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This is the threat which I and my principal commanders must be prepared to meet. It is an essential element in the development of our plans, both our availabilities plans and our requirements plans. The requirements plans are the source of the determinations of requirements in terms of divisions, ships, aircraft, and supply. As I indicated this morning, the military estimate of the minimum requirements to meet the threat is under constant review. [At this point the committee digressed for a brief procedural discussion.]

General RIDGWAY. In reappraising the military situation, the NATO Military Committee agreed at its April meeting in Paris on the following minimum requirements up to D-plus-30: 140-1/3 divisions and 3,347 vessels and 12,314 D-day aircraft for the defense of the NATO area, less North America, against the initial Soviet threat. Of these totals, the requirement for Allied Command Europe is 100 percent of the divisions, 25 percent of the vessels, or 833, and 80 percent of the aircraft, or 9,979.

I should now like to discuss the progress which Allied Command Europe is making toward meeting these requirements. In doing this, I shall first discuss the progress that has actually been achieved since 1950 and then discuss the planned buildup in 1953 and 1954.

[A chart was shown entitled "Forces Buildup and Total Requirements for All NATO Countries Less North America."]

General RIDGWAY. The first three bars from the left indicate the status of forces, army, navy and air, as of the end of 1950, 1951, and 1952; the fourth and fifth bars similarly depict the force goals for 1953 and 1954, and the sixth bar represents the military requirement of 140% D-plus-30 divisions and 3,347 D-plus-30 vessels, as well as 4,689 D-plus-180 vessels and 12,314 D-day aircraft.

There is a relatively large increase in the number of forces available at the end of 1952 over those of 1951. This is, in a large measure, due to the inclusion for the first time of the forces of Greece and Turkey, as these valiant peoples only entered NATO in 1952.


Referring to the army, the D-day forces as shown in solid green increase from 14 divisions in 1950 to 20% in 1951, and to 48% in 1952. Of these 4813 divisions, 23% are Greek and Turkish forces. The expansion of D-plus-30 forces in 1952, which is shown in green stripes, reflects comparable increases. In referring to the total number of divisions on this chart, I have, for the purpose of simplicity, considered three separate regiments to be a division equivalent. For example, of the 14013 divisions shown on the chart, there are 132 divisions and 25 separate regiments. The dotted lines drawn across the bars indicate combat effective divisions available by D-plus-30 increasing from 211⁄2 in 1950 to 68 in 1952.

Two points should be made here, neither showing on the chart. First: Although the Lisbon goal of 50% divisions for 1952 was met numerically, I rated only 4023 as combat effective. Second: At the end of 1952 there were 24 out of a total of 91% divisions which it was estimated would not be fully combat effective by D-plus-30. The

principal reasons these D-plus-30 divisions could not be combat effective were shortages of regular, specialist, and active duty personnel, inadequate national service and training and lack of equipment and ammunition.

The fourth and fifth bars reflect D-plus-30 goals of 911 divisions and 1023 for 1953 and 1954 respectively. Mr. VORYS. These are calendar years? General RIDGWAY. Yes, sir.


Turning to the naval forces, I should like to point out that for simplicity in presentation, I have used the term "vessels" which includes all combatant types.

As an operational commander, I am primarily concerned with carriers, escorts, minesweepers and maritime aircraft. The latter category includes principally long and short-range antisubmarine air


The rate of buildup of total vessels indicated on this chart parallels almost exactly the rate of buildup of escorts, minesweepers, and maritime aircraft, whereas combat carriers remain at 14 from 1951 through 1954. Less than 10 of these would be available to the operational commander on D-day.

Referring to the naval bar for 1950, on the extreme left, we see that there were 543 vessels available in the NATO area in active commission, presumably ready on D-day, and a cumulative total of 1,173, including those in reserve. The bars for 1951 and 1952 show an increase both in the NATO naval forces available and in the number of vessels effective on D-plus-30. Included in the 1952 bar are some 75 effective Greek and Turkish vessels.

