Page images

until we are attacked. We know that. So we watch these concentrations build up.

I am not free to shift these things, now. Remember, this 140 is practically an absolute minimum. Up in the North there were 13 divisions. As I said in my statement, if you will recall, I had no general reserves for inter-regional use. I do not have a mass of reserves in France, for instance, where if I am hard pressed in the North, I could shift up to Norway. I could not get it there in time if I did under present means of transportation, but it does not exist and it does not exist in this requirement.

So what we have here--I am still talking just about the Army— is that minimum strength within the first 30 days to give us a reasonable chance of avoiding disaster.

Now the buildup for an offensive stage of the war is something far different, and that bar is going on up to the ceiling, then, to go back and destroy the hostile power. That is a 3-, 4-, or 5-year affair, maybe 10 each time. Each of these terrible catastrophies has been longer than the preceding one, although I would like to point out again what I said before, that at no time in the history of warfare has that basic principle of surprise had such terrible significance. If we get surprised this time with all these atomic capabilities, the destruction is going to infinitely exceed anything we have ever known.

Mr. BURLESON. That is what I was trying to develop a little while ago, the reference to the atomic offensive. In other words, while you are deploying these 140 divisions and giving attention to defending this tremendous line of defense, then in the meantime you are going to be putting those atomic bombs where they hurt. That is where the emphasis has been and I hope still is.

General RIDGWAY. That in large part is going to be devoted to crippling their warmaking potential, but that would not necessarily in itself slow up this great mass.

We are going to use part of that effort, too, in retardation.


Mrs. BOLTON. General, you have spoken a number of times about the captive nations and their forces and the fact that they have purged the suspicious ones and so forth.

On the other hand, those captured nations are not happy. Is it not very possible that one of the deterrents to Moscow is the fact that they are so unsure of the populace even though they may be sure of their armies. If the move forward should take place and the populace rise up, they have nothing to put in there to stop the populace? We might have a revolutionary action against Moscow, might we


General RIDGWAY. Very definitely.

I think Mrs. Bolton, one of the great challenges to statemanship and, it has to be supported by military power in being, is to be able to reach these captive peoples.

As a theoretical evercise, now-Poland has 17 divisions. I do not know their reliability to the Soviets, but assuming for the moment

that we were attacked and that we had a ground force with air support which was capable of making ground contact with those Polish divisions, I would venture to say that a large part, if not all of them, would defect and fight on our side. Now that would represent not only the loss of 17 divisions, captive-nation divisions of Russia, but a diversion of a lot of their own force to held that population down. There is an opportunity, but it is an exceedingly difficult one, and the leadership for working out that problem is in the political field.

Mrs. BOLTON. Do we have any contacts with those people?
General RIDGWAY. Yes; we do.

Mrs. BOLTON. You continue to be able to press in toward them?

General RIDGWAY. Before World War II, France and Britain guaranteed Poland's integrity, but they could never get there in time. It is too much now, in view of what has happened in the last few years, I think, to ask any people to rise up when they have this closed machine in there.

Mrs. BOLTON. I was not thinking of that, I was thinking of the automatic action of that people. If the armies that have been keeping them down should move into another area, there is a possibility of that.

General RIDGWAY. There certainly is.

It is hard to see why the Russians would turn over some of their finest, most modern equipment to these people if they did not think they were reliable.

Mrs. BOLTON. Thank you very much.

Mr. BENTLEY. Mr. Chairman, I have one question along that line. There is always the possibility of a certain amount of defection among the Soviet forces themselves, is there not?

General RIDGWAY. I would think so, but that depends on the nature of the war. If you could convince the Russian soldier that he was fighting for his native land, he is a pretty tough fighter.

Mr. BENTLEY. But outside of Russia it might be a different story. General RIDGWAY. It might very well be.


Mr. VORYS. On these maps we have here, the line of the Rhine would be the first place you might hold and the Pyrennees might be the last place you might hold

Chairman CHIPERFIELD. Will you yield on that point?

Mr. VORYS. Yes.

Chairman CHIPERFIELD. Will our boys face a Dunkirk over there if they were attacked tomorrow?

General RIDGWAY. I do not think so.

Chairman CHIPERFIELD. That goes to the question of whether they could be stopped at the Rhine.

General RIDGWAY. We have a force over there, Mr. Chairman, of which you can be exceedingly proud. They are ready to fight tomorrow and fight magnificently, and they are a pretty powerful force. Mr. VORYS. Along that line, you mentioned I think this morning or this afternoon about plans for not having our forces-certainly

our own forces, we hope-simply chewed up and destroyed in a heroic but futile resistance.

Have you got plans for what you do now so as to sell ground dearly but keep your forces intact?'

General RIDGWAY. Might I go off the record on that?

Mr. VORYS. Yes.

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. VORYS. Are there other questions?

Mrs. BOLTON. I would like to say that we have not touched on Morocco and that area, and I think we should know more about it. It is 20 minutes until 5 o'clock and I would hope, General, that we might have something on that.

