APPENDIX IV

A. TEXT OF HOUSE REPORT 569, MUTUAL SECURITY ACT OF 1953, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO ACCOMPANY H.R. 5710, JUNE 16, 1953.

[House Report 569, 83d Cong., 1st sess.]

MUTUAL SECURITY ACT OF 1953

JUNE 16, 1953.-Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed with illustrations

Mr. CHIPERFIELD, from the Committee on Foreign Affairs, submitted the following REPORT

[To accompany H.R. 5710]

The Committee on Foreign Affairs, to whom was referred the bill (H.R. 5710) to amend further the Mutual Security Act of 1951, as amended, and for other purposes, having considered the same, reports favorably thereon without amendment and recommends that the bill do pass.

INTRODUCTION

A. THE "PACKAGE"

This is a "package" bill. It involves the extension of 11' different laws providing for various aspects of our foreign policy in all parts of the world. The package plan was devised in the 80th Congress and has been used ever since. It has the advantage of bringing many phases of our worldwide foreign policies together for overall comparison, consideration and action at the same time. The problems involved, however, are diverse and complex and cannot be understood or solved, or even described, in any quick, easy way.

The committee has had 47 meetings and 18 subcommittee meetings this year studying the areas and the situations involved in this bill, which has 7 chapters, affects 56 countries directly, and every country on earth indirectly.

This is not an appropriations bill, but is a foreign-policy bill. The amounts involved are limitations on appropriations. The proposals have already received three successive reductions, as follows:

Thus, the committee bill is $2.6 billion, or 34 percent, below the Truman request, and $830 million, or 15 percent, below the administration's original request. We believe, however, that the adjustments we have made will not

1 See p. 301 for list of laws involved.

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impair the program. They have been selective, based on considerations of policy. They will be described later in this report. We believe strongly that this "package" of policies should be extended, as requested by the President.

B. THE PRESIDENT'S APPRAISAL

The President made the following statement in support of the program: "I present this whole program to you with confidence and conviction. It has been carefully developed by the responsible members of this administration in order to achieve, at least possible cost, the maximum results in terms of our security and the security of our friends and allies. In my judgment, it represents a careful determination of our essential needs in pursuing the policy of collective security in a world not yet freed of the threat of totalitarian conquest.

"Unequivocally I can state that this amount of money judiciously spent abroad will add much more to our Nation's ultimate security in the world than would an even greater amount spent merely to increase the size of our own military forces in being.

"Were the United States to fail to carry out these purposes, the free world could become disunited at a moment of great peril when peace and war hang precariously in balance.

"This is the way best to defend successfully ourselves and the cause of freedom." (Message of May 5 transmitting recommendations for legislation to extend the Mutual Security Program.)

C. PARTY PLATFORMS

The following excerpts dealing with foreign aid are taken from the platforms of the major political parties:

Republican platform

"We shall have positive peace-building objectives wherever this will serve the enlightened self-interest of our Nation and help to frustrate the enemy's designs against us.

"In Western Europe we shall use our friendly influence, without meddling or imperialistic attitudes, for ending the political and economic divisions which alone prevent that vital area from being strong on its own right.

"We shall encourage and aid the development of collective security forces there, as elsewhere, so as to end the Soviet power to intimidate directly or by satellites, and so that the free governments will be sturdy to resist Communist inroads.

"In the balanced consideration of our problems, we shall end neglect of the Far East which Stalin has long identified as the road to victory over the West. We shall make it clear that we have no intention to sacrifice the East to gain time for the West."

Democratic platform

"We reject the ridiculous notions of those who would have the United States face the aggressors alone. That would be the most expensive and the most dangerous-method of seeking security. This Nation needs strong allies, around the world, making their maximum contribution to the common defense. They add their strength to ours in the defense of freedom."

Progressive Party platform

It is of interest to note the following statement taken from the platform of the Progressive Party :

"The Progressive Party asserts that the real threat to American security comes, not from without, but from within: from the policies of the bipartisans themselves. These policies have not protected our national security, but undermined it. They have debased the living standards and are destroying the freedom of the American people, on which our national security rests.

"The tremendous armaments program that the Truman administration has forced upon Western Europe, together with its disruption of East-West trade, have steadily lowered living standards in England, France, and Italy; and are bringing these countries to the brink of economic disaster. America's 'get tough' policy is also tough on the hard-pressed peoples of Western Europe."

