way to vivacity. It doth so by substituting the instrument for the agent, by employing the abstract to represent the concrete, or by naming the passion for its object, the gift for the giver, the operation for the subject. Of the first sort, the instances are very common; as when we say of a poem that it is the production of an elegant pen instead of an elegant writer. In the same way pencil is sometimes used for painter. It must be owned, that the triteness of such expressions considerably lessens their value, and that for a reason explained in the preceding part of this section. It is, however, certain, that what vivacity can justly be ascribed to them ariseth purely from the principle which hath just now been illustrated in the synecdoche; namely, a coincidence in the expression with the bent of the imagination, both pointing to that particular with which the subject spoken of is immediately connected. Nay, so close is the relation between this species of the metonymy and that of the synecdoche above exemplified, that the same expression may sometimes be considered indifferently as belonging to either trope. Thus, in the quotation brought from Dryden, " All hands employ'd," it is of no consequence whether we denominate the word hunds one or other, a part for the whole, or the instrument for the agent.

The second species of metonymy mentioned, the abstract for the concrete, occurs much seldomer, but hath also, in the same way, a very good effect. Isaac Bickerstaff, in his lucubrations, acquaints us with a visit which an eminent rake and his companions made to a Protestant nunnery erected in England by some ladies of rank. "When he entered," says the author, "upon seeing a servant coming towards him with a design to tell him this was no place for them, up goes my grave Impudence to the maid.”** Everybody must perceive that the expression would have been incomparably fainter if he had said," Up goes my grave impudent fellow to the maid." The reason is obvious: an impudent fellow means one who, among other qualities, has that of impudence; whereas, by personifying the abstract, you leave no room for thinking of any other quality; the attention is entirely fixed on that to which the action related is imputable, and thus the natural tendency of the fancy is humoured by the expression.

The last species of this trope I took notice of, if that can be called one species which is so various in its appearances, presenting us sometimes with the passion instead of its object, sometimes with the operation instead of its subject, and sometimes with the gift instead of the giver, is in very frequent use. By this trope the Almighty hath been styled "the terror of the oppressor, and the refuge of the oppressed;" which, though the same in sense, is more cuphatical than *Tatler, No. 32.

'the object of terror to the oppressor, and the giver of refuge to the oppressed." "The Lord is my song," says Moses; "he is become my salvation;"* that is, the subject of my song, the author of my salvation. Dryden makes Lord Shaftesbury style the Duke of Monmouth

"The people's prayer, the glad diviner's theme,

The young men's vision, and the old men's dream."+

Here the terms prayer, vision, dream (for the word theme is literal), are used each for its respective subject. Nothing is more natural or more common among all nations, the simplest as well as the most refined, than to substitute the passion for its object. Such tropes as these, my love, my joy, my delight, my aversion, my horror, for that which excites the emotion, are to be found in every language. Holy Writ abounds in them; and they are not seldom to be met with in the poems of Ossian. "The sigh of her secret soul" is a fine metonymy of this kind, to express the youth for whom she sighs in secret. As the vivacity of the expression in such quotations needs no illustration to persons of taste, that the cause of this vivacity ariseth from the coincidence of the expression with the bent of the imagination, fixing on the most Interesting particular, needs no eviction to persons of judg

ment.

3. THINGS SENSIBLE FOR THINGS INTelligible.

A third way wherein tropes may be rendered subservient to vivacity is when things intelligible are represented by things sensible. There is no truth more evident than that the imagination is more strongly affected by what is perceived by the senses than by what is conceived by the understanding. If, therefore, my subject be of things only conceivable, it will conduce to enliven the style that the tropes which I employ, when I find it convenient to employ tropes, exhibit to the fancy things perceivable.

I shall illustrate this doctrine first in metaphors. A metaphor, if apposite, hath always some degree of vivacity, from the bare exhibition of likeness, even though the literal and the figurative senses of the word belong to the same class of objects; I mean only in this respect the same, that they be both sensible or both intelligible. Thus a blunder in the administration of public affairs hath been termed a solecism in politics, both things intelligible. Again, when the word sails is employed to denote the wings of a fowl, or conversely, when the word wings is adopted to signify the sails of a ship, both objects are of the same class, as both things are sensiole; yet these metaphors have a considerable share of vi+ Absalom and Achitophel.

* Exod., XV., 2.

EE

vacity, by reason of the striking resemblance both in the ap pearance of the things signified and in their use. The last however, is the best, for a reason which will be given in the next remark. But, in general, it may be asserted that, in the representation of things sensible, there is less occasion for this trope; accordingly, this application of it is now almost entirely left to the poets. On the contrary, if we critically examine any language, ancient or modern, and trace its several terms and phrases to their source, we shall find it hold invariably, that all the words made use of to denote spiritual and intellectual things are in their origin metaphors, taken from the objects of sense. This shows evidently that the latter have made the earliest impressions; have, by consequence, first obtained names in every tongue; and are still, as it were, more present with us, and strike the imagination more forcibly than the former.

