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hower's plan which was submitted in the fall of 1951 were taken together with the Navy's recommendations--and I may as well round out the picture by giving the naval story. The naval requirements were worked out by five regional planning groups. They got going ahead of the air and the ground, they got going in 1950. Before the establishment of the two commanders, SACEUR and SACLANT— Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic-there were five regional planning groups, one for the Canadians, and the United States, one for the Atlantic, one for Northern Europe, one for Southern Europe and Western Europe.

Those five submitted their total navy requirements and the total of those was the seapower element which added to the air requirement developed in this so-called Paris plan and added to General Eisenhower's plan submitted in the fall of 1951, after being analyzed and reviewed by the standing group, and the Military Committee, came out approved by the Military Committee as MC 26/1.

MC 26/1 was approved by the Military Committee at Rome in the November meeting of 1951, and was submitted to the council, the top body, the NATO Council of Ministers in February 1952.

This is a very important point. The ministers accepted MC 26/1 as the advice of their military advisers as to what, in the judgment of the military advisers would be required to carry out the military


Namely the defense of Western Europe against aggression.

The task of the ministers was to determine what could be done to accomplish or fill the requirements developed by their military advisers. Their job was to set this concept that we call force goals.


I want to make the distinction between the concept of military requirements and the concept of force goals. The best way for me to do that is to go back a little bit.

In the fall of 1951, which I have been speaking of as the time when the ministers of the then 12 NATO nations-Greece and Turkey did not come along to be added until February 1952-were talking in terms of 10,000 planes, 97 divisions, and a large number of vessels-I think these should be added for the record as rounded off at 3,000 major and minor vessels, and our charts will show you in more detail just how they breakdown between major and minor. These 97 divisions, 10,000 aircraft, and 3,000 major and minor vessels were called for by the military by July 1, 1954.

Now this was the fall of 1951. SHAPE Headquarters had just been established in April 1951. SACLANT, the commander of the Atlantic, had not yet been agreed upon. It took us some time to work that out with the British, as you know. The countries, the ministers, the financial ministers particularly, were pretty well staggered by the requirements laid down in dimensions as great as 97 divisions, 10,000 aircraft, and 3,000 ships, and especially by a target date of July 1, 1954.

You might ask me, "Why July 1, 1954?" Well, you have to have some date to shoot at. There were various estimates as to the growing

Soviet strength, particularly with reference to what they had achieved in September 1949 when they exploded the first known atomic explosion that they have accomplished. Their growing atomic strength was thought at that time to be a really serious threat by July 1, 1954. In all events, that was the target date that the countries were addressing themselves to in the fall of 1951.

How could you get hold of the thing? You could not do it all at once. How to make a start to, was the job of the ministers themselves, the representatives of the NATO partners.

So, in Ottawa, the NATO meeting in Ottawa in the last part of September 1951, established a committee which came to be known as the "Wise Man," the "Three Wise Men," chaired by Mr. Harriman of the United States. The other two countries being the United Kingdom and France.

The technical title of the committee was "The Temporary Council Committee❞—the TCC-but colloquially it came to be known as "The Three Wise Men." 12

Their job was to study the economic and political capabilities of the NATO partners to see how much of these military requirements the countries could undertake to raise, how to distribute these requirements, how many of these divisions is France to raise, how many of these aircraft is the United Kingdom to furnish, and in what increments year by year.

That temporary committee-let me refer to it as "TCC", if I may, which is synonymous, or if I slip into it, as "The Three Wise Men" operated right through January, 1952.

What they did was to analyze the national gross income yield of each one of the NATO countries and to determine as best they couldand they had a great deal of expert testimony-I appeared before them in November 1951 to lay out the United States contribution what was the maximum defense effort that each of these NATO countries was capable of without unduly burdening its economy, because it would not be useful to go ahead and put on these countries a defense effort that would bankrupt them.

That is the tightrope that NATO has been trying to walk ever since it got legs to walk on.