D. STATEMENTS BY CABINET MEMBERS AND OTHER OFFICIALS

1. Statements of Secretary of State Dulles

In his opening statement in support of the Mutual Security Program Secretary Dulles said, speaking to a joint committee hearing:

"The mutual program will produce more real security for the people of the United States than we could get by spending the same amount of money on a purely national program. I want to make clear at the beginning that this program has nothing to do with pure charity. It is based upon solid considerations of self-interest. It is, in fact, an inescapable part of our own national-security program."

On May 6, when asked by Hon. James P. Richards whether he considered the mutual security authorization to be just as important to the defense of the United States as any equivalent amount in our own defense appropriation bill, Secretary Dulles said:

"Yes, sir. I would even go further than that and say that by and large, cuts in this bill would require in the very near future the expending of more money in terms of our purely national defense than could be cut out of the bill. In other words, I believe that cutting this bill will not, in the long run, involve a saving, but will involve additional cost. I believe that the defense value that the United States gets, for example, out of divisions of other countries, which cost far less to maintain than do United States divisions, which are already located perhaps in a more strategic position to deter aggression than would our forces if they were kept here at home, that to round that out with some additional end items and military equipment from the United States, is the cheapest way in which we can get defense. If we do not do it that way, we will have to do it in a more expensive way. That is, broadly speaking, my view." Secretary Dulles had also said in his opening statement:

“*** our country is confronted by a very grave threat. There is not yet any evidence that this threat has diminished, or will diminish within the foreseeable future. * ** Our mutual security planning must be, and is, long-range. We cannot afford to exhaust ourselves by spasmodic programs designed to meet ever-recurring emergencies. We cannot operate on a day-to-day, hand-to-mouth basis. Instead, we must think in terms of policies and programs that we can afford to live with for what may be a long period of years."

2. Statement of Director for Mutual Security Stassen

"I feel we are at one of these crucial points in the history of this country and the free nations, and in which the prospects of peace are in balance. I think that the vital thing is whether or not this country and this Congress are backing the President and the Secretary of State as they endeavor to move in these very complex, delicate, difficult, world problems. This program, with all of its interlocked defense, military, and economic aspects that affect these governments all around the world, is one essential element in the whole picture. You are in a situation where these governments, which have been moving on the basis of certain policies, are being turned in new directions. The President has made it clear, after careful study, that he wants to cut the program down to this level of $5.8 billion. In addition, we have found, within the 1950-53 programs that we can make further savings of $404 million, even though we have already met *** certain other needs out of these savings. Thus, you can see that we are not just carelessly issuing funds, and under those circumstances I think it is just tremendously vital to the future prospects of peace and to economic success within America that the President be backed in the program."

3. Statement of Secretary of Defense Wilson

"Late yesterday afternoon I returned from 3 weeks in Europe. The review of the military situation in the NATO meeting in Paris, the informal discussions which I had with Defense Ministers and military leaders of other nations, and my conversations with our own United States commanders, and inspection of the installations on which United States forces are presently deployed have all led me to the following conclusions:

"(a) We have come quite a long way toward the goal of attaining security for the North Atlantic Community;

"(b) We still have a long way to go, measured in terms of military, economic, and political strength;

"(c) To date no justification has yet appeared to warrant any belief that the danger has disappeared or even appreciably lessened;

"(d) We have now reached a posture of defense in NATO where we can determine the rate of further improvement in our military forces in the light of the economic capabilities of NATO nations to sustain a continued defense effort and state of preparedness over an indefinite period of years.

"(e) Problems outside the NATO area, particularly in the Pacific where two hot wars are now going on, require individual treatment although they are essentially an important part of the defense of the free world.

"You will see as the program for the Far East is laid out for you that, together with the further strengthening of Japan, Formosa, and the Philippines, more than 25 percent of the total proposed military aid is designed to replace weakness with strength in this vitally important area. Likewise the crucial Middle East is not being neglected. In conclusion, it is my opinion, confirmed by the judgment of other members of the executive branch, that this program is what can and should be done by way of military assistance in the fiscal year 1954."

