"; that it "completely reverses all the political relations of the United States "; and that by it France assumes to us the attitude of defiance," and makes "it impossible that France and the United States can continue long friends." Madison writing Livingston with the approval of Jefferson, at about the same time, declared that "mere neighborhood could not be friendly" to the harmony of France and the United States. Lord Hawkesbury (1802) inquired of King as to the "line of policy" which the United States would adopt if France acquired Louisiana. In a mémoire which he delivered to French authorities (1802) Livingston again spoke of the dangers of neighborhood; and in the latter part of the year (1802) Madison wrote to Pinckney in Madrid of the "injuries" coming to us on account of the "colonial officers scattered over the hemisphere, and in our neighborhood."
King (early 1803) informed Addington of the British Government that we would “with much concern see New Orleans in British possession. Hawkesbury (1803) speaking of our purchase of Louisiana, stated he had "received his Majesty's commands to express to you the pleasure with which His Majesty has received this intelligence." Jefferson (1803) in a message to Congress, observed that a "wide ocean" separated us from the entangling "political interests of Europe, that "it cannot be the interest of any to assail us, nor ours to disturb them," a position we should be “most unwise to cast away."
The Congress of the United States in 1811 passed a resolution, which, while dealing with a restricted territorial area, invoked our "security, tranquillity, and commerce." This resolution reads:
Taking into view the peculiar situation of Spain, and of her American provinces; and considering the influence which the destiny of the territory adjoining the southern border of the United States may have upon their security, tranquillity, and commerce: Therefore,
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America, in Congress assembled, That the United States, under the peculiar circumstances of the existing crisis, cannot, without serious inquietude, see any part of the said territory pass into the hands of any foreign power; and that a due regard to their own safety compels them to provide, under certain contingencies, for the temporary occupation of the said territory; they, at the same time, declare that the said territory shall, in their hands, remain subject to future negotiation.
In 1820, Secretary Adains instructing Middleton at St. Petersburg, affirmed that the political system of the United States was essentially "extra-European," and "that for the repose of Europe as well as of America, the European and American political system should be kept as separate and distinct from each other as possible." Beginning in 1821, Adams continued his correspondence with Russia in the course of which he developed, as it appears for the first time, the anti-European colonization principle, which was crystallized in his statement on July 17, 1822, that "we should assume distinctly the principle that the American continents are no longer subjects for any new European colonial establishments.” Later (July 22, 1823) Adams instructed Middleton to say "frankly and explicitly to the Russian Government, that the future peace of the world, and the interests of Russia herself cannot be promoted by Russian settlements upon any part of the American continent."
The situation as to Cuba in 1823 is said to have called for a remark from Clay to Canning that "we would fight" if Britain were to secure possession of Cuba.
As to the Canning-Rush negotiations, about the middle of August 1823, Mr. Canning orally advised Mr. Rush that "His Britannic Majesty disclaimed all intention of appropriating to himself the smallest portion of the late Spanish possessions in America "; that "Great Britain certainly never again intended to lend her instrumentality or aid, whether by mediation or otherwise, towards making up the dispute between Spain and her colonies, but that if this result could still be brought about she would not interfere to prevent it "; that he (Canning) "hoped that France would not, should even events in the Peninsula be favorable to her, extend her views to South America for the purpose of reducing the colonies, nominally, perhaps, for Spain, but in effect to subserve ends of her own"; and that if France should meditate such a policy, a knowledge that both Great Britain and the United States opposed it "could not fail to have its influence in checking her steps."
On August 20, 1823, Mr. Canning sent a "private and confidential" communication to Mr. Rush suggesting that Great Britain and the United States "might understand each other as to the Spanish-American colonies." He stated:
For ourselves we have no disguise.
1. We conceive the recovery of the colonies by Spain to be hopeless.
2. We conceive the question of the recognition of them, as independent states, to be one of time and circumstances.
3. We are, however, by no means disposed to throw any impediment in the way of an arrangement between them and the mother country by amicable negotiation.
