HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY,2 Washington, D.C. a.m. in room The subcommittee met in executive session at 10:20 G-3, U.S. Capitol, Hon. Lawrence H. Smith [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding. Mr. SMITH. The subcommittee will be in order. Do you have a formal statement, Mr. Nash? STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK C. NASH, ASSISTANT Mr. NASH. I have no prepared statement, but I will try to speak from the notes I have. Mr. SMITH. I have asked the Secretary if he would tell us something about the targets of the program last year and just how far we were off that target at the end of the year. I think that will be very helpful to us; and, from that point, we can go on into a discussion of what we are expecting for next year. Mr. NASH. I think it might be well to go back a little bit to show just what led up to the establishment of these so-called targets that were fixed at the NATO-North Atlantic Treaty Organizationmeeting in Lisbon in February 1952. There has been so much misunderstanding about those targets it is difficult to clear it all up in one short session. I was particularly disappointed yesterday to read in the newspapers an article attributed to Mr. Lovett's final report as Secretary of Defense; a newspaper article carrying a paragraph that read as follows: Lovett notes among the failures in the defense build-up the inability of this country's European partners to meet the 1952 NATO goals. Although Europe's defenses were substantially strengthened in the last six months of 1952, he said they did not meet the fifty divisions and four thousand combat planes, as hoped. Some of the hearings on H.R. 5710 were printed at the time, in whole or in part. Except for short connecting passages, the hearings on this bill which are included in this series were not printed at the time. Members of the Subcommittee on National Security of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 83d Cong., 1953-54 Republicans: Lawrence H. Smith, Wisconsin, Chairman; John M. Vorys, Ohio; and Winston L. Prouty, Vermont. Democrats: A. S. J. Carnahan, Missouri, and Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr., New York. (9) 25-940 O - 80 - 2 Now compare that with what his report actually said. This is the text of the report: In the field of military assistance to other nations, progress in the approved programs has been steady, but in some phases not as great as planned. Although our NATO allies were unable to achieve completely all the 1952 goals established at the Lisbon meeting of the North Atlantic Council in February, 1952, the defenses of Europe had been substantially strengthened during the past six months. The number of units available to NATO command, continued to increase and their military effectiveness was substantially improved as deliveries of modern weapons from the United States, as well as local sources, multiplied. I would say that is disappointing, because you can understand how an oral statement or a statement made in a press conference might come out a little bit garbled; but when it is a statement in a report that merely has to be copied, it does seem as though they could reflect it a little more accurately. Mr. VORYS. Would you tell me, Mr. Nash, what is inaccurate about the newspaper account? Mr. NASH. The newspaper's statement: Lovett noted among the failures in the defense build-up the inability of this country's European partners to meet the 1952 NATO goals. Now I will show you, or try to show you in a few minutes, that is Mr. VORYS. The word "inability"? The word "failure" is borne out. Mr. NASH. The impression that statement leaves is that they fell flat on their faces. The impression left is that they did not come even near to attaining their mark. It leaves out the word that is the key in Mr. Lovett's report, the word "completely," and that is what I would like to concentrate the story on this morning. You can judge for yourselves when I am through as to whether or not I am fair in my criticism of the newspaper's account of Mr. Lovett's report. Perhaps the initial mistake was made in trying to set a goal in terms of a certain number of divisions. That is oversimplification. When the newspapers carried the release at Lisbon that the NATO countries had agreed to raise 50 divisions by the end of calendar year 1952, they gave the public no idea of what was meant by the concept of divisions. I think it might be useful to go back just a little bit and show how these goals came to be established. THE FORMATION OF NATO I said at the very end of the meeting last Friday, that, concentrating as we should in looking ahead at the problems that are facing us, it is well at times, so as to keep from being too discouraged, to look over our shoulders to see how far we have come. I commented last Friday, that it is only 5 years ago 5 years ago Tuesday of this week-that we started on this so-called cold war program. It was President Truman's address to Congress, on March 17, 1948. that declared that we had come to the conclusion, with the rape of Czechoslovakia