happens, it may almost always be remarked, that all the pirncipal members of the period are similar in their structure, and would constitute so many distinct sentences if they were not united by their reference to some common clause in the beginning or the end.

SECTION II.

THE DOUBLE MEANING.

Ir was observed that perspicuity might be violated not only by obscurity, but also by double meaning. The fault in this case is, not that the sentence conveys darkly or imperfectly the author's meaning, but that it conveys also some other meaning which is not the author's. His words are susceptible of more than one interpretation. When this happens, it is always occasioned either by using some expression which is equivocal—that is, hath more meanings than one affixed to it, or by ranging the words in such an order that the construction is rendered equivocal, or made to exhibit different senses. To the former, for distinction's sake, I shall as sign the name of equivocation; to the latter I shall appropriate that of ambiguity.

PART I. Equivocation.

I begin with the first. When the word equivocation denotes, as in common language it generally denotes, the use of an equivocal word or phrase, or other ambiguity, with an intention to deceive, it doth not differ essentially from a lie. This offence falls under the reproof of the moralist, not the censure of the rhetorician. Again, when the word denotes, as agreeably to etymology it may denote, that exercise of wit which consisteth in the playful use of any term or phrase in different senses, and is denominated pun, it is amenable, indeed, to the tribunal of criticism, but cannot be regarded as a violation of the laws of perspicuity. It is neither with the liar nor with the punster that I am concerned at present. The only species of equivocation that comes under reprehension here is that which takes place when an author undesignedly employs an expression susceptible of a sense different from the sense he intends to convey by it.

In order to avoid this fault, no writer or speaker can think of disusing all the homonymous terms of the language, or all such as have more than one signification. To attempt this in any tongue, ancient or modern, would be to attempt the annihilation of the greater part of the language; for in every language, the words strictly univocal will be found to be the smaller number. But it must be admitted, as a rule in elocution, that equivocal terms ought ever to be avoided, unless where their connexion with the other words of the sentence

instantly ascertains the meaning. This, indeed, the connexion is often so capable of affecting, that the hearer will never reflect that the word is equivocal, the true sense being the only sense which the expression suggests to his mind. Thus the word pound signifies both the sum of twenty shillings sterling and the weight of sixteen ounces avoirdupois. Now if you tell me that you rent a house at fifty pounds, or that you have bought fifty pounds of meat in the market, the idea of weight will never present itself to my mind in the one case, or the idea of money in the other. But it frequently happens, through the inadvertency of writers, that the connected words in the sentence do not immediately ascertain the sense of the equivocal term; and though an intelligent reader may easily find the sense on reflection and with the aid of the context, we may lay it down as a maxim, that an author always offends against perspicuity when his style requires that reflection from his reader. But I shall proceed to illustrate by examples the fault of which I am treating. An equivocation, then, may be either in a single word or in a phrase.

As to the former, there is scarcely any of the parts of speech in which you will not find equivocal terms. To begin with particles: the preposition of denotes sometimes the relation which any affection bears to its subject; that is, the person whose affection it is; sometimes the relation which it bears to its object. Hence this expression of the apostle hath been observed to be equivocal: "I am persuaded that neither death nor life-shall be able to separate us from the love of God." By the love of God, say interpreters, may be understood either God's love to us, or our love to God. It is remarkable, that the genitive case in the ancient languages, and the prepositions corresponding to that case in the modern languages, are alike susceptible of this double meaning. Only as to our own language, we may observe in passing, that of late the preposition of is more commonly put before the subject, and to before the object of the passion. But this is not the only way in which the preposition of may be equivocal. As it sometimes denotes the relation of the effect to the cause, sometimes that of the accident to the subject, from this duplicity of signification there will also, in certain cir cumstances, arise a double sense. You have an example in these words of Swift: "A little after the reformation of Luther." It may, indeed, be doubted whether this should not rather be called an impropriety, since the reformation of a man will suggest much more readily a change wrought on the man than a change wrought by him. And the former of these senses it could not more readily suggest, if the expression in that sense were not more conformable to use.

Romans vii., 38, &c.

† Mechan. Operat.

My next instance shall be in the conjunctions: "They were both much more ancient among the Persians than Zoroaster or Zerdusht."* The or here is equivocal. It serves either as a copulative to synonymous words, or as a disjunctive of different things. If, therefore, the reader should not know that Zoroaster and Zerdusht mean the same person, he will mistake the sense. In coupling appellatives, there is not the same hazard, it being generally manifest to those who know the language whether the words coupled have the same signification. If, nevertheless, in any case it should be doubtful, an attention to the ensuing rules may have its utility. If the first noun follows an article or a preposition, or both, the article or the preposition, or both, should be repeated before the second, when the two nouns are intended to denote different things, and should not be repeated when they are intended to denote the same thing. If there be neither article nor preposition before the first, and if it be the intention of the writer to use the particle or disjunctively, let the first noun be preceded by either, which will infallibly ascertain the meaning. On the contrary, if, in such a dubious case, it be his design to use the particle as a copulative to synonymous words, the piece will rarely sustain a material injury by his omitting both the conjunction and the synonyma.