The suggestion as made for a Middle East Command was so illtimed it could not help but be refused by the Arab countries. They were certain that we were just aiding and abetting the French, as they feel we are the English, so they were not going to play with it at all.

On the other hand, my information-and it comes directly from authoritative Arabs-is that if the British will just move, they will be the first ones to say, "Let's have a Near East Command." Timing is such an important factor.


Then I have another deeply worrying problem, particularly for some of my people, of the potentialities of Germans. How much danger do we run of their taking up the old militaristic idea and really building themselves into something and going to it again?

General RIDGWAY. I cannot very well comment on the first, Mrs. Bolton, but on the second, I think it is a small risk. If the means available to the NATO authorities today are properly utilized, that is so. It seems to me the control mechanism to avoid any dangerous resurgence of aggressive German armed might is not too difficult if we exercise the leadership.

Mrs. BOLTON. General, would you permit me to say just that little sentence, if I am put in a jam about it?

General RIDGWAY. With the chairman's permission, I certainly would, Mrs. Bolton.

Mr. VORYS. This whole thing is to be edited and any parts that are printable, they will be printed. I will ask your staff to go over it and make what you can available.

General RIDGWAY. I would like to do that because I have talked with complete freedom to you this afternoon.

Mr. VORYS. We appreciate that and realize your responsibility.


Mr. McCORMACK [John W. McCormack of Massachusetts, Democratic Party Whip, House of Representatives]. General, without disregarding other parts of the world, what is your opinion as to the necessity of Europe being defended in the national interests of the United States?

General RIDGWAY. I think it is essential.

Mr. McCORMACK. Assuming Europe is overrun and taken over by the Communist forces, what effect do you think this will have on the national security of the United States?

General RIDGWAY. Very dangerously a detrimental one.

Mr. McCORMACK. Would it leave us practically alone in the world? General RIDGWAY. It almost would, sir-so far as "effective" allies are concerned; militarily effective.



Mr. McCORMACK. What effect do you think a further cut of $1 billion or $2 billion will have upon the unification of the European army and so forth?

General RIDGWAY. I tried to make it clear this morning that I am not in this dollar business at all because my purely military responsibilities are to evaluate the military force requirements, which we have done in terms of divisions, aircraft, and combat vessels.

When you convert it to dollars, you are out of my field entirely and I am unable to assess, for instance, at the present moment, what effect, if any, it is going to have upon delivery schedules of the hardware, which is what I am interested in, at support facilities.

Mr. VORYS. General, along that line, did you notice any loss of momentum or loss of morale over there last summer, due to any action of the American Congress?

General RIDGWAY. I did not, sir.

Mr. VORYS. We cut the original programs $1.9 billion and the year before, we cut it nearly $1 billion, and there has never been any reduction in the amount of money available for hardware delivery during all that period.

I just mentioned that to see whether you had gotten any reaction. We have the problem of keeping the stuff coming to you, but the fact is that the original program was cut $1 billion in 1951, $1.9 billion in 1952, and that has not been mentioned up to this time in our hearings.

Mr. HARRISON. Maybe that is the reason they are so short over there.

Mrs. BOLTON. Then why do they have so much left?

Mr. HARRISON. They certainly have not got much force?

Mr. VORYS. There is a difference in the flow because there has been an unspent but large appropriated amount of money to keep it coming to you.

At 10:30 tomorrow, we will proceed with offshore procurement and infrastructure.

Remember about correcting the transcripts of this morning.
General, this has been a great opportunity for us.

[Whereupon, at 4:50 p.m., the committee recessed to reconvene at 10:30 a.m., Tuesday, May 19, 1953.]


(H.R. 5710, 83d Cong., 1st Sess.)



Washington, D.C.

The committee met in executive session in room G-3, the Capitol, at 10:40 a.m., Hon. Robert E. Chiperfield (chairman) presiding. Chairman CHIPERFIELD. The committee will come to order.

Mr. Secretary, we welcome you back. You may proceed in any way that you care to.



Secretary DULLES. Mr. Chairman, if it meets with your approval, I will run over the situation primarily from the political standpoint, and then Mr. Stassen will follow with observations primarily on the economic aspect of the situation.


I thought it might be most useful if I took the situation up in terms of the political problems, not necessarily as a travelog, in the order in which I visited the countries. If I do it in that way, I will take up first Libya, which is actually the last of the countries we visited. Libya is the central area, there, on the Mediterranean. It is important from the strategic standpoint because of the base facilities there. We have an airfield which I think is rated very highly by the Defense Department in terms of SAC [Strategic Air Command] possibilities. The British also have facilities there, which they are seeking to extend as a possible place to which the forces now in the Suez base could be removed, assuming they are removed. There are 81,000 British troops at the present time in the Suez base and it has been agreed in principle that those troops will be taken out, and Libya is one of the places to which it is presumed they will be removed. From the standpoint of British forces, both ground and air, and from the standpoint of our air force, Libya assumes very considerable importance.

As far as we can judge, there are good relations with the Libyan Government. Subject to a controversy about the base terms, there was

[blocks in formation]
« PreviousContinue »