men to action, may not with great and evi-had a taste and preference, or might be dent advantage to the science of mind, be supposed to have a taste or preference. This classified and reduced to a few plain and shows the distinction between the actor and primary distinctions? Can we not be per- his motives. The actor has a chance to look at mitted to divide all the moral motives which and to examine these motives in the light of are thought to influence the conduct of men his intelligence, before he performs or before into good and bad motives? Is this classifi- he can perform a moral action. An involuncation not absolutely necessary in order to tary action is not a moral action either way: any rational inquiry into the merit or de-either meritorious or blameworthy. merit of human conduct, as this merit and If now the actor, anterior to a moral acthis demerit form the basis of moral phi- tion has an opportunity to look at motives as losophy? they have been previously classified by moral If we are permitted to make this classifica- philosophy into good and bad, true or false, tion and are sustained in it by just philosophi- has he not a chance to exercise his preference cal principles of moral science, are we not for the good over the bad, the true over the thereby under a necessity to say that there false, or vice versa, the bad over the good, is much human conduct, or what is the same the false over the true? If you admit this thing, many human actions, which are neither philosophy, do you not restrict the actor to good nor bad and hence not the result of the chance of one of two motives leading to good or bad motives, and hence not proper a moral action—a good or a bad motive? phenomena for moral investigation? For ex- Even, therefore, if we were to admit that ample. A human being may pass from one room to another: may change his position from one seat to another: may choose coffee rather than tea: may prefer to read a tale in poetry rather than in prose. Now, here are evidently a class of human actions which are neither good nor bad, and are brought about, so to speak, by neither good nor bad motives. With respect to these actions, the science of moral philosophy has no applicability. But let us return again to the subject more immediately on hand. motives produce actions, still we would not destroy human freedom unless we were also to destroy the choice of the actor. If motives produce actions-that is to say, if good motives produce good actions, in the light of moral philosophy, still if you wish to prove that I am not a being responsible for my actions, you would have to prove that I had no ability to prefer freely either a good or an evil motive. Men act from preference and Whenever you succeed in classifying mo- not from motives. It is therefore possible tives into good and bad motives in order to for a man to prefer an illusion of his own any rational investigation into the science mind which pleases him, and which he supof morals, you at once make a large advance poses to be a true thing, to a true principle towards comprehending the scope of human of moral philosophy. freedom and the design of hnman freedom. It at once and irresistibly leads you to infer, since motives may be ranged and classified Man is a compound being, compounded of into good and bad or true and false, that will and intelligence. He is materially poshuman freedom is the result of the relation sessed of five senses, through which he obsubsisting between the actor and these pre- tains all the information which it is possible. viously existing motives that have been also for him to procure. His first converse then previously ranged and classified. The very is with an outer world, and this converse we moment that the science of moral philosophy call the objective knowledge of things obbegins to classify motives, calling some good, tained by means of sensation. After he has and calling others bad-calling some true, acquired the knowledge of certain facts, he and calling others false, this antecedent ex- then begins to reason from those facts and istence of the motives, whether good or bad, to establish beliefs. These are called his to the moment when the actor brings them to subjective knowledge. his use and employment is clearly estab- If a boy takes a piece of heated iron in lished. Then, the motives constituted an his hands and burns them, and then presents antecedent fixed something about which he it to his companion with the belief that it will also burn his hands he exhibits both the lily ears, and am thus brought into acquainobjective and the subjective processes of tance with the sonorous properties of matter, thought. From his own senses he learns and after having heard these sounds, it is the objective reality of heat, and from his still me myself that does my own thinking. subjective reflection he confidently believes Does the reader wish me to give the meanit will burn the hands of his companion. ing of the pronoun I, as I have used it in the Now the German Philosophers say that foregoing sentences? If