The following is an example in the pronouns : “She united the great body of the people in her and their common interest. The word her may be either the possessive pronoun or the accusative case of the personal pronoun. A very small alteration in the order totally removes the doubt. Say, "in their and her common interest." The word her, thus connected, can be only the possessive, as the author doubtless intended it should be, in the passage quoted.

An example in substantives: "Your majesty has lost all hopes of any future excises by their consumption." The word consumption has both an active sense and a passive. It means either the act of consuming, or the state of being consumed. Clearly thus: "Your majesty has lost all hopes of levying any future excises on what they shall consume."

In adjectives: "As for such animals as are mortal or nox ious, we have a right to destroy them." Here the false sense is suggested more readily than the true. The word mortal, therefore, in this sentence, might justly be considered as improper; for though it sometimes means destructive or causing death, it is then almost invariably joined with some noun expressive of hurt or danger. Thus we say a mortal poison, a mortal wound, a mortal disease, or a mortal enemy; but

Bo. Subst. of Letters to M. de Pouilly.

+ Idea of a Patriot King.

◆ Guardian, No. 61.

Guardian, No. 52.

the phrases mortal creature, mortal animal, or mortal man, are always understood to imply creature, animal, or man, liable to death.

In verbs: "The next refuge was to say, it was overlooked by one man, and many passages wholly written by another."* The word overlooked sometimes signifies revised and sometimes neglected. As it seems to be in the former sense that this participle is used here, the word revised ought to have been preferred. Another instance in verbs: "I have furnished the house exactly according to your fancy, or, if you please, my own; for I have long since learned to like nothing but what you do." The word do in this passage may bc either the auxiliary, or, as it might be termed, the supplement ary verb, and be intended only to supersede the repetition of the verb like; or it may be the simple active verb, which answers to the Latin facere, and the French faire.

In the next quotation the homonymous term may be either an adjective or an adverb, and admits a different sense in each acceptation:

"Not only Jesuits can equivocate "+

If the word only is here an adverb, the sense is, "To equivocate is not the only thing that Jesuits can do." This interpretation, though not the author's meaning, suits the con struction. A very small alteration in the order gives a proper and unequivocal, though a prosaic expression of this sense: "Jesuits can not only equivocate." Again, if the word only is here an adjective (and this, doubtless, is the author's intention), the sense is, "Jesuits are not the only persons who can equivocate." But this interpretation suits ill the composition of the sentence. The only other instance of this error in single words I shall produce, is one in which, on the first glance, there appears room to doubt whether a particular term ought to be understood literally or metaphorically. The word handled in the following passage will illustrate what I mean: "Thus much I thought fit to premise before I resume the subject, which I have already handled-I mean, the naked bosoms of our British ladies." Sometimes, indeed, a thing like this may be said archly and of design, in which case it falls not under this animadversion.

It was remarked above, that there are not only equivocal words in our language, but equivocal phrases. Not the least and not the smallest are of this kind. They are sometimes made to imply not any; as though one should say, not even the least, not so much as the smallest; and sometimes, again, to signify a very great, as though it were expressed in this manner, far from being the least or smallest. Thus they are sus + Spect.. No. 627.

Spect., No. 19.

✦ Dryden's Hind and Panther.

No 116

ceptible of two significations that are not only different, but contrary. We have an instance in the following passage: "Your character of universal guardian, joined to the concern you ought to have for the cause of virtue and religion, assure me you will not think that clergymen, when injured, have the least right to your protection."* This sentence hath abo the disadvantage taken notice of in some of the preceding quotations, that the sense not intended by the writer occurs to the reader much more readily than the author's real meaning. Nothing less than is another phrase which, like the two former, is susceptible of opposite interpretations. Thus, He aimed at nothing less than the crown," may denote either, Nothing was less aimed at by him than the crown," or "Nothing inferior to the crown could satisfy his ambition.” All such phrases ought to be totally laid aside. The expression will have mercy is equivocal in the following passage of the vulgar translation of the Bible: "I will have mercy, and not sacrifice." The expression commonly denotes "I wil exercise mercy;" whereas it is in this place employed to sig. nify "I require others to exercise it." The sentiment, there fore, ought to have been rendered here, as we find it express ed in the prophetical book alluded to, "I desire mercy, aro not sacrifice." When the phrase in question happens to be followed by the preposition on or upon before the object, ther is nothing equivocal in it, the sense being ascertained by the connexion.

66

So much for equivocal words and phrases.

PART II. Ambiguity.

I come now to consider that species of double mean ng which ariseth, not from the use of equivocal terms, but solely from the construction, and which I therefore distinguish hy the name of ambiguity. This, of all the faults against per spicuity, it is in all languages the most difficult to avol There is not one of the parts of speech which may not be ›› placed as that, agreeably to the rules of grammar, it may br construed with different parts of the sentence, and, by conse.. quence, made to exhibit different senses. Besides, a writer intent upon his subject is less apt to advert to those imper fections in his style which occasion ambiguity than to ary other. As no term or phrase he employs doth of itself suggest the false meaning, a manner of construing his words different from that which is expressive of his sentiment wil. not so readily occur to his thoughts; and yet this erroneou manner of construing them may be the most obvious to the reader. I shall give examples of ambiguities in most of th· Farts of speech, beginning with the pronouns.

* Guardian, No. 80

+ Matt., ix., 13
Y

+ Hos., vi., 6