(3) Further, whether in view of uncertain political conditions in many of the areas receiving our aid, assistance in this bill at this time can be justified.

We believe in a mutual security program. But it must be "mutual," it must bring us closer to the goal of "security," and the vehicle must be a wisely planned program, conceived in sound economic terms and based on what Secretary of the Treasury Humphrey has so aptly described as “balance.” H.R. 5710, as reported, falls substantially short of these standards of value. Because we do believe in a mutual security program, we therefore cannot in all good conscience support the so-called Mutual Security Program in H.R. 5710 in its present form.

Let us hasten to add that these standards are not ours. The first one, for example the mutuality-is the basic standard enunciated by the House Foreign Affairs Committee itself. Here are its words when reporting the Mutual Security Act of 1951, the first of the series of Mutual Security Acts: "The committee emphasizes that if the program is to achieve its objective, one element of it especially must be borne in mind by our partners—mutuality. This is a Mutual Security Program. It involves the assumption of mutual responsibilities and mutual sacrifices to achieve a mutually desirable objective— international peace and security. Unless this element of mutuality is clearly understood and effectuated by all concerned, this program cannot, in the opinion of the committee, achieve its purpose.

The second standard-"security"-of course goes to the very heart of what we are entitled to expect of a Mutual Security Program. Absolute security is admittedly not yet within the grasp of contemporary man. But unless progress is made toward that goal with each successive Mutual Security Act or its successor, then the program fails to live up to its promise and cannot justify the vast American financial and military efforts made in the name of security. The third standard-balance-applies to the planning of the program, its implementation, its success in maintaining what Secretary of State Dulles has referred to as "an essential balance between our economic health and our military effort." In this connection, the Secretary in his testimony on the bill under consideration stressed that

"The American economy is the very heart of the strength of the free world, but our resources are not unlimited, and we dare not endanger our fundamental economic stability. *** If economic stability goes down the drain, everything else goes down the drain. * * * The burden of this program is too great for us to finance boondoggles."

II. THE LACK OF BALANCE

Starting first with the last standard-balance-even by the terms of the testimony presentation itself before the committee, H.R. 5710 is not a balanced bill. We have attended the hearings regularly. We have followed the testimony closely. We have studied the bill carefully, both as considered by the committee and as reported. Each successive stage has only served to confirm the lack of balance in the bill and of the mutual security which it promises.

Among the authorizations in the bill are those which can be eliminated, postponed, or reduced, without impairing the effectiveness of mutual security. Other authorizations are undesirable until certain international negotiations are completed or legislation by other countries has been enacted. Still others, in the nature of so-called defense support for Europe, are not balanced by specific military production of commensurate value. In many of the technical and special economic assistance authorizations, dams and other long-range development programs are carried forward despite the clear intent of the Act for International Development against this distortion of "technical assistance" into an international WPA. In still other projects, there are authorizations on the basis of possible need, though very little has been told the committee of how the money would be programed if appropriated.

The above items, when reduced to figures, total a little over $1 billion. They include:

(1) Military aid to Spain.-An authorization of $10 million for defense support and $91,091,000 in military assistance is requested for Spain. Negotiations with Spain are not complete, and in the words of a statement placed in the record of the committee hearings by the executive branch, "it is, of course, impossible to be certain of defense support requirements." It must also be

pointed out that the executive branch estimates that none of the $125 million in funds already appropriated for military and economic assistance will be obligated by June 30, 1953, under the present status quo.

(2) Military assistance to Japan.-This in effect is an attempt at rearming the nation of Japan behind the backs of the Japanese people. Let us remember, even if the supporters of the bill do not that chapter II, article 9, of the Japanese Constitution provides :

"Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized."

The words "war potential" should be stressed because despite this provision of the Japanese Constitution, the United States plans a program which will provide this potential. Calling these forces "home guard," "police force," or "safety forces," cannot alter this basic fact.