he does I tell him these two beliefs are differently acquired. I mean by it, my will or my soul. In the That sensation tells the one and conscious- school of nature our first acquaintance is ness the other. And hence they make con- with the outer-the objective world and it is sciousness the criterion of the truth of our only after we have improved our knowledge subjective knowledge. So also does Sir Wil- of material objects, and learned the causation liam Hamilton. They both insist upon the there prevailing-that causation according to existence of primary beliefs in mankind. In which one thing goes before as cause, and doing this they certainly attribute the power another thing comes after as effect, that we of absolute origination to a created being. turn our attention to, or make our acquainIt is, we think, not to be questioned that tance with, the subjective philosophy of there are primary truths, but not primary mind and the science of ontology. But it is beliefs. Between the two there is a very the same immaterial, intangible, immortal great distinction. unit, designated by the pronoun I-designaTo acknowledge the existence of a prima- ted by the term soul-designated by the ry belief would be to discard the doctrine of word will thus acting. cause and effect, or the pre-established har- If this philosophy be true, it would be utmony of the moral universe. The Supreme terly impossible for German philosophy to Being of the Scripture cannot possess the at- draw any distinction between my method of tribute of a first cause, or what Humboldt acquiring my objection, and my subjective calls the "commencement of the history of knowledge. You must impart to me a pororigination," if it be possible for a primary tion of intelligence before you can make it belief to arise in the human mind. possible for me to know that an outer world in reality exists. There is a remark made by Reid that philosophers who make consciousness the crite- In order to understand this subject we rion of the truth of our subjective knowledge, must draw the distinction between the facts would do well to consider. He says that "it or truths acquired, and the ability of the will were difficult to give any reason for distrust- or the soul, or the spirit of the infant to acing our other faculties that will not reach quire them. When the infant concludes consciousness itself." If Reid be right in that if he puts his hand into the flame of the this remark, then the famous argument of taper, a second or a third time it will burn it, Des Cartes, that "I think, therefore I am," by what name are we to call that conclusion? loses its value as a foundation for any the- The infant gets his knowledge of the properory in mental philosophy. ties of heat through the senses. But how What is that thing which looks out upon does he get his conclusion? It is in answer an outer world through the sensorial organs to this question that German philosophers fly of the body, and who or which after having into the regions of transcendentalism. They this converse with the outer world indulges go at once into the doctrine of idealism, as in speculations, draws conclusions and forms taught by Fichte, or into the primitive judg judgments-I answer it is me myself and ments of Kant, or into the pyrrhonism of not my mind. I am the party inhabiting my Hume, or the skepticism of Cousin. body, and I have a power or capacity of It seems to be as plain as any proposition thinking-I am the individual who looks out can be, that this conclusion is nothing more of my eyes, and sees the things of the outer than what the infant thinks. He thinks, (and world—and then think about what I see-so by him the infant, the reader will remember, that I do both the seeing and the thinking. we mean the will, or the soul, of the infant,) I am the individual who hears with my bod- that the flame of a candle will burn. This is VOL. XXI-11 what Sir William Hamilton calls conscious- (thousand years. The greater number of ness. The infant, he would say, was con- philosophers have been against Sir William scious that the flame of a candle would burn. and they have all been of the school of SkepBut how much better is the consciousness of tics. But although, they have denied our the infant with respect to phenomena, than intuitive knowledge, they have not denied the thinking of the infant? Both may be de- that consciousness declares in favor of an inceived. The great question which underlies this whole debate, is with respect to man's ability to rise to the conception, or the knowledge of God by original ability. If it were not for that, there would be no debate in it. Now my theory settles this question, as plainly as it does German transcendentalism. tuitive knowledge. They, therefore deny that the declaration of consciousness is to be relied on as a certain test of truth. It is not to be denied that all materialists, and all infidels contend that we are not im mediately percipient of the existence of matter that we have no intuitive knowledge, that we have no certain means of