to some of the routine, and many of them are very serious criticisms or difficulties that we face, and to give the best answers we can.

I think that maybe you do not want to-You say never defend and never apologize. If you feel that way, then strike the whole business out, but it seems to me the way to do this is to face the facts, and these are the ones that Roy and I could think of and the best things we could think to say about them.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. Chairman, I approve of the idea of doing this very much. I do not, however, believe that we have done it in this particular thing. Instead of going into details, I would like to point out that from the way this reads, you would think they were our conclusions and not the criticisms of those who were mainly against the program.

I would like to see us say, "These are the criticisms of those who were very critical of the program" and the answers are also in the same paragraph.

Mr. JUDD. You can say, "These are criticisms that a great many people have made or have heard during the program."

Mr. VORYS. Are you criticizing the title "Criticisms and Comments"?

Mr. JAVITS. I am all for that. But it takes something like No. 6 on page 6: "In recent years more money has been made available for the mutual security program than could be effectively used." It sounds like a conclusion of ours. Or No. 2 says, "Others are so fearful that they feel resistance is hopeless."

Mr. VORYS. I finished whatever I could do on it on Friday afternoon. I was quite aware exactly what you are saying, that we have not made it clear, we have not done what Stettinius did when you say criticisms, or objections, or handicaps, and then comment. I think typographically it would be well to do that.

Chairman CHIPERFIELD. We cannot locate Mr. Lanham. The vote is 17 to 5.

COMMITTEE PLANS

Mr. VORYS. Those who wish to make contributions, comments, and criticisms to the report, could we meet at 4 o'clock, and could we take the report with us and while we are doing something else, read it over? The only thing is, if we do not keep things moving, we will get bogged down and we do not want to be the ones to slow up the pro

gram.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. I do not want to slow up the program either, but I know if you were in my shoes this very morning, you would do exactly what I did, you would say you want to read it first.

Mr. VORYS. This report has been available to all of you since Saturday morning?

Mr. CRAWFORD. We just gave it to the members this morning. Actually, we did not get it from the printer until yesterday.

Mr. HAYS. Suppose we come back at 4. Suppose we find there are some paragraphs we would like some consideration of. Is it possible to carry it over without throwing the schedule out? I am anxious to cooperate with you, as one member of the minority.

Mr. VORYS. I think we must do that.

Mr. CRAWFORD. I think it might be a good thing, just in case the report is finished today, to ask unanimous consent for the committee to have until midnight tonight to file it.

Mr. VoRYS. Then it should be printed tonight.

Mr. CRAWFORD. Yes.

Mr. HAYS. Then I would hope no one did object to it, but assuming we ran into some difficulties, I think you have more to gain for the program by letting everybody feel that there has not been undue haste.

Mr. VORYS. Could I say to Mr. Zablocki and other members of the minority that I have been a minority member of this committee for 15 years, all except 2 years, but particularly in recent years, I have worked with the staff and those in the majority who were drafting it just as I did this year? I went over it in lead pencil form and in typewritten form, and the staff has been anxious to have the help of all committee members.

Now, if they did not do it, then we do not want to delay the whole thing. Remember, we are talking about an act that is going to have to have, it looks like now, a continuing resolution, unless we go like the devil, so that time is of the very essence.

It is not the committee's fault. We should have been on this thing before. We finished floor consideration May 23 a year ago, but the year before that we finished in August or July.

Chairman CHIPERFIELD. We met just as often as we could and did our work in our offices.

Mrs. BOLTON. And we did not have a bill.

Mr. VORYS. As far as the minority is concerned, the committee staff has been anxious to get suggestions, help, aid, and comfort from members, minority and majority, in this colossal job which they have done.

Mr. HAYS. Now the leadership would like to schedule this for Wednesday, is that right?

Mr. VORYS. Wednesday or Thursday.

Mr. HAYS. In either event, I agree there is much reason to get it filed if we can. However, will you press with that until we see what we find when we return at 4? I have not seen anything yet. I think all you have read we can put in shape with a word. I am in favor of the reference to the 80th Congress. You ought to see some of my speeches. They sound like Walter Judd wrote them.

Chairman CHIPERFIELD. We will adjourn at this time and return at 4 o'clock.

[Whereupon, at 12.30 p.m., the committee adjourned to reconvene at 4 the same day.1

[The committee reconvened at 4:30 to further consider the report language and met again on Tuesday, June 16, when it completed consideration of the report which was then filed (H. Rept. 569).]

APPENDIX I

TEXT OF MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TRANSMITTING RECOMMENDATIONS FOR LEGISLATION TO EXTEND THE MUTUAL SECURITY PROGRAM, MAY 5, 1953

[Document No. 140, 83d Cong., 1st sess.]