(3) Special defense financing for France.-There is an authorization of $100 million to France for the manufacture of artillery, ammunition, and semiautomatic weapons. France has facilities to produce this equipment. As stated in the committee report, however:

"The French budget is so overstrained, however, that this capacity would not be used if the money available from the Government of France could not be supplemented by United States funds. This arrangement differs from offshore procurement in that the United States does not procure or contract for the military equipment. The French Government does the procurement under its normal procedures."

In other words, the amount is being made available for the manufacture of military equipment over which we have had no procurement or contract authority.

(4) Special weapons.-What weapons these will be and what makes them "special" we have not been told. This is a "maybe" item, as it has been referred to. Can the supporters of this bill defend $100 million for a project of this type at this time? The committee report states that "the United States may wish to produce for NATO a superior guided missile which may be invented by a NATO country." This may be true, but can anyone justify this authorization when viewed against the millions of dollars available to the Defense Department for this purpose through its regularly appropriated funds?

(5) So-called technical assistance-which is a minimum of "technical" and a maximum of "assistance"-straight out-and-out financial assistance to bolster budgets and 5-year plans of economic development and to fill dollar gaps. There is no difficulty in demonstrating this fact. The difficulty is in deciding which country to use there are so many-to describe this distortion of technical assistance. United States projects in India and Pakistan, for example, mesh into the large-scale development programs of each country. All forms of United States assistance in India are geared to that country's 5-year plan. Yet, as stated in the committee hearings, if this plan is successfully completed, "it will raise per capita income by only a fraction over 1 percent per year." We do not feel that the United States should subsidize programs of development abroad of the kind that at this very moment are being denied to the American people in the name of economy.

In some items, authorization of carryover of funds is requested although the mutual security evaluation teams recommended against them. These teams, made up of business leaders from various sections of the United States, had been asked by Director for Mutual Security Stassen to survey Mutual Security Agency operations in Europe and Asia, and to make recommendations on these operations. To mention only one such recommendation, there is the defense support item of $37,500,000 requested for Italy. In this connection, the mutual security evaluation team for Italy made two specific recommendations-"avoid heavy industry, aircraft, and complex electronic purchases" and "the purchase of aircraft, jet engines, and so forth * since Italy is not fitted to produce or support them." In response to a question raised by Mr. Bentley during the hearings on how these specific recommendations can be reconciled with the announced policy, it was developed that the specific recommendations of the evaluation team had been overruled.

Furthermore, this bill is an example of the way in which the Congress is losing its constitutional authority in the control of expenditures. In addition, there is a provision in H.R. 5710 permitting a 10-percent transfer within an area between funds authorized for different purposes in the area or between countries or groups of countries in the same area; another provision permits a 10-percent transfer between areas for the same type of assistance as the funds were originally authorized for.

In the case of military assistance, the authorization for fiscal year 1954 involves funds for many military end items to be shipped not in fiscal 1954, not in fiscal 1955, but in fiscal 1956. Unexpended funds are estimated to amount to $8,038,300,000 by the end of June 30, 1953. Estimated expenditures are estimated by Secretary of Defense Wilson to amount to some $5 billion for fiscal 1954. Thus, the unexpended balance from present appropriations remaining at the end of fiscal 1954, the fiscal year for which authorizations are requested in this bill, will equal $3,038,300,000. Thus, if we authorize no funds for fiscal 1954, there would be more than enough military end items to ship abroad. Secretary of the Treasury Humphrey in testifying before the committee pointed out the danger of "getting away out so far in front." He pointed out how the Congress has lost control of expenditures: "At the moment you have not any control over expenditures at all. It is in large part money that was appropriated 1 or 2 years ago. We have not any control over it and you have no control over it. You are just paying the bills as the stuff comes in. The way to stop that is to stop buying ahead." We don't stop buying ahead in this bill.

