declared that war must be made upon slavery, selecting a single sentence, his declaration that "a house divided against itself cannot stand. I believe this government cannot endure permanently half slave and half free" as typifying his stand and probable course of action. He was nominated largely because of this conservatism so unwisely disregarded by the South, and as a more available candidate for this reason than Seward. It is a striking fact that the Garrison school of abolitionists themselves were opposed to the result." Seward himself had been certain of success, despite the knowledge of an opposition, the grounds of which were frankly stated to him by an eminent member of his own party. When about leaving Washington he complained to Senator Wilson of the latter's antagonism. Wilson replied, substantially: "If I could elect a President, I should nominate you or Mr. Chase. . . . But . . . like Mr. Chase, you have by your ability and long devotion to the antislavery cause, excited prejudices and awakened conservative fears in the great states of Pennsylvania, Indiana, Illinois, New Jersey, and Connecticut which are to be the battle ground of the contest, and whose votes must be secured to give success. . . I do not think your name will command the necessary strength." Nevertheless, Seward left the Senate chamber with Sumner, reiterát 1 Speech at Springfield, June 16, 1858, Lincoln, Works (ed. of 1894), I., 240. 2 Garrisons, Garrison, III., 502. ing his confidence, assured of both the nomination and election.1 Seward had failed to recognize the weight and influence gained by his western antagonist just preceding the election. Even a few in the South had begun to comprehend that Lincoln was more than the uncouth boor, the possibility of whose nomination had been derided. Benjamin, of Louisiana, was one of the southerners who had come to recognize the lofty qualities of his nature and mind. In his speech in the Senate against Douglas, of May 22, he said, referring to the category of questions put by Douglas to Lincoln in the debate of 1858,2 the answers to which are among the finest in character of Lincoln's statements, "It is impossible, Mr. President, however we may differ in opinion with the man not to admire the perfect candor and frankness with which these answers are given; no equivocation-no evasion." " The victory for Lincoln was in fact a simple question of availability. He had not been seriously thought of for the presidency until his acclaim at the Republican state convention at Decatur, Illinois, May 10, 1860. There can be little doubt that a large majority of those assembled at Chicago went expecting to vote for Seward. "Certainly two thirds of the delegates . . . preferred him 1 Wilson, Slave Power, II., 694. 2 Lincoln, Works (ed. of 1894), I., 306. for president." 1 But Pennsylvania and Indiana were to hold elections for governor in October. Those who had nominated Curtin in Pennsylvania had not even yet taken the name "Republican." It was a party of fusionists in which the "American" element was strong, and this element was bitterly opposed to Seward through his favoring a division of school funds. "Without its aid the success of Curtin was simply impossible. A like condition of things existed in Indiana. While the anti-slavery sentiment asserted itself by the election of a majority of Republicans to Congress in 1858, the entire Democratic State ticket was successful by majorities varying from 1534 to 2896. . . . The one thing that Curtin, Lane [the Republican nominee for governor in Indiana] and their respective lieutenants agreed upon, was that the nomination of Seward meant hopeless defeat in their respective States.' "2 Seward thus, in fact, though it was not apparent, was defeated before the convention met. The struggle really lay between Lincoln and Bates, and Lincoln had immensely the advantage in the locale of the convention. It was the first which had been held at Chicago, and it was in his own state. The environment was one which knew the man and his worth. The fact, too, that Douglas was certain to be the nominee of the regular Democratic conven 1 McClure, Lincoln and Men of War Times, 28. 2 Ibid., 31-33. tion was greatly in Lincoln's favor. The publication of the speeches of the great contest of 1858 had shown the superior logic and ability of Lincoln, and if able to assert his superiority then, there could be little doubt of his ability to meet him on more than a favorable footing in the great contest about to come. If the hand of Providence is ever to be recognized in human affairs, it was in this debate and in this nomination. L чето Прия 1861 THE CHAPTER VIII THE TIDE OF SEPARATION (SEPTEMBER-NOVEMBER, 1860) HE final days of the session of Congress, ending June 25, 1860, showed the nebulous state of mind of the prominent men of the North, and how slight a grasp they had upon the realities of the situation. At the instance of Sherman, of Ohio, the estimate for repairs and equipment of the navy was cut down a million; his influence had caused even a greater reduction the preceding year. Senator Pugh, of the same state, could say, "I think we have spent enough money on the navy, certainly for the service it has rendered; and for one I shall vote against building a single ship under any pretense at all." The blatant Lovejoy, in the face of the rising storm, said, "I am tired of appropriating money for the army and navy when absolutely they are of no use whatever. . . . I want to strike a blow at this whole navy expenditure and let the navy go out of existence. . . . Let us blow the whole thing up! let these vessels rot; and when 1 Cong. Globe, 36 Cong., 1 Sess., 3109. |