LEGISLATION TO EXTEND THE MUTUAL SECURITY PROGRAM

MAY 5, 1953.-Referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and ordered to be printed

To the Congress of the United States:

I recommend to the Congress the passage of legislation extending the Mutual Security Program in order to enable the United States to carry out its responsibilities of leadership in building up the security of the free world and the prospects for peace both for ourselves and our allies.

The basic purpose of this program is simply the long-term security of the United States living in the shadow of the Soviet threat.

The program being submitted to you includes approximately $5,250 million for military weapons and support directly to the defense efforts of our friends and allies. It also includes approximately $550 million for technical, economic, and developmental purposes designed to promote more effective use of the resources of the free nations and thus to further the freedom and security of all of us. This total represents a reduction of about $1.8 billion from the previous administration's 1954 budget.

The devotion of so large a portion of this request to military purposes is a measure of the peril in which free nations continue to live. The blunt, sober truth is that we cannot afford to relax our defenses until we have seen clear, unmistakable evidence of genuinely peaceful purpose on the part of the Soviet Union. As I strived to make clear to all peoples in my recent appeal for real peace and trust among nations, we continue earnestly to hope for such evidence, so that the world may turn its energies and resources to serving the needs, rather than the fears, of mankind.

Until Soviet good faith is proven by deeds, the free nations must rely on their own strength for the preservation of peace. To fail to continue vigorously to strengthen our military forces would be to risk wasting all our efforts for the past 5 years in defense of our liberties.

Since the initiation of our major bipartisan foreign-aid program in 1947, the accomplishments of the free world have been very great. In Greece the onrush of Communist imperialism has been halted and forced to recede. Out of the ruins left by that aggression, a proud, self-reliant nation has reestablished itself. Threatened economic and political collapse in Western Europe was averted through the intensive efforts of the great peoples of that continent aided by American resources. Revitalized economies in Europe today are producing more than ever before and are in a far better position to defend themselves from external or internal aggression. In the Near East and Far East, American aid is helping many new nations on their way to a better life for their citizens. And the free nations everywhere-realistically facing the threat of Soviet aggression-have in addition sought to create, with American assistance, the military strength essential to guard their security.

The Mutual Security Program for 1954 has been developed by the new administration after the most careful study and deliberation. All elements of the

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program have been reviewed in great detail, all proposals subjected to thorough scrutiny.

From this study I have come to certain clear conclusions.

First: The United States and our partners throughout the world must stand ready, for many years if necessary, to build and maintain adequate defenses. Second: To accomplish this objective we must avoid so rapid a military buildup that we seriously dislocate our economies. Military strength is most effective indeed it can be maintained-only if it rests on a solid economic base. Third: We must help the free nations to help themselves in eradicating conditions which corrode and destroy the will for freedom and democracy from within.

Fourth It is necessary to do more in the Far East. We are proposing to make substantial additional resources available to assist the French and the Associated States in their military efforts to defeat the Communist Vietminh aggression.

Fifth Since it is impossible to forecast precisely the year and moment when the point of maximum military danger may occur, the only prudent course calls for a steady military buildup, with our partners throughout the world, sustained and planned so as to use our joint capabilities with maximum efficiency and minimum strain.

We must and shall keep steadfastly on the course we have set. We must, so long as the present peril lasts, keep constantly growing in a military strength which we can support indefinitely. These basic principles were agreed upon and applied in the successful meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty Council just concluded in Paris.

While the amounts requested for technical, economic, and developmental purposes are small as compared with the military support, these programs are nonetheless of the most vital importance. They will be applied chiefly in South and Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Latin America, and Africa. Through these programs, the United States is proving its interest in helping the peoples of these areas to work toward better and more hopeful conditions of life, to strengthen the foundations of opportunity and freedom. To guard against the external military threat is not enough: We must also move against those conditions exploited by subversive forces from within.

I present this whole program to you with confidence and conviction. It has been carefully developed by the responsible members of this administration in order to achieve, at least possible cost, the maximum results in terms of our security and the security of our friends and allies. In my judgment it represents a careful determination of our essential needs in pursuing the policy of collective security in a world not yet freed of the threat of totalitarian conquest.

Unequivocally I can state that this amount of money judiciously spent abroad will add much more to our Nation's ultimate security in the world than would an even greater amount spent merely to increase the size of our own military forces in being.

Were the United States to fail to carry out these purposes, the free world could become disunited at a moment of great peril when peace and war hang precariously in balance.

This is the way best to defend successfully ourselves and the cause of freedom. DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER.

THE WHITE HOUSE, May 5, 1953.