in February of that year, that the U.S.S.R. was not going to cooperate and try to make this world a world in which people could live in peace. Now, that was followed a month later by Congress' voting the initial funds for the so-called Marshall plan. That was in April of 1948. That was followed a little while later with the adoption of the Vandenberg resolution. The Vandenberg resolution came out in June 1948, and the Vandenberg resolution is really the foundation and philosophy of what the whole NATO effort involves. On the same day that the President-President Truman, that is— made his sort of declaration of the cold war, on March 17, 1948, five of the nations of Western Europe-England, France, Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg-on their own initiative formed what was called the Western Union. That was a defense pact where those five nations joined together. The North Atlantic Treaty negotiations which went forward in the summer and fall of 1948 culminated in the signing of the treaty in April 1949. Directly after the treaty was signed by us in April 1949, the other NATO nations followed suit and I think the last one signed up in August 1949. THE STRUCTURE OF NATO It might be useful at this point to put the NATO organization chart up there so when I refer to these committees they might be more meaningful. [A chart entitled "North Atlantic Treaty Organization," principal agencies and United States members was referred to.] Mr. NASH. The North Atlantic Council, at the top, is composed of the foreign ministers, the defense ministers and the finance ministers. The principal military advice to the North Atlantic Council comes from the military committee. That is composed of the Chiefs of Staff of each of the 14 nations that are now in NATO. General Bradley is the representative of the United States. Mr. VORYS. Do I understand that the red letters on the right are the American representatives on those things? Mr. NASH. That is correct. Mr. Dulles is our foreign minister; Mr. Wilson is our defense minister; Mr. Humphrey is our finance minister." The aims of the Marshall plan, also called the European recovery program, were outlined in a speech given at the commencement exercises of Harvard University by Secretary of State George C. Marshall on June 5, 1947. The Marshall plan was the first large-scale foreign assistance program of the post-World War II period. It was carefully constructed by the Congress in coniunction with the executive branch and became part of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948 (Public Law 472, 80th Cong. 2d sess.). For additional information on the development, objectives, and achievements of the Marshall plan, see vols. III and IV of this historical series, particularly the introduction to Vol. III. The Vandenberg resolution (S. Res. 239, 80th Cong., 2d sess.), introduced in the Senate in 1948 by Arthur H. Vandenberg, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, with strong support from the executive branch, pertained to the security of Western Europe, the achievement of international peace through the United Nations, and mutual security arrangements. Ultimately, the Vandenberg resolution led to the North Atlantic Treaty. As shown later in the hearing for this day, Mr. Vorys argued that the Committee on Foreign Affairs also had in mind a concent similar to NATO. The Western Union was a defensive alliance aimed at preventing Soviet expansion into Western Europe in the period following World War II. It was established at the urging of Great Britain, with strong U.S. support, under the Brussels Pact of March 1948. The five signatory nations to the Brussels Pact were Belgium, France, Great Britain, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. 'The persons referred to are John Foster Dulles, Charles E. Wilson, and George M. Humphrey, who at the time were Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and Secretary of the Treasury, respectively. We have what no other of the NATO nations have, this director of mutual security position, with Mr. Stassen, and then we have the socalled special representative in Europe for the administration of mutual security and assistance matters, Mr. Draper. The North Atlantic Council's permanent headquarters is in Paris. The Military Committee's permanent headquarters, if they had any such headquarters, would be in Paris, also. They meet ad hoc, but they have a permanent group called "the standing group" which has its locale here in Washington. The standing group is composed of three nations: France, United Kingdom, and the United States. It has also in Washington the military representatives of all 14 nations. The Military Representatives Committee is a sort of board of deputies to the Military Committee itself. The real working group, the one which works out the plans, is the standing group. They submit them, go over them with the military representatives. If agreed upon, they go on up to the Military Committee, and ultimately are submitted to the North Atlantic Council. General Bradley10 is our representative on the Military