You may be interested to know that NATO as a whole met and slightly exceeded the naval goals set at Lisbon. As for the goals for 1953 and 1954, you will observe a gradual increase in vessels planned to be available.


Our air situation has undergone a similar change. At the end of 1950 there were less than 2.000 aircraft available for the defense of the NATO area, the great majority of which were seriously deficient in the combat capability required in modern warfare. Our end 1951 status shows considerable improvement quantitatively. However, the NATO air forces were still for the greater part equipped with obsolescent planes. Although the Lisbon 1952 goal was not met, the end 1952 status presents a picture which is nonetheless encouraging.

The effect of our past efforts is beginning to be evident here for the first time. You will note that we have realized a numerical increase from a little under 3,000 to almost 3,800, including, however, some obsolescent types.

The NATO force buildup goals set at the Lisbon Conference of February 1952 by the North Atlantic (NATO) Council were earlier presented to the committee by Frank C. Nash, Assistant Secretary of Defense; see the Mar. 19, 1953 session in this volume.

While it is true that about half of this increase results from the addition of Greek and Turkish forces, there was still a gain of some significance in the other countries. The fact that there was any gain at all is particularly important in relation to the striking fact that in 1952 we nearly doubled our jet aircraft availability.

The task of converting units equipped with conventional type aircraft to jet aircraft is an undertaking of major proportions involving very substantial efforts in training, maintenance, and supply operations.

This is certainly a very encouraging picture. However, I do not want to leave you with a too optimistic evaluation of the air forces available. Of the 3,800 aircraft available, about 2,900 are assigned to Allied Command Europe. The remainder are retained under national control, primarily in France and the United Kingdom where air defense and certain other functions are national responsibilities. These forces are not evaluated by SHAPE. Of the 2,900 aircraft in squadrons of Allied Command Europe, the SHAPE evaluation is that at most 2,400 could be considered effective as of the end of the year. Deficiencies in equipment, in training, in personnel all remain to be overcome before our air forces are fully effective.

The next two columns indicate the goals for 1953 and 1954, respectively, as approved in Paris last month. You will note that by the end of this year our objective is to have a force of about 5,400 aircraft, and at the end of next year, 7,300. The final column shows the currently approved overall air requirement of 12,314.


To summarize, the forces that existed in 1950 have been more than doubled in number and there has been a similar increase in the combat effectiveness of these units. A command structure has been set up to exercise control and coordination of the forces. There has been continued improvement in each of the three services in the state of training of forces. Field commanders have gained in command experience. Additional unit commanders have been trained. The numerous exercises and maneuvers that have been conducted have done much to weld the national contingents into an effective force.

In the army, the D-day forces are at a generally satisfactory state of training; the reserve forces, although improved, require additional call-up training in many instances. The combat effectiveness of the naval forces has been increased through the development of common doctrines, international exercises, and the receipt of electronic equipment and modern weapons from the military assistance programs. The combat effectiveness of the air force has substantially increased as a result of the receipt of jet aircraft, a large part of which were provided under these programs. The support available to these units, their air base network, and their operational capabilities all have been marked by considerable improvement.

The military assistance programs have contributed materially to the increased combat effectiveness of the NATO forces. An outstanding example during the past year which comes to my mind with regard to the army forces is that of the delivery of more than 1,000

modern medium tanks during the latter part of 1952 and this spring. These tanks not only increased combat effectiveness but very greatly improved morale.

During the past year SHAPE and its subordinate commands have devoted considerable effort to evaluating the effectiveness of existing forces, to determining those areas which should be emphasized in the buildup of forces, and to developing the priorities which should be afforded the relative buildup of the forces themselves, their logistical support, and their reserves of supply and equipment. These studies indicate that the main weaknesses in the ground forces are those relating to combat and logistic support units, operational reserves of ammunition, POL-petroleum, oil, and lubricants-and equipment. In the navy the shortages of minesweepers and escort vessels are particularly acute. However, the primary weakness in the overall buildup is the lack of adequate progress in the buildup of modern aircraft, particularly with respect to all-weather fighters, light bombers, and shore-based naval maritime aircraft.

