tells us, that the Romans fell upon this Model purely by chance, (which I take to have been Nature and common Reafon) but the Spartans by Thought and Defign. And fuch at Carthage was the fumma Republica, or Power Id. ib. in the laft Refort; For they had their Kings call'd Suffetes, and a Senate which had the Power of Nobles, and the People had a fhare establish'd too.

Secondly, IT will follow, That thofe Reafoners who employ fo much of their Zeal, their Wit and their Leifure for the upholding the Balance of Power in Chriftendom, at the fame time that by their Practices they are endeavouring to deftroy it at home, are not fuch mighty Patriots, or fo much in the true Intereft of their Countrey, as they would affect to be thought, but seem to be employed like a Man who pulls down with his right Hand what he has been Building with his left.

Thirdly, THIS makes appear the Error of thofe who think it an uncontroulable Maxim, that Power is always

always fafer lodged in many Hands than in one. For if those many Hands be made up only of one of the three Divifions before mentioned, 'tis plain from those Examples already produced, and easy to be parallel'd in other Ages and Countries, that they are as capable of Enflaving the Nation, and of acting all Manner of Tyranny and Oppreffion, as it is poffible for a fingle Person to be; tho' we fhould fuppofe their Number to be not only of Four or Five Hundred, but above Three Thousand.

AGAIN, it is manifeft from what has been faid, that in order to preserve the Balance in a mix'd State, the Limits of Power depofited with each Party ought to be ascertained, and generally known. The Defects of this is the Cause that introduces thofe Strugglings in a State about Prerogative and Liberty, about Encroachments of the Few, upon the Rights of the Many, and of the Many upon the Privileges of the Few, which ever did and ever will conclude in a Tyranny; Firft, either of the Few, or the Many, but at last infallibly

of

1

of a fingle Perfon. For, which ever of the three Divifions in a State is upon the Scramble for more Power than its own as one or other of them generally is) unless due care be taken by the other two; upon every new Queftion that arifes, they will be fure to decide in Favour of themfelves, talk much of Inherent Right; they will nourifh up a dormant Power, and referve the Privileges in petto, to exert upon Occafions, to ferve Expedients, and to urge upon Neceffities. They will make large Demands, and fcanty Conceffions, ever coming off confiderable Gainers: Thus at length the Balance is broke, and Tyranny let in, from which Door of the three it matters

not.

TO pretend to a declarative Right upon any Occafion whatfoever, is little lefs than to make use of the whole Power: That is, to declare an Opinion to be Law, which has always been contefted, or perhaps never ftarted at all before fuch an incident brought it on the Stage. Not to confent to the Enacting of fuch a Law, which has

no

no View befides the general Good, unless another Law fhall at the fame time pass with no other View but that of advancing the Power of one Party alone; What is this but to claim a pofitive Voice as well as a negative? To pretend that great Changes and Alienations of Property have created new and great Dependences, and confequently new Additions of Power, as fome Reafons have done, is a moft dangerous Tenet: If Dominion must follow Property, let it follow in the fame Pace: For Changes in Property thro' the Bulk of a Nation make flow Marches, and its due Power always attends it. To conclude that whatever Attempt is begun by an Affembly, ought to be purfued to the End, without Regard to the greatest Incidents that may happen to alter the Cafe; To count it mean, and below the Dignity of a House, to quit Profecution; To refolve upon a Conclufion before it is poffible to be apprised of the Premiffes; To act thus, I fay, is to affect not only abfolute Power, but Infallibility too. Yet fuch unaccountable Proceedings as these have

4.

have popular Affemblies engaged in, for Want of fixing the due Limits of Power and Privilege.

GREAT Changes may indeed be .made in a Government, yet the Form continue, and the Balance be held; but large Intervals of Time must pass between every fuch Innovation, enough to melt down and make it of a Piece with the Conftitution. Such we are told were the Proceedings of Solon, when he modelled anew the Athenian Commonwealth: And what Convulfions in our own, as well as other States, have been bred by a Neglect of this Rule, is fresh and notorious enough: 'Tis too foon in all Conscience to repeat this Error again.

HAVING fhewn that there is a natural Balance of Power in all free States, and how it has been divided fometimes by the People themselves, as in Rome, at others by the Inftitutions of the Legislators, as in the feveral States of Greece and Sicily: The next thing is to examine what Methods have been taken to break or overthrow this Balance