ACTIVITIES OF FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES TOWARD THE BRANCH DAVIDIANS (Part 2) WEDNESDAY, JULY 26, 1995 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME, Washington, DC. The subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, at 9:25 a.m., in room 2141, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Bill McCollum (chairman of the Subcommittee on Crime) presiding and Hon. William H. Zeliff, Jr. (chairman of the Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs, and Criminal Justice). Present from the Subcommittee on Crime: Representatives Bill McCollum, Steven Schiff, Howard Coble, Stephen E. Buyer, Steve Chabot, Bob Barr, Fred Heineman, Ed Bryant of Tennessee, Charles E. Schumer, Robert C. Scott, Melvin L. Watt, Shelia Jackson Lee, and Zoe Lofgren. Present from the Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs, and Criminal Justice: Representatives William H. Zeliff, Jr., Robert L. Erlich, Jr., Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, John L. Mica, Peter Blute, John B. Shadegg, Mark E. Souder, Karen L. Thurman, Tom Lantos, Robert E. Wise, Jr., Gary A. Condit, Louise McIntosh Slaughter, Gene Taylor, and Bill K. Brewster. Also present from the Committee on the Judiciary: Representatives Henry J. Hyde and John Conyers, Jr. Also present from the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight: Representatives William F. Clinger, Jr., Cardiss Collins of Illinois, and Gene Green. Staff present from the Subcommittee on Crime: Paul J. McNulty, chief counsel; Glenn R. Schmitt, counsel; Daniel J. Bryant, assistant counsel; and Audray L. Clement, clerk; Committee on the Judiciary: Alan F. Coffey, Jr., general counsel/staff director; Dan Freeman, parliamentarian; Julian Epstein, minority staff director; Perry Apelbaum, minority general counsel; Melanie Sloan, minority counsel; and Tom Diaz, minority counsel. Staff present from the Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs, and Criminal Justice: Robert Charles, staff director and chief counsel; L. Stephan Vincze, defense counsel; T. March Bell, counsel for justice affairs; Michele Lang, special counsel; and 24-824 96-10 Sean Littlefield, special assistant and clerk; Committee on Government Reform and Oversight: Kevin Sabo, general counsel; Judith McCoy, chief clerk; and Jeffrey Wilmot, professional staff member. Mr. MCCOLLUM. These hearings of the joint subcommittees on the Waco matter will come to order. This morning we are going to have the usual short opening statements from the four principal chairmen and ranking members and then we are going to go immediately to our first panel that was kicked over from yesterday. As you know, we now have begun the first of what will be five days of hearings. We had not intended to meet tomorrow but because of the delays yesterday we are going to be forced to hear from a panel that was scheduled to be later this afternoon tomorrow, and we will do that. We will then, again, meet on Friday and on Monday and hopefully we will conclude these hearings at that time. Our attention now turns to the FBI and the Department of Justice. During an appearance on "60 Minutes" in May, Attorney General Reno said words to the effect that there had been, in her judgment, no mistakes that warranted taking action against any of the parties involved from the FBI in the raid and in the assault and in the siege. We are here to learn and to corroborate or deny that particular statement and assertion, essentially. What we want to do is try to review as carefully as we can what happened in that 51-day siege and what happened in the assault. We need to know the background and we need to know the conclusions and reasons for those conclusions in the decisionmaking process that led to the use of CS gas and led to the use of force in the final assault instead of continuing the negotiations. I think that is really the heart of what this is all about at this juncture. Yesterday, we had some tough criticisms lodged with respect to this by the two attorneys who represented the leading figures in the matter of those Davidians who were killed in the compound at Mount Carmel during that final assault. Mr. DeGuerin, in particular, who was the attorney for the late David Koresh said to us yesterday that he believed, as did Mr. Zimmermann, who was with him, that had there been just about 10 more days of negotiations they were absolutely convinced that there would have been a surrender, that Koresh would have come out, and there was a basis for it that made this particular negotiation that was going on just preceding the assault fruitful as opposed to those where Koresh had indicated he would surrender earlier and did not. They were very compelling in their testimony as to why they felt that way. They spent a lot of time going over with us the details of their reasoning and how they got to that point. In fact, they asserted that a deal had been made, in essence, in their mind and that they could not believe it when the assault actually took place. They were convinced that some of you, at the table today, in our first panel were equally aboard with them in this final negotiation and that there was a general consensus that movement had been made, very significant movement. And we are here today, in part, to explore why, perhaps, there is a difference of opinion on that. Maybe there is not. We do not know. There also was a concern expressed that because they could not believe that those who were involved in the negotiations and in the operation in the field had changed or had lied to them, as they put it, they felt very strongly that it must have been a Washington bureaucrat, I think as Mr. Zimmermann put it, who overrode the surrender plan or surely this would not have occurred, because they felt very betrayed otherwise in this