knowing— The terms absolute, unconditioned, infinite, not even that we exist-not even that we eternal, primitive, first cause, original prin- know that we do not know. And it is also ciple, first truth, are applied to God. The not to be denied that it has heretofore been questions are, is God an objective being, and pretty well agreed that to deny that consciousis our knowledge of God, objective know-ness is the criterion of truth is tantamount to ledge? an admission that these conclusions as above The true theory upon this subject is the enumerated are plainly and logically unahypothesis of the Scripture that God is a voidable. All matters in dispute are always spirit. If the great first cause be a spirit, open to debate. If we wish to ascertain the the next question is how we, who derive our ability of any instrument to effectuate a cerinformation through material organs, can de- tain end, it is certainly important to know rive a knowledge of a spirit by means of sen- something of the nature of that instrument. sible organs? We cannot hear a spirit, we If we wish to know whether man is capable cannot see a spirit, we cannot feel a spirit, of knowing, or not, it is certainly important we cannot taste one, and we cannot smell to learn something of the nature of man. one. Obviously, however, before we answer Then the enquiry at once arises is man an this question, there is a preliminary distinc-imperfect being in the mental department of tion to be carefully noted and that is, the his nature? If he be, does not this mental distinction between absolute knowledge of a imperfection necessarily attach to his knowspirit, or rather the knowledge of an absolute ledge? Can man as an imperfect being know spirit, and the history of the acts and doings otherwise than as an imperfect being? If of that spirit. Upon the solution of this ques-you say yes, then you cannot think that he tion turns the system of the Christian reli- immediately knows. He must, upon the gion, with which we do not purpose to inter- contrary know indirectly. If so, then, the fere in these pages. representational system in mental philosophy is true. But with the other question, we shall deal differently and shall advocate, in opposition But let us look at this question in the light to the Scotch school, which teaches that con- of Revelation. Revelation proceeds upon sciousness is our instructor, that our only the supposition that man is a fallible being. teacher must of necessity be the First Cause If Revelation be true, then there are but two itself, and this teaching must be done by Rev-classes of knowledge in this world, the reelation. vealed and the unrevealed;-the unrevealed It is with reference to this subject that Sir is the knowledge of fallible men, and the reWilliam Hamilton's philosophy has yet to be vealed in the knowledge of infallible men. considered. He contends that we are imme- If the distinction of fallible and infallible diately percipient of an external nature. The prevails between the writers of Revelation reader is doubtless well aware that this ques- and the residue of men, then it seems to me, tion has been fiercely debated for over a that no believer in this distinction can hold consciousness to be the criterion of truth.] "With greatest pleasure," chimed in The question is grave and important, and re- Miss Phillis, equally hopeful that her sweet quires yet farther examination. amiability would charm the handsome bachelor. LITTLE MAGGIE. BY M. LL. W. H. "You will get your bonnet and come?" His words asked the question, but the tone carried within it a little golden thread of entreaty, irresistible to the ear of the sorrowful child. She ran eagerly for it. Mr. McIntosh conversed to such purpose during her short absence, that his auditors seemed under the spell of delight. DEDICATED TO ANNIE, A BELOVED SISTER, They set off-first through the little green Who proposed its being written, "in the mean time," gate leading to the meadows, and then bewhilst waiting for the publication of some fugitive pie-side the beautiful windings of the creek, in ces-she having just read the admirable essay in the Whose pellucid waters the ripening nuts, January number of Harper, upon the successes achiev-dropped by the busy squirrels overhead, ed by a proper application of the usually deemed nu-made ten thousand ripples. Both were silent important interval between effort and result. N.B.