be brought under the aptitude lying at the root of the sentiments of awe, surprise, or jealousy. Yet Hamilton and other advocates of the tripartite classification appear to be utterly unaware of this serious objection to their scheme.

Readings.-For Aristotle's theory of Pleasure and Pain, see his Ethics, Lib. X. cc. 1-5; St. Thomas, Comment. 11. 1-9; and Hamilton, Metaphysics, Lect. xliii. On Feeling, cf. Jungmann, Das Gemüth, §§ 53-60, 83, seq.

PSYCHOLOGY.

BOOK I.

EMPIRICAL OR PHENOMENAL PSYCHOLOGY.

PART II.-RATIONAL LIFE.

CHAPTER XIII.

INTELLECT AND SENSE.

HITHERTO We have been treating mainly, though not exclusively, of the sensuous faculties of the mind; we now pass on to the investigation of its higher activities. From the earliest stages of psychological speculation there have been found advocates of the view that there is no essential distinction between Sensuous and Rational life, and even Aristotle could speak of ancients who said that thought and feeling are the same thing. There is thus nothing new or original in the fundamental tenet of that school which claims to represent the most advanced scientific thought at the present day. So far from this doctrine being the peculiar result of a superior 1 Καὶ οίγε ἀρχαῖοι τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ταὐτὸν εἶναι φασιν.

1

degree of mental development, the history of philo. sophy proves that it found an easy acceptance in the lowest grades of intellectual culture, and among the crudest and most superficial of man's attempts at psychological speculation.

The philosophical sects, ancient and modern, opposed to the main thesis of the present chapter, and who have been variously described as Sensational, Associational, Materialistic, Phenomenalistic, and Empirical,2 agree in the primary dogma that all knowledge is ultimately reducible to sensation. According to them the mind possesses no faculty of an essentially supra-sensuous order. All our most abstract ideas, as well as our most elaborate processes of reasoning, are but sensations reproduced, aggregated, blended, and refined in various

ways.

In direct opposition to this theory we maintain that the mind is endowed with two classes of faculties of essentially distinct grades. Over and above Sensibility it possesses the power of Rational

2 These several epithets emphasize special characteristics which are, however, all consequences of the chief doctrine. The word sensationalism, and its cognates, mark the attempted analysis of all cognition into sensation. Materialism points to the fact that on the sensist hypothesis we can know nothing but matter, and that there is no ground for supposing the human mind to be anything more than a function or a phase of an organized material substance. Phenomenalism calls attention to the circumstance that by sense alone, and consequently according to the sensational theory of knowledge, we can never know anything but phenomena -the sensuous appearances of things. Empiricism (éμπeipía, experience) accentuates the assumption of the school that all our mental possessions are a product of purely sensuous experience. The stress laid by its leading representatives in this country on the principle of mental association has caused them to be styled the Associationalist school.

or Spiritual Activity. As Sir John Davies quaintly puts it

There is a soul, a nature which contains

The power of sense within a greater power
Which doth employ and use the sense's pains,
But sits and rules within her private bower.3

The term Intellect, with the adjective Intellectual, was formerly retained exclusively to denote the cognitive faculty of the higher order. The word Rational also designated the higher cognitive operations of the mind, but it frequently expressed all forms of spiritual activity, as in the phrases Rational Will and Rational Emotions. The term Reason is used sometimes to signify the total aggregate of spiritual powers possessed. by man, sometimes to mean simply the intellectual power of understanding, and sometimes to express the particular exercise of the understanding involved in the process of ratiocination, or reasoning. Reasoning and Understanding do not, however, pertain to different faculties. The former is but a series of applications, a continuous exercise of the latter. The Rational Appetite or Will is itself a consequence of the same power, so we must look upon Intellect as the most fundamental of the higher faculties of the soul. The words Intellect and Intellectual we intend to retain ex

3 On the Immortality of the Soul.

In this general sense the possession of reason is said to separate man from the brute. Some writers, e.g. Coleridge, would define reason as the power of immediately apprehending truth by intuition. Such a usage is, however, contrary to ordinary language. The verb to reason and the participle reasoning show that it is not the contemplative, but the discursive activity of the intellect. First truths are apprehended by the understanding. (Cf. Whewell, Lectures on Moral Philosophy, Lect. xiv. Appendix.)

clusively for this superior grade of mental life, and we shall thus avoid the lamentable confusion caused by the modern use of these terms as signifying all kinds of cognition, whether sensuous or rational.

So far, however, we have merely asserted a difference in kind between Sense and Intellect; it is now our duty to prove our doctrine. By affirming the existence of a faculty specifically distinct from that of sense, we mean to hold that the mind possesses the power of performing operations beyond the scope of sense. We maintain that many of its acts and products are distinct in kind from all modes of sensibility and all forms of sensuous action whether simple or complex; and that no sensation, whatever stages of evolution or transformation it may pass through, can ever develope into thought. We have already investigated at length the sentient life of the soul, and to it we have allotted the five external senses, internal sensibility, imagination, sensuous memory, and sensitive appetite. The superiority of the spiritual life will be established by careful study of the nature and formal object of its operations. Intellect we may define broadly as the faculty of thought. Under thought we include attention, judgment, reflexion, self-consciousness, the formation of concepts, and the processes of reasoning. These modes of activity all exhibit a distinctly supra-sensuous element. In order to bring out the difference between intellect and sense, we will say a few words on each of these operations.