4. Statement of Secretary of the Treasury Humphrey

"When you start cutting the security or taking a chance with the security of your country, that is an entirely different matter from just cutting off departments or services or something of that kind. Even if you cut out a whole department for a year, it would not ruin the country, you could still build it back again if you made a mistake. But if you cut the security funds of your country to the point where you have jeopardized the safety of America you have done something that is irreparably damaged. So with this tremendous big percentage of our total expenditure for total security of America, I think we have to be very cautious. It slowed me right down to a walk in how fast you could go, what chances you could take, in cutting that down. I think it has to be only cut down slowly, and with the greatest of military consideration everywhere. Now, with the Mutual Security Program itself, that relates mostly to our friends, and I am sure of this: that any time we can get our friends to help us to do some fighting, to help us supply things we are just that much ahead. We need our friends to help in this field. * * 'I am distressed not to get the budget balanced now. I would like to see it done. But I believe we should not balance the budget now, because I do not think we are justified in making the size cuts in security programs that we would have to make if we were balancing the budget. I think it is too early; it is too fast. We have got to learn more about what we are doing, all of us, and get a better picture of a better balanced, less expensive program. I think we can get more security for less money, but you cannot do it right now. I do not see how you can do it right now and until we see how we can do it, I think we ought not to jeopardize the defense of this country. That is the whole story. No one is more economy-minded than I am. *** I just do not want economy at the expense of security."

5. Statement of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Bradley

"The military aid part of the Mutual Security Program is all important to the collective security of the free world. For several more years our allies-which we sorely need right now and in time of war if it occurs-will not be able to mobilize effective ground, naval, or air forces without a strong continuing support, through a program of mutual security. To a large extent our security is dependent upon their security.

"The defense support funds in the present Mutual Security Program

for the long pull-are almost as important as the military end items to be supplied. The defense support directly assists in the reestablishment of an adequate mobilization base and furnishes additional means for self-help among the producing nations."

The committee has given careful consideration to these appraisals of the President, his Cabinet, and other officials as to the urgency, the scope and the magnitude of the program. The problems of United States foreign policy are worldwide. It is essential to our security that the measures we take to offset the aggressive measures of Communist forces be adapted to the situations that exist in different areas of the world. In order not to hamstring the program, our efforts avoided any narrow set of criteria for the various types of assistance

which might be properly applied to one area but which could keep us from meeting effectively the situation confronting us in another part of the world.

E. POLICY MODIFICATIONS REFLECTED IN BILL

The bill as reported reflects a number of significant modifications in previous foreign aid policy and operations:

1. There has been some shift in the emphasis from Europe to the East. This is indicated by the following comparison of the distribution of Mutual Security funds in 1953 compared with the 1954 program.

This shift involves more than an increase in funds. The programs of assistance to the nations of Asia and Africa have been enlarged in scope and made more flexible so that they can be adapted to the variety of situations which exist in those areas.

2. The European nations have more definitely assumed the status of military allies. The conversion of United States aid from a recovery program to a program geared to defense is further reflected in this bill.

3. The fact that new weapons are superseding those of World War II is recognized and authorization has been made for the construction of new and special nonatomic weapons.

4. The fact that our foreign-aid policy and program are in process of reorganization is recognized in the bill as reported. The Mutual Security Agency and the Technical Cooperation Administration have been combined by executive order and a plan for the establishment of a Foreign Operations Administration is before the Congress. The bill provides for the operation of the Technical Cooperation Administration program in fiscal 1954 under administrative provisions adaptable to Reorganization Plan No. 7. At the same time a reduction in the total number of persons employed in the program is specifically required to assure that reorganization does not leave personnel with nothing to do.

5. The provisions of the Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1953, designed to bring expenditures of local currency counterpart funds under control of the Congress, have been carried forward, and authorization has been included for the expenditure of counterpart funds.

F. CRITICISMS AND COMMENTS

The committee is familiar with the criticisms of the program. Certain of the criticisms are justified, and are being corrected. Many critical comments, however, are directed at conditions which do not exist, which are beyond the control of the United States, beyond the range of this program, or beyond the jurisdiction of this committee. The committee feels it should express its comments on some of the typical criticisms.

1. Criticism

The strain on the United States economy of the present defense program, including foreign aid, is a cause for concern.

Comment.-Undoubtedly the public debt is nearing the authorized limit and the people are growing restive under the burden of taxation. It is mandatory that we economize. But it would be false economy at the cost of the real security of the United States. In time the security of the United States can most economically be provided for by the joint effort of the United States and other free nations. Foreign aid is essential to strengthen this joint effort. 2. Criticism

There are people in allied countries of the free world whose zeal for defense has cooled somewhat. Other people are so fearful they feel resistance is hopeless.