-It has been remarked by persons who have heard this story read, that the exchange of Bibles recalled a similar incident in Queechy." The writer of "Little Maggie," never met with "Queechy," till some months after the above little tale was written. CHAPTER FIRST. "I don't care; it's no matter; I wish I was dead!" till they reached a large flat rock nearly overgrown by the dark green leaves of the chickaberry, and seated themselves. He gathered a hand full of the red and aromatic fruit, and after she had eaten it, "So you wish you were dead, Maggie?" She looked up now she knew certainly he had heard her. "Did you mean what your words expressed?" asked he, fixing his calm, clear, reproving eye upon her. She met his gaze courageously; her face. flushed a little "Twould be quite as well," said Miss Phoebe, with the cold, ironical smile, more taunting in its incredulity than words-"I felt forsaken-desperate. O, did you 'Quite as well I dare say." "I did when I spoke them"-then starting up, her whole impassioned soul in her eyes, ever know what it was to feel so? No pa "Quite!" did not escape the prim lips of rents, no friends, no home, unloved, uncared for, desolate-lost ?" Miss Phillis, but her look was eloquent. Yes, I wish I was dead!" again said Maggie, desperately. lost?" Yes, Maggie," he said softly and slowly, and taking her hands in his-" yes, Maggie, The Misses Petre's boarder, Mr. McIntosh, all this I have passed through before your who had entered unnoticed, laid his hand eyes opened on this world's light. But who gently on the little girl's shoulder. Her came to seek and to save that which was cheeks colored violently, then paled; the elder ladies looked annoyed and a little frightened. He was gentle, yet impressive. "I should like your young charge to take a walk with me this fine evening," he said in a voice soft, but commanding. "Our blessed Saviour; O, that is the sweetest word in all the Bible. O, that He would save me!" "And He will, Maggie, but you must ask Him-not once, not twice, but ever unceas"O certainly," said Miss Phoebe graciously, ingly; in your daily employments; ere you hoping to propitiate him by her readiness to close your eyes in sleep: He is the friend gratify his every wish. nearer than a brother, He has said "He But you that seeketh me shall find me. "Yes often, earnestly." But do you pray with faith-with the real belief that God is listening, and will accept your prayer for the sake of Jesus our Lord ?" "I dont know, I try, but I am wicked, oh so wicked, I speak the truth always." "Iknow you do." "And yet they blame me for it." Perhaps you do not speak it in the right way Maggie. We should speak the truth in At this moment two youths passed within a few roods of them, the one fair-haired, handsome, but bold and scornful looking, dressed in sporting style, but with the indiscriminable something pertaining to fashion,-the other a stout, awkward farmer's boy, carrying the game slung over his shoulder which his companion had killed. Their looks were full of curiosity, and Mr. McIntosh returned love." "I cannot love them, they do not love me, the cool stare of the tallest with a fixed comI think they hate me. “O, she cried with posure that did not seem altogether agreeawild vehemence of agony; and falling down ble. They passed on slowly-when out of on her knees before him. "Tell me, tell sight, he said, "come Maggie, it is time me is it true you notice me only from pity? we were going home." Am I so ugly, so loathsome?" Parting the tangled, ill kept hair from the troubled little face, gently as a tender mother might have done, he said. 46 gie." With a sigh she repeated the word. "Home !" "The same roof shelters us both, Maggie." She rose, placed her little hand confidingly You are very beautiful in my eyes, Mag-in his, and walked slowly on beside him, and in all his dreams, and they were many that An arrow of joy pierced the poor little night, the soft pressure of the slender finfluttering heart-a flood of light illumined gers was with him still. CHAPTER SECOND. its darkness--with a smothered sob she nestled her face close to him. Tears were on it! now, like the soft summer rain they were falling and the soil was prepared for their reception. Uncultivated, uncared for hitherto, its rare and beautiful qualities might yet be redeemed by the judicious husbandman.; Little Maggie was the daughter of a young Mr. McIntosh dried the wet cheek and conofficer, who died at sea, her mother lived but tinued. "He who appoints our times and trials a few days after the tidings reached her, and is wise and good. He can make our bitterest the child was sent to the Misses Petre, very troubles show forth His glory and in the end distant relatives of the poor Father. Their bring us joy. Had it not been for ours; we callous and ungenerous spirits embittered might never have known each other, are every hour of the little orphan's life. Her sole comfort had been derived from the conyou glad or sorry Maggie to know me ?" siderate kindness and warm sympathy of Mr. McIntosh, a retired lawyer of ample fortune, who for eighteen months past had been a boarder in their family. He was grave and handsome, standing high in society; but reserved in manner, and one who never alluded to himself. The pale weary face, the dark dress, and sorrowful eyes of the little Maggie, must have touched a tender chord in his bosom, for from the instant he saw her, she seemed to take possession of his heart, "Glad! O happy," she cried "and thankful. Who has been kind to me but you, who has taught me right but you: To whom can I open my heart but to you, and who shall I she paused. "What Maggie?" She shook her head. "You will not finish what you began ?" |