With all our progress toward the requirements we have set, there is still today a great gap in our ability to defend Western Europe successfully. That gap can be partially closed by the latent military power of Western Germany. I should like to tell you just what the addition of German defense forces would mean to our whole effort. The planning of the Interim Committee of the EDC-European Defense Community-which my headquarters has followed closely, has already advanced to a point where the creation of German military units following ratification of the treaty will not be delayed. In other words, in planning for German strength we are already a long step ahead. These plans for six divisions, 84 naval vessels, and 279 aircraft at the end of the first year after ratification, and for an eventual buildup to a total of 12 divisions, 1,326 aircraft, and 275 minesweepers and other coastal vessels-manned by half a million



In addition to planning the buildup of forces, one of our major activities-and, in fact, one of our most difficult problems, is infrastructure, our international program of construction of fixed military installations. Without the necessary fixed installations our forces could not be sustained in battle. Let me relate this military problem to the bill you are considering.

This bill includes provision for the United States share of the fourth annual increment, or as it is commonly called the "Fourth Slice" of infrastructure. This fourth slice, our 1953 program, has been pared down to the minimum required in keeping with the forces foreseen for 1954. In addition to 35 airfields, the fourth slice will provide us with a critically needed jet fuel supply system for our airfields, important improvements in our communications facilities, and certain basic facilities for training and operational requirements. I consider our program to be an operational minimum, carefully developed in keeping with principles of economy in requirement and in utilization. In respect to the maior part of the fourth slice and, in fact, the major part of the entire infrastructure program, namely our

airfields, I have already indicated that the fourth slice provides 35 airfields constructed to the SHAPE standard. Four of these are in Germany. Previous slices provided us with a total of 125 airfields, including those in Germany. This adds up to a total of 160 on which we may dispose our air forces.

There has been considerable discussion of our airfield program, in the press and elsewhere, most recently to the effect that it has been slow. I believe that there has, in fact, been very substantial progress in our airfield construction, that considering the complications necessarily a part of international construction and financing, we have made major steps forward. In my view the progress that we have made in airfields is one of the significant achievements of NATO and Allied Command Europe.

[A chart was shown entitled "SHAPE Infrastructure Program Construction Progress-Airfields."]

General RIDGWAY. This chart indicates the construction status of airfields. The solid block indicates those airfields where programed construction is complete. This next block indicates those constructed to a point where they could be used on a limited basis in the event of emergency. The next block indicates those under construction but not yet at a usable level. Finally, the last block indicates those on which construction has not been started.

The construction programed by NATO at 21 airfields is complete. Seventy-nine are now far enough along to be usable on an emergency basis. Twenty-six are under construction but not usable, and 34 are yet to be started. By the end of this year, we expect that the number completed will have increased to about 80. Accomplishment of this kind within 3 years is major progress.

One last comment on infrastructure is to report to you the real satisfaction which we at SHAPE felt as a result of the recent North Atlantic Council action in approving the new long-range program for infrastructure. As you perhaps know, this program is designed to provide a basis for planning and budgeting of infrastructure over a 3-year period beginning with our 1954 program. This new basis is sure to result in more effective, better coordinated, and more soundly phased construction. This in turn should produce more economical infrastructure. While we were given a long-range planning figure, we shall, of course, continue to submit recommendations for annual slices which will be supported by military requirements.


This mutual security program-along with the previous ones-constitutes an essential element to the buildup of the NATO forces. The tanks, ships and aircraft included in their provisions are the hard core of the weapons so necessary for combat effectiveness.

The army portion, will provide the most essential equipment and ammunition for NATO ground units which are now in being or scheduled for activation prior to the end of 1954. A substantial share for the fiscal year 1954 will be devoted to filling equipment deficiencies in selected existing combat and support units and to furnishing 60 days of ammunition for U.S.-type weapons in the program.

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