Committee and on the standing group. He has a deputy who works at it full time. General Bradley has a lot of other duties, as you know, as Chairman of our Joint Chiefs of Staff. Vice Adm. Arthur Davis is General Bradley's deputy on the standing group. Now the two commanders of the two principal field commands; SACEUR headed by General Ridgway "those initials add up to Supreme Allied Command in Europe. He succeeded General Eisenhower. General Eisenhower was the first one appointed in late 1950 and agreed upon at the Brussels meeting in December of 1950. He established SHAPE-Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe-headquarters in April, 1951. This became operational with the establishment of General Eisenhower's headquarters at SHAPE in April 1951, which was just 2 years ago. The other commander is the Supreme Commander of the Atlantic Forces, a command set up later than SACEUR and is presently headed by a U.S. commander, Admiral McCormick. NATO'S MEDIUM TERM DEFENSE PLAN Shortly after the North Atlantic Treaty came into being, in the spring of 1950, the Military Committee, working with its standing group, developed an overall strategic plan that has come to be fairly well known as the MTDP-meaning the medium term defense plan. 8 Harold E. Stassen was a former Governor of Minnesota and a former president of the University of Pennsylvania. At the time, he was the Director of the Mutual Security Agency; he later was Director of the Foreign Operations Administration, and then a Special Assistant to President Eisenhower in the period 1955-58. The person referred to is William H. Draper who was formerly the U.S. Special Representative in Europe, Economic Cooperation Administration, and at the time was U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO. 10 The person referred to is Gen. Omar N. Bradley, U.S. Army, who at the time was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The person referred to is Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway. U.S. Army, who at the time was Supreme Allied Commander in Europe and Commander in Chief, U.S. Forces, Europe. They set as a target date July 1, 1954 for the development of the forces which they conceived to be necessary to carry out the military task. The military task is a defensive task. It is a defensive mission. The job of the NATO military forces under the NATO treaty is one of deterring Soviet aggression, and if aggression should occur, despite the attempts to deter it, to provide a force expected or hoped to be adequate to deal with the aggression. It does not have an offensive mission. That is important in the way of the philosophy of NATO. It is a defensive organization. It was a defense against aggression. That was the underlying impression of this overall strategic concept that is the basis of all of our military force planning and military buildup that we are talking about this morning. To take that strategic concept and translate it into specific numbers of divisions, airplanes and ships. That was a task that went forward in the fall of 1950. Out of that was developed what is called MCmeaning Military Committee-MC 26/1. That is the identification of this military requirement study. MC 26/1 is the present basis of our military force planning. That, as I say, took the strategic concept of the MTDP, of May, 1950, and developed it into military requirements-I emphasize the word "requirements." It is what our military experts voice is necessary to carry out the mission, which I repeat, is a mission to deter aggression and, if aggression should occur, to be able to defend and resist successfully. After the organization of General Eisenhower's headquarters at SHAPE, in April 1951, he and his planning staff put together their own idea of what is required in the way of ground forces to carry out his mission as Supreme Allied Commander of European Forces. He submitted his report to the standing group from which he takes direction, and his report, his recommendations, called for a total of 97 divisions and approximately 9,000 planes. Mr. SMITH. That was in 1951? Mr. NASH. This report was submitted by General Eisenhower in October 1951, 4 or 5 months after SHAPE headquarters was established. Mr. SMITH. As you recall it, that was after the subcommittee from our committee was over there. We were there in June, were we not Boyd? Mr. CRAWFORD [Boyd Crawford, staff administrator]. June 1951. Mr. PROUTY. How many planes is that? Mr. NASH. Nine thousand is the figure that sticks in my mind. I believe it is between 9,000 and 10,000. I want to emphasize that General Eisenhower's principal recommendation as to ground forces was 97 divisions. On the side of air requirements, as long as that question has been raised, the air requirements were developed initially in the spring of 1951, in Paris by the Air Chiefs of Staff of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Canada. Those four. They developed what is called "The Paris Plan." The Paris plan called for 10,000 planes. Both the so-called Paris plan which was developed in the spring of 1951 and General Eisen |