of variety, and by the entire absence of the illustration which fancy or imagination might have brought to them. Above all he wants cntirely that saving gift of humour which brightens literary controversies and keeps their savour fresh when the subjects have passed into oblivion. Against the approach of such humour Bolingbroke's egotism and affectation set an impenetrable bar. He has not even that literary instinct which enabled such a man as Temple to refresh his reader by digressing into devious ways, and lingering on his road to give his imagination play.

His literary work is at its best when it comes nearest to the active part of his own life, and reflects most strongly the habit of the orator. The Letter to Sir William Windham was one of his earliest writings, and was composed soon after his breach with the Pretender in 1716, although not published until nearly forty years later. In this Bolingbroke had to face the hard task of defending himself against an overwhelming suspicion of political treachery and tergiversation. He accomplishes his task with consummate skill. He is by turns dignified, jocose, sarcastic, indignant, and yet apologetic. He contrives to convey the impression of a man mistaken perhaps, baffled sometimes by circumstances, but always with high aims, and never acting except at the prompting of high-minded, even if erroneous, principle. In some respects this Letter rises to a higher level than any of his writings; and if he fails to procure his own acquittal, it is because the evidence against him is invincibly strong. The Spirit of Patriotism, and the Idea of a Patriot King rise at times to a very high eloquence. But their style is monotonous and heavy. Undoubtedly the notions which Bolingbroke set forth, and the ideal which he preached—of a strong and effective monarchical force, resting upon popular support, and by this means able to frustrate the factiousness of parliamentary parties-had great influence, and have not ceased to operate in our own day. But the ideal was not created by Bolingbroke, and was not materially extended by his writings. It was the inevitable result of a reaction against Walpole's rule; it was admirably fitted for eloquent declamation, became the watchword of a vigorous party, was the theme of countless speeches, and Bolingbroke's dissertations were rather eloquent essays on a current topic than the first manifestoes of a new propaganda. The letters to the Crafts

Each

man, which were brought together afterwards, with a dedication to Sir R. Walpole, in the form of A Dissertation upon Parties, were really a variation upon the same scheme; and the same may be said as to the Remarks upon the History of England. Bolingbroke's political writings, indeed, have something of the effect which might be produced by the republication of scraps of the work of a political journalist of our own day. tract was an episode in the party fight. Bolingbroke kept the tools of the controversy sharp enough, and knew how to lead the dispute into specious generalities; but permanent literature cannot be gathered out of the pages of the political journal, however skilfully these may be framed for their immediate aim. The journalist necessarily repeats himself. It would be easy to find many instances of this in Bolingbroke; as one, it may be enough to refer to a long passage in the Letter to Sir W. Windham, comparing the recantation of Henry IV. of France, with the obstinate refusal of the later Stuarts to conform to the Anglican Church, and the conduct of the French and English in each case. The passage is almost verbally repeated,

at full length, in the Dissertation upon Parties (Letter IV.)

The Letters on History stand half-way between Bolingbroke's political and his so-called philosophical writings. The question of the origin and authority of history is made the basis of an attack upon Christianity, and upon the clergy, which in its dishonesty of tactics goes beyond even those bounds which Bolingbroke usually observes. Here is a specimen :

The notion of inspirations that come occasionally, that illuminated the minds and guided the hands of the sacred penmen while they were writing one page, and restrained their influence while the same authors were writing another, may be cavilled against; and what is there that may not? But surely it deserves to be treated with respect since it tends to establish a distinction between the legal, doctrinal, and prophetical parts of the Bible, and the historical; without which it is impossible to establish the first, as evidently and as solidly as the interests of religion require.

It is typical of Bolingbroke to set forth a proposition which he so states as to make it manifestly absurd: with a mock air to defend it; and to give as an excuse for the defence, the interests of revealed religion, for which he cared nothing. It is discreditable argument, and it is very poor wit.

But the literary work which Bolingbroke evidently thought

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was to be his chief monument to posterity, and which posterity has most neglected, consists of his essays on philosophy. He dealt with this subject partly in letters to Pouilly, written when he was in France in 1720; partly in letters to Pope, left for publication after his death. According to a story circumstantially told, Bolingbroke drew up for Pope the scheme of the Essay on Man. Johnson's common sense perceived that this was an exaggeration; that all the fancy, the illustration, the poetic form, were necessarily due to Pope alone; and when we subtract these, the frame of philosophy on which the Essay is based is so attenuated, that the honour of its conception is scarcely worth dispute.