III. MUTUALITY

Turning to the "mutuality" test, can anyone maintain that the basic doctrine enunciated by the House Foreign Affairs Committee in this respect is being complied with? The people, especially in Europe, are not contributing as great a share of the expenses to their own defense as the United States is contributing to that defense. Henry Hazlitt, top economic affairs reporter for Newsweek magazine, points out in the June 15, 1953, issue of that periodical that

"Our foreign aid program, once mainly economic, is now mainly for defense. Congressmen hesitate to criticize it because they think it involves primarily a military question. It still involves, in fact, primarily an economic question, for it rests on two invalid economic assumptions: (1) That Europe cannot afford to pay for its own defense, and (2) that the amount we give for defense aid all goes to increase foreign defense. Here are this fiscal year's armament expenditures of 10 of our aid beneficiaries stated as a percentage of (1) their total central governmental expenditures (TGE) and (2) their gross national product (GNP). The record of these European countries is compared with our own:

"The United States, in brief, is spending on national defense more than 4 times as much absolutely as these 10 nations combined (some $53.2 billion against a total of $11.8 billion). It is also spending much more relatively-15 percent of its gross national product against an average of 7 percent for the 10 beneficiaries.

“Yet the United States, which is giving the defense aid, is spending some 70 percent of its total budget on defense, whereas the countries receiving the aid are spending on the average only some 30 percent of their total budget on nondefense. This is another way of saying that while we in the United States can afford to spend only 30 percent of our total budget on nondefense items, the European beneficiaries of arms aid are lavishly spending some 70 percent of their total budgets on nondefense items. They are robbing their own defense at the cost of comparative luxuries (including deficits on their nationalized industries).

"This relationship cannot be excused on the plea of poverty. On the contrary, in the foregoing table it is Greece and Turkey that have the highest relative defense budgets. Yugoslavia devotes some 80 percent of its total spending budget to defense, and Nationalist China about 57 percent. The 10 countries in the table spend altogether a modest $11.8 billion on defense and some $34.2 billion on nondefense. Suppose we assume that we are contributing some $4.2 billion a year to their defense. Why can't they, instead, take this out of their nondefense expenditures (which would still leave them some $30 billion for this purpose) and add it to their defense expenditures (which would still be only about half of their nondefense expenditures)?

"It is relevant here to point out that whatever money or material we give to a European government for defense aid, however specifically earmarked, can simply release that much of that country's own funds for additional nondefense expenditures."

C. L. Sulzberger, ace reporter of the New York Times, writes from Paris, on June 10, 1953, that—

"The political complexion of Europe is beginning to change in a manner that can be considered only as unfavorable to the policy and interests of the United States. This is the lesson to be deduced from the Italian election results announced today, from the inferences to be drawn from certain aspects of the French political crisis, and from certain implications of the Soviet 'peace offensive' as it perseveres on this Continent.

"Everybody knew that the Communists and their allies remained menacing. Italy has the largest Communist Party in any democratic country. But, whereas 5 years ago a great many people of monarchic and fascistic leanings recognized the need for submerging these in favor of a center coalition, similar restraint is now less apparent. ***

"This change in Italy coincides with a perceptible shift in the overall attitude of the French. The fact that Pierre Mendes-France failed to win Assembly approval as new Premier by the narrowest of margins last week demonstrated how the wind is blowing. ***

"The growth of an apparently more solid leftist opposition in France and the reduction of Premier de Gasperi's working majority in Italy makes more difficult the prospect of obtaining ratification of the European defense community and West German rearmament. Yet this is one of Washington's cardinal policies.

"What impact the gradual growth of anti-American political feeling has had in West Germany cannot be ascertained accurately until the elections in the Federal Republic late this summer. Yet there are many signs that on both the extreme right and the extreme left opinion is nibbling into Chancellor Konrad Adenauer's uneasy moderate majority."