It may be said, that if this observation be true, it is to no purpose to mention, as a method of enlivening the diction, the representing of intelligible things by sensible images, since it is impossible by language to represent them otherwise. To this I answer, that the words of which I am speaking I call metaphors in their origin; notwithstanding which, they may be at present, agreeably to what was formerly observed, proper terms. When speaking of tropes in general, it was remarked that many words, which to a grammatical eye appear metaphors, are in the rhetorician's estimate no metaphors at all. The ground of this difference is, that the grammarian and the rhetorician try the words by very different tests. The touchstone of the former is etymology, that of the latter is present use. The former peruseth a page, and perhaps finds not in the whole ten words that are not metaphorical. the latter examines the same page, and doth not discover in it a single metaphor. What critic, for example, would ever think of applying this appellation to terms such as these— spirit, evidence, understanding, reflection? or what etymologist would not acknowledge that to this trope solely these terms had owed their birth?

But I proceed to give examples of vivacity by true rhetorical metaphors, wherein things sensible are brought to signify things intelligible. Of this the following is one from Pope : "At length Erasmus, that great injured name (The glory of the priesthood and the shame!), Stemm'd the wild torrent of a barbarous age, And drove those holy Vandals off the stage."

Here the almost irresistible influence of general manners, which is an object purely of the understanding, is very appositely and vivaciously represented by a torrent, an object both of the sight and of the feeling. By the same vivid kind of metaphor, light is usel for knowledge, bridle for restraint;

we speak of burning with zeal, being inflamed with anger, and having a rooted prejudice.

But metaphor is not the only trope which can in this way confer vivacity; metonymy frequently, in a similar manner, promotes the same end. One very common species of the metonymy is when the badge is put for the office, and this invariably exhibits a sensible in lieu of an intelligible object. Thus we say the mitre for the priesthood, the crown for the royalty; for the military occupation we say the sword; and for the literary professions, those especially of theology, law, and physic, the common expression is the gown. Often, also, in those metonymies wherein the cause is put for the effect, and contrariwise in those wherein the effect is put for the cause, we have the same thing exemplified, a sensible object presented to the mind instead of an intelligible. Of the former, the cause for the effect, the following lines of Dryden may serve as an illustration:

""Tis all thy business, business how to shun,

To bask thy naked body in the sun.”*

Though the rhyme had permitted the change, the word sunshine instead of the sun would have rendered the expression weaker. The luminary itself is not only a nobler and distincter, but a more immediate object to the imagination than its effulgence, which, though in some respects sensible as well as the other, is in some respect merely intelligible, it not being perceived directly no more than the air, but discovered by reflection from the things which it enlightens. Accordingly, we ascribe to it neither magnitude nor figure, and scarce, with propriety, even colour. As an exemplification of the latter, the effect, or something consequential for the cause, or, at least, the implement for the motive of using it, these words of Scripture will serve : "The sword without, and terror within," where the term sword, which presents a particular and perceivable image to the fancy, must be more picturesque than the word war, which conveys an idea that is vague and only conceivable, not being otherwise sensible but by its consequences.

4. THINGS ANIMATE FOR THINGS LIFELESS.

A fourth way in which tropes may promote vivacity is when things sensitive are presented to the fancy instead of things lifeless; or, which is nearly the same, when life, perception, activity, design, passion, or any property of sentient beings, is by means of the trope attributed to things inaniIt is not more evident that the imagination is more strongly affected by things sensible than by things intelligible, than it is evident that things animate awaken greater atten † Deut., xxxii., 25.

mate.

* Dryden's Persius.

tion, and make a stronger impression on the mind, than things senseless. It is for this reason that the quality of which I am treating hath come to be termed vivacity, or liveliness of style.

In exemplifying what hath been now advanced, I shall proceed in the method which I took in the former article, and begin with metaphor. By a metaphor of this kind, a literary performance hath been styled the offspring of the brain; by it a state or government in its first stage is represented as a child in these lines of Dryden :

"When empire in its childhood first appears,

A watchful fate o'ersees its tender years.'
""**

In the last two examples we have things lifeless exhibited by things animate. In the following, wherein the effect is much the same, sense, feeling, and affection are ascribed metaphorically to inanimate matter. Thomson, describing the influence of the sunbeams upon the snow in the valley. thus vividly and beautifully expresseth himself:

"Perhaps the vale

Relents a while to the reflected ray."†

"Every hedge," says the Tatler, "was conscious of more than what the representations of enamoured swains admit of." Who sees not how much of their energy these quotations owe to the two words relents and conscious? I shall only add, that it is the same kind of metaphor which hath brought into use such expressions as the following: a happy period, a learned age, the thirsty ground, a melancholy disaster.

There are several sorts of the metonymy which answer the same purpose. The first I shall mention is that wherein the inventor is made to denote the invention-Ceres, for instance, to denote bread, Bacchus wine, Mars war, or any of the pagan deities to denote that in which he is specially interested, as Neptune the sea, Pluto hell, Pallas wisdom, and Venus the amorous affection. It must be owned, that as this kind seems even by the ancients to have been confined to the discoveries, attributes, or dominions ascribed in their mythology to the gods, it is of little or no use to us moderns.

Another tribe of metonymies, which exhibits things living for things lifeless, is when the possessor is substituted for his possessions. Of this we have an example in the Gospel: "Wo unto you, scribes and pharisees, hypocrites, for ye devour the families of widows." Here the word families is used

+ Winter.

Tatler, No. 7.

* Almanzor. Even when such tropes occur in ancient authors, they can scarcely be translated into any modern tongue, as was hinted in Part First, in regard to the phrase "Vario Marte pugnatum est." Another example of the same thing, "Sine Cerere et Baccho friget Venus."