process. Then we heard yesterday evening from two experts in religion, Drs. Tabor and Arnold, who agreed with the challenge that had been presented earlier in the day. They believed that Koresh had not broken all of his promises during his negotiations and walked through an explanation of his psyche, if you will, with respect to how he came to each step of his decisionmaking process. And why they believe very strongly that based upon analysis of his religious views and his convictions that he was, indeed, prepared to come forward when this tragic event occurred on April 19. It was their conclusion in a very elaborate discussion that Koresh had come to himself on this though this process was unique to his interpretation of the Seven Seals in the Book of Revelation, and that had he been permitted to fulfill the contract, if you will, that he thought he had made with regard to surrender, on this occasion, he would have done so. There was a lot of discussion late last night, when we kept the panel here until 11 o'clock or so, about the details of that and particularly about the positive reinforcement that Dr. Tabor saw in the attitude of Koresh and the fact that he had some reason to come out at that point, something that Koresh was really wanting to do at that juncture. They also pointed to the tapes that had been played-that we did not get to hear openly in the hearing but were given to us of the last few days of discussions with David Koresh in which they say this was corroborated, that inside the compound over the last couple of days there was joy, there was clear indication by all the members of the Davidians that they were coming out and they were happy about it and they really believed that they were coming out once Koresh finished writing his interpretation of the seals. Well, at any rate, that is what we heard yesterday. We also heard at that time about concerns over the pressure tactics that were used by the FBI. The fact that almost all of the witnesses yesterday did not believe that was appropriate and, in fact, were negative. And that, in fact, the use of the CS gas at the end actually was fulfilling the doomsday prophecy that would have pushed Koresh over the edge. That they had convinced him or he had been convinced that, indeed, his original assumption about the fifth seal was wrong, that it was not his time to have Armageddon, if you will, or to die, but rather that it was his time to expound his prophecy. But that when the last assault was made he became and would have become, under the normal course of understanding this, convinced that it was all over, that he was, indeed, destined to be the one who met the day of judgment there, so to speak. Now, in addition we heard some words that we are not going to rehash today about the shots and who fired first? I think, frankly when you get done with it-I would like to tend to believe as most would I think, the ATF officers and those involved that the shots first came from inside the compound. But we did hear the attorneys yesterday who were eyewitnesses to some of the actual bullet holes say they were absolutely certain that shots came from without, that they came through the roof of the building. There has been no logical explanation to corroborate that because no one has been able to tell us, in any way in these hearings, that the helicopters had fired or that they had the equipment on them to make those kind of bullet holes. On the other hand, there is no logical explanation for why the holes would have come through the roof as these attorneys described them yesterday, from their own visual inspection, if they did not come from the helicopters. On the other hand, we also had them saying that there were marks in the front door, a missing door. We had some explanation about that but it was, as they said themselves, unsatisfactory and inconclusive and rather than criticize the issue of the who shot first, they suggested that we be more pointed and concerned about the raid plan to begin with. We heard tough words from the Texas Rangers. They believe that the FBI should have used them in dealing with Koresh and that Koresh may have surrendered to them based on comments Koresh made. They also challenged the point, which we will talk about tomorrow at length, that no other specialized law enforcement unit could have replaced the FBI's highly trained Hostage Rescue Team for a short duration had they needed to fall back to regroup and retrain in order to continue the siege that was on at the time the final assault was made. And last, but not least, the Texas Rangers made it very clear to us that after their criminal investigation they came to the conclusion that two ATF officers, Sarabyn and Chojnacki should be prosecuted for false statements or lying and apparently they have recommended that to the Attorney General. I do not know where that stands. So, today, we come forward with the status that we are with our witness panel that we will be discussing the issue with respect to what actually happened from the FBI's perspective and how we got into this whole matter after they assumed the role of the lead agency for the 51-day siege. But before we do that, I want to yield to Mrs. Thurman for any opening comments she may have and then to Mr. Zeliff and Mr. Schumer. Mrs. Thurman. Mrs. THURMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and let me welcome you all. I certainly do appreciate the fact that you have stayed over an extra day and you probably will be better served than if you would have been here at 1 o'clock this morning. So we do appreciate the fact that you have come back again today. Clearly, the decision to try, after waiting 51 days, to force David Koresh and his followers to surrender peacefully to authorities was a difficult one. Today, we will begin to examine the process by |