Within the past few weeks we have witnessed a shift in the Allied front; the unity which was boastfully asserted in the past is on the wane. The British and French appear willing to accept the Kremlin's promise to be good-at least in the Far East. In Europe, however, they want "Uncle Sam" to foot the bill. In this area they are not too sure about Soviet promises; they prefer to rely on American dollars. So the policy is one of trust in Asia and distrust in Europe. How can we justify continued confidence in our allies when they lack a mutual confidnce in us, as evidenced by an ever-increasing anti-Americanism on the move? This has been vividly described by Constantine Brown, in the Washington Evening Star of June 11, 1953:

"The unmistakable trend for amity with the U.S.S.R. and dictatorships at the price of political appeasement is stronger today in Europe than at any time since before World War II. Most of our western European allies appear determined to clear the decks, that is to say, renounce if necessary the American

billions, in order to bring about political-commercial understanding with the Reds. The Italian election of this week is one of the several straws in the wind. Premier de Gasperi and his government were labeled as pro-American. There is no doubt that a number of other considerations have contributed to his setback. But his pro-Americanism is said to have been one of the reasons why the Italian electorate turned in such numbers to the extremest anti-American candidates."

There are those, like Director for Mutual Security Stassen, who maintain that comparing the situation, for example, in France in 1947, with the picture in that country today, is an indication of the progress that has taken place there in fulfilling their part of the Mutual Security Program. But as was stated by Hon. Omar Burleson during the committee hearings:

"I recognize that comparison, Mr. Secretary, and appreciate it. On the other side of the ledger, however, in 1947 and 1948 they did not have the threat of Russian aggression hanging over them as in more recent years and as we have it today. So the comparison in that respect, it seems to me, hardly holds water. Yes, certainly, improvements have been made, but on the other hand the threat is much greater and therefore the improvements should be accordingly parallel to meet the threat. That is what I mean. Certainly I do recognize that conditions have improved. They could not have gotten much worse except for France to have completely capitulated to communism."

In the past programs, the Congress has stated as a basic principle of aid that the countries of Europe must unify and integrate their efforts as an indispensable part of the process of attaining "mutuality." Since that has not been accomplished, the United States now says in this bill, "You have not been able to unify, you have not been able to integrate, but we still will give you 50 percent of the funds anyway." This is the effect of the provision in the bill that"not less than 50 per centum [of the $2,079,689,870 in military assistance funds] shall be made available only for the organization referred to in clause (C) of section 2(b) [the EDC]."

As stated in the report of the Special Study Mission of the House Foreign Affairs Committee to Europe, undertaken in April 1953:

"The question should be asked: Will continued United States aid increase the will of European countries to help themselves. The study mission believes that future foreign-aid appropriations should be viewed in the light of progress being made to the establishment of the European Defense Community. The defense of Western Europe would seem to rest on the organization of the European Defense Community now subject to ratification. Until the future of the European Defense Community is known, it is difficult to plan additional United States military assistance."

Thus far, "mutuality," insofar as the recipients of our aid are concerned, has been a figment of legislative hope. The concept has not become a reality for them. Pouring forth vast sums from our Treasury has not made it any more realistic for them.

IV. LACK OF SECURITY

Turning now to the final-and most important-element in a Mutual Security Program, "security," what promise does the program in H.R. 5710 give the American people and our "allies" in that regard. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, in reply to Mr. Bentley's question as to the Soviet forces, from the standpoint of offensive or defensive capabilities, replied:

"I think the thing that deserves continuing emphasis is that this threat, this peril of which we speak, is a combination of two things. It is a combination of a machine in existence of great capabilities, great potentialities, and a demonstrated pattern of willingness to use it for aggressive purposes whenever it suits the state's policies. That is what makes the threat."

There are those who say that we cannot guess at the Soviet mind but must prepare for Soviet capabilities. We agree. The fact is that the U.S.S.R. is capable of sweeping over Europe with the same ease now that it could last year and the year before. Despite the expenditure of billions of dollars, the fact is that our allies could not withstand such an onslaught if it should come. Our allies know it; the Communists know it; Secretary of State Dulles knows it; and we know it. What progress toward the goal of security can we say there