How far could you go and how fast could you go-and I must keep emphasizing the time element in this thing-how far could you go and how fast could you go in building up the defenses of Western Europe without bankrupting the countries or without the United States having to take on an even bigger chunk of the load.

Now the recommendations of the TCC were laid before the NATO Council of Ministers in Lisbon in February 1952, and with modifications were approved as what the countries could be expected to do by the end of calendar year 1952, the so-called firm force goals; and further agreement with respect to what they should shoot for by the end of calendar year 1953, which were called provisional goals, to distinguish them from the firm commitments the countries took with respect to 1952 forces; and further, with respect to 1954, planning

19 The "Three Wise Men." W. Averell Harriman of the United States. Jean Monnet of France, and Sir Edwin Plowden of Great Britain, comprised the executive board of the Temporary Council Committee of NATO.

goals for those long lead-time items like aircraft, which if you wanted by the end of 1954, you would have to get under contract pretty early in 1952, because it takes 18 to 24 months to build aircraft in this country and longer, of course, in Europe, where the industry is just beginning to get going again.


Now I come to the chart that shows the comparison of where they were before Lisbon and what they agreed to do at Lisbon.

Let me emphasize this again. What they agreed upon at Lisbon was that they would take on and permit their countries to raise a certain increment of this overall military requirement, which, I repeat, is in terms of 97 divisions, 10,000 aircraft, and 3,000 ships.

[A chart entitled "Build-up of NATO Army Divisions" was referred to.]

Mr. NASH. Now in 1950, they had some forces. I want to point out two things on this chart: If you will note that we go through 1950 and 1951 in two classes of forces: D-day, and D-plus-90. D-day is the day that the fight begins. It is the day the balloon goes up. And forces listed as D-day forces are forces expected to be on the line, guns in hand, really to shoot.

D-plus-90 day forces are so-called reserve divisions that have their equipment ready and they can be mobilized and brought up to the front line at various times during a total period of 90 days. It would take 90-days to get them all up there.

You will note that 1950 and 1951 are in terms of D-day and D-plus90. But when we move over to the first year, the countries made firm commitments on, 1952, they have shortened the time that the reserve divisions have got to get up on the front line and get firing.

D-plus-30. That is a very important qualification. If we were still on a D-plus-90-day basis, that red column, the third one, would be well above the top of the chart. But, the D-plus-30-day concept is what we are going on in describing NATO forces as agreed on in Lisbon.

The second thing and most important to note in this chart is that there is a qualitative evaluation with respect to the forces that have been attained as of the end of the calendar year 1952. That pink or whatever color you might call it at the top of that red column represents divisions that are in being by which General Ridgway by a personal inspection and evaluation does not regard as being fully effective. They have not completed all of their training or they have not got all of their equipment or they have not in one way or another got themselves to where he would say they could get on the line in 30 days and be ready to fight.

There is no such qualitative evaluation with respect to either the 1950 or the 1951 forces.

So those two points are important in evaluating this comparison of buildup.

Now if you can just note roughly where you come out, in 1950 you have about 13 divisions which were able to really start fighting, and there, I repeat, we have no qualitative analysis as to how effective

they were at that time. At D-plus-90 you have about 22. In 1951 you go up in your D-day forces to about 23 or 24 divisions as best I can see it from here, and your D-plus-90 goes to about 32.

What was agreed on at Lisbon for the goal in calendar year 1952 was the last column. It calls for 25 divisions on the line ready to fight that are to be there on December 31, 1952. It calls for an additional 25 divisions, reserve divisions, divisions that could be brought up to the front line and be ready to fight within 30 days.


How far off are we in 1952 in terms of General Ridgway's evaluation? We have the 25 D-day divisions, divisions which are for all practical purposes 100 percent effective. We have on the side of the total divisions, active and reserve divisions, 48. In other words, 23 out of the additional 25 reserve divisions called for. But of the 23 that we have, General Ridgway evaluates some of them as not being fully effective. He rated as of the first week in December-and of course the effectiveness is something that is being improved all the time-but as of December 6, when he submitted his report, he rated 15 of those divisions as being combat effective.