The world has indeed condemned and feared the attacks of Bolingbroke, and has occasionally admired his speculative boldness, entirely upon trust. Be truth what it may, no more pretentious and superficial travesty of speculation was ever palmed off upon the world as serious philosophy. At times he reminds us almost of Pangloss, for whom everything was for the best in the best of all possible worlds; but he is a very sour and dull Pangloss compared with Voltaire's. Of the humour and perception to be found in these letters, we may form an estimate when we find that the most suitable epithet he can invent for Swift in a letter to Pope is "the jocose Dean of St. Patrick's." He who wrote that word had something of the dullard beneath all his brilliancy. His sense of proportion may be gathered from the fact that he thinks the philosophy of Locke to be the most valuable product of his time, that Leibnitz and Descartes are only named for ridicule, and that, though Berkeley is treated with courtesy, his speculative greatness is ignored. Plato and Aristotle he discusses and condemns with all the arrogance of an acquaintance which is entirely second-hand. Metaphysical philosophy he mentions only with a sneer. Swift abandoned metaphysics in despair; Bolingbroke despises it with the easy conceit of a man of fashion, the cynicism of a roué, and the scepticism of one who mistook the transparence of superficiality for the clearness of reason. He wrote against it with about as much power of expression, range of intellect, and display of erudition, as we might expect in an expert journalist.

H. CRAIK.

1

THE USES OF HISTORY.

BESIDES the advantage of beginning our acquaintance with mankind sooner, and of bringing with us into the world, and the business of it, such a cast of thought and such a temper of mind, as will enable us to make a better use of our experience, there is this further advantage in the study of history that the improvement we make by it extends to more objects, and is made at the expense of other men: whereas that improvement which is the effect of our own experience, is confined to fewer objects, and is made at our own expense. To state the account fairly, therefore, between these two improvements; though the latter be the more valuable, yet allowance being made on one side for the much greater number of examples that history presents to us, and deduction being made on the other of the price we often pay for our experience, the value of the former will rise in proportion. have recorded these things, says Polybius after giving an account of the defeat of Regulus, "that they who read these commentaries may be rendered better by them; for all men have two ways of improvement, one arising from their own experience, and one from the experience of others. Evidentior quidem illa est quæ

I

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per propria ducit infortunia; at tutior illa, quæ per aliena.” use Casaubon's translation. Polybius goes on and concludes, "that since the first of these ways exposes us to great labour and peril, whilst the second works the same good effect, and is attended by no evil circumstance, every one ought to take for granted that the study of history is the best school where he can learn how to conduct himself in all the situations of life." Regulus had seen at Rome many examples of magnanimity, of frugality, of the contempt of riches, and of other virtues, and these virtues he practised. But he had not learned, nor had opportunity of learning another lesson, which the examples recorded in history inculcate frequently, the lesson of moderation. An insatiable thirst of

military fame, an unconfined ambition of extending their empire, an extravagant confidence in their own courage and force, an insolent contempt of their enemies, and an impetuous overbearing spirit with which they pursued all their enterprises, composed in his days the distinguishing character of a Roman. Whatever the

senate and people resolved, to the members of that commonwealth appeared both practicable and just. Neither difficulties nor dangers could check them, and their sages had not yet discovered that virtues in excess degenerate into vices. Notwithstanding the beautiful rant which Horace puts into his mouth, I make no doubt that Regulus learned at Carthage those lessons of moderation which he had not learned at Rome; but he learned them by experience, and the fruits of this experience came too late, and cost too dear; for they cost the total defeat of the Roman army, the prolongation of a calamitous war which might have been finished by a glorious peace, the loss of liberty to thousands of Roman citizens, and to Regulus himself the loss of life in the midst of torments, if we are entirely to credit what is perhaps exaggeration in the Roman authors.

:

There is another advantage, worthy our observation, that belongs to the study of history, and that I shall mention here, not only because of the importance of it, but because it leads me immediately to speak of the nature of the improvement we ought to have in our view, and of the method in which it seems to me that this improvement ought to be pursued; two particulars from which your lordship may think perhaps that I digress too long. The advantage I mean consists in this, that the examples which history presents to us, both of men and of events, are generally complete the whole example is before us, and consequently the whole lesson, or sometimes the various lessons, which philosophy proposes to teach us by this example. For first, as to men we see them at their whole length in history, and we see them generally there through a medium less partial at least than that of experience: for I imagine, that a Whig or a Tory, whilst those parties subsisted, would have condemned in Saturninus the spirit of faction which he applauded in his own tribunes, and would have applauded in Drusus the spirit of moderation which he despised in those of the contrary party, and which he suspected and hated in those of his own party. The villain who has imposed on mankind by his power or cunning, and whom experience could not unmask for a time, is unmasked at length; and the honest