4. We aim not at the possession of any portion of them ourselves.
5. We could not see any portion of them transferred to any other power with indifference.
If these opinions and feelings are, as I firmly believe them to be, common to your Government with ours, why should we hesitate mutually to confide them to each other, and to declare them in the face of the world?
In a subsequent paragraph Mr. Canning inquired whether Mr. Rush was authorized to enter into negotiations and sign a convention upon this subject.
In a later communication marked "private and confidential ” (August 23, 1823) Mr. Canning informed Mr. Rush that he found as a further reason for the two Governments reaching the proposed understanding, the fact that the French expected as soon as their military objects in Spain were achieved to propose "a Congress, or some more or less formal concert and consultation, specially upon the affairs of Spanish America."
President Monroe, on October 17, 1823, wrote to Mr. Jefferson and to Mr. Madison, enclosing copies of this correspondence, and stated among other things:
My own impression is that we ought to meet the proposal of the British Gov. & to make it known, that we would view an interference on the part of the European powers, and especially an attack on the Colonies, by them, as an attack on ourselves, presuming that if they succeeded with them, they would extend it to us.
Mr. Jefferson replying under date of October 24, 1823, stated among other things:
Our first and fundamental maxim should be, never to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe; our second, never to suffer Europe to intermeddle with cis-Atlantic affairs.
As to the war which the proposal of Great Britain might lead to, Mr. Jefferson said:
Its object is to introduce and establish the American system, of keeping out of our land all foreign powers-of never permitting those of Europe to intermeddle with the affairs of our nations. It is to maintain our own principle, not to depart from it.
Later in his communication Mr. Jefferson said:
I could honestly, therefore, join in the declaration proposed, that we aim not at the acquisition of any of those possessions, that we will not stand in the way of any amicable arrangement between them and the mother country; but that we will oppose, with all our means, the forcible interposition of any other power, as auxiliary, stipendiary, or under any other form or pretext, and most especially their transfer to any power by conquest, cession or acquisition in any other way.
The foregoing sets out, as to principles involved, the general situation when Monroe's Cabinet began its deliberations early in November of 1823. It will be observed that every essential principle of
the declaration as finally framed had been definitely stated, some of the principles over and over again, before the Cabinet began consideration of the matter. The only thing left for the Cabinet to do and the only thing which the Cabinet did was to frame the formulae by which the principles should be announced.
Much research and learning have been exhausted in an effort to place or distribute, as among Adams, Monroe, Canning, and Rush, the credit for conceiving the principles of the declaration. From what has been said it would appear that neither Adams nor Monroe had any closer connection with this Doctrine than Jefferson had with the Declaration of Independence, except as to the colonization principle, which Mr. Adams seems to have developed. In each case, the drawing of the instrument was the work of the draughtsman; the principles cast into definite formulae in the Doctrine had long been the common property of the American statesmen of the time, and even of European statesmen.
Returning to the declaration itself, it must not be overlooked that the matters inhibited by the Doctrine came under ban because they were "dangerous to our peace and safety," or were a "manifestation of an unfriendly disposition towards the United States," or "endangering our peace and happiness."
This is the language used in international correspondence to describe matters which challenge the security or self-preservation of a nation. From the time when the announcement of the Doctrine was made to the present time, substantially equivalent expressions have been used to describe the Doctrine and the principles which underlie it. No reasonable doubt can be sustained that it has always been considered as involving our security. Secretary Knox speaking in 1911, declared:
The maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine is considered by us essential to our peace, prosperity, and national safety.
In 1914 Senator Elihu Root declared:
The doctrine is not international law but it rests upon the right of selfprotection and that right is recognized by international law.
In 1923 Secretary Hughes wrote:
The Monroe Doctrine is not a policy of aggression; it is a policy of selfdefense. It still remains an assertion of the principle of national security. The decision of the question as to what action the United States should take in any exigency arising in this hemisphere is not controlled by the content of the Monroe Doctrine, but may always be determined on the grounds of international right and national security as freely as if the Monroe Doctrine did not exist. The Monroe Doctrine rests 'upon the right of every sovereign state to protect itself by preventing a condition of affairs in which it will be too late to protect itself."