Let me repeat, therefore. You have 25 active divisions which were the goal and that exact goal was achieved, and you have 25 additional reserve divisions of which the countries achieved 23, but of the 23, Ridgway evaluates 15 as being combat effective. That means they have the stuff to be ready to fight within 30 days of D-day. The other eight in his judgment were not able to take the line within 30 days for various reasons and in varying degrees of relative ineffectiveness. Therefore, on the side of the ground forces, we come out with an achievement of the D-day division goal of 25 divisions. We fall short of the reserve divisions by two in terms of numbers, and by seven or eight in terms of effective combat divisions.

Perhaps I might stop there and ask if there are questions.

Mr. SMITH. Yes, I would like to raise a question there. The D-day troops of 1951 and 1952, do I understand that they only developed two divisions in that period, that whole year? I refer to the D-day troops.

Mr. NASH. The thing I want to emphasize again, Mr. Smith, is that column that we called D-day divisions for 1950 and 1951 is a column that has no qualitative analysis at all. We were told these were divisions that were ready to fight as of that time. Of those, five and twothirds, rounded off at six, are U.S. divisions. A number of others are United Kingdom divisions, so that the assurance that we have from General Ridgway at the end of 1952, that those 25 divisions and I again repeat that is what the countries at Lisbon set as their goal-are fully combat effective at D-day. It is important in all these things not to get too involved in the "numbers racket" as I refer to it, as I think we did at Lisbon.

When General Ridgway comes before this committee, as I expect he will when the hearings on legislation begin, he will speak and I think in some detail, of the survey that he made personally beginning almost a month after he got to Europe on May 30. In July, he started

a personal tour and went every place from Turkey all the way on up to Norway and personally evaluated the effectiveness of the forces that he saw there. That is what we have, therefore, when he says that the 25 combat divisions are combat worthy. The reserve divisions, of the 23 that were raised out of the 25, 15 are effective, and of course, the effectiveness of the other 8 has improved rather rapidly and rather steadily since December 6 when his report was made, so that if we were speaking to General Ridgway as of this time, I would hope he could tell us that that pink stuff at the top of that column there was pretty well reddened out to blend in with the whole column.

Mr. PROUTY. How about the equipment and ammunition for those forces that are supposed to be combat ready?

Mr. NASH. When General Ridgway makes his evaluation of the effectiveness of the divisions shown on the chart there, he has to evaluate their equipment. He evaluates the equipment for the blue chart as being all there and for the solid red line as being all there, but when I say "all there," I hasten to emphasize that this is the equipment they need at the front line. It does not include reserves. The Lisbon meeting in February 1952 did not set any goal in the way of war reserves.

You had the initial buildup to achieve, first, and the war reserve target to set and then shoot for after you got the initial buildup. The initial buildup having been "approximated" I think is a fair statement. General Ridgway's concentration in the last 6 months has been in getting, particularly in the way of ammunition, adequate reserves so that those front line divisions would be able to fight for a period of time, 60 days to 90 days. His goal is to have 90 days of ammunition.

Of course he would like, and we are going to have to shoot for that subsequently, the reserve equipment other than ammunition-replacement tanks, replacement guns, replacement vehicles. However, that was not fixed as a goal for achievement in 1952 and our mutual defense assistance program-MDAP-programing is in terms of equipment for the front line divisions, plus 60 days of ammunition. We do not now have, however, a program for reserve equipment.

Mr. PROUTY. When you refer to front line troops, do you refer to the blue?

Mr. NASH. I refer to blue and red, the only difference being that the red ones are inactive divisions. The men are reserves that got called up on D-day and it takes them overall 30 days to get on the front line.

Mr. SMITH. Let us stop at this point. I think there might be questions.

Mr. NASH. I am going on from here to the air and then to the navy so I think it would be well to speak to the aviation picture. before we go on to the other two.


Mr. VORYS. Just to refresh my recollection, I got hold of our testimony in the last year.

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