fion when a paffion is termed pleasant or painful, we refer to the actual feeling; when termed agreeable or difagreeable, we refer to it as an object of thought or,reflection; a paffion is pleasant or painful to the perfon in whom it exifts; it is agreeable or disagreeable to the person who makes it a subject of contemplation. : In the description of emotions and paffions; these terms do not always coincide: to make which evident, we must endeavour to afcertain, first, what paffions and emotions are pleasant what painful; and next, what are agreeable what difagreeable. With refpect to both, there are general rules, which, if I can truft to induction, admit not a fingle exception. The nature of an emotion or paffion as pleasant or painful, depends entirely on its cause the emotion produced by an agreeable object is invariably pleasant; and the emotion produced by a difagreeable object is invariably painful. Thus a lofty oák, a generous action, a valuable discovery in art or fcience, are agreeable objects that invariably produce pleasant emotions. A ftinking puddle, a treacherous action, an irregular ill-contrived edifice, being difagreeable objects, produce painful emotions. Selfifh paffions are pleasant; for they arife from felf, an agreeable object or caufe. A focial paffion directed upon an agreeable object is always pleasant; See part 7. of this chapter. directed upon an object in diftrefs, is painful. Laftly, all diffocial paffions, fuch as envy, resentment, malice, being caufed by difagreeable objects, cannot fail to be painful.. A general rule for the agreeableness or disagreeableness of emctions and paffions is a more difficult enterprife: it must be attempted however, We have a fenfe of a common nature in every fpecies of animals, particularly in our own; and we have a conviction that this common nature is right, or perfect, and that individuals ought to be made conformable to it ". To every faculty, to every paffion, and to every bodily member, is alligned a proper office and a due proportion: if one limb be longer than the other, or be difproportioned to the whole, it is wrong and difagreeable; if a paffion deviate from the common nature, by being too ftrong or too, weak, it is alfo wrong and difagreeable: but as far as conformable to common nature, every emotion and every paffion is perceived by us to be right, and as it ought to be; and upon that account it must appear agreeable. That this holds true in pleafant emotions and paffions, will readily be admitted: but the painful are no less natural than the other; and therefore ought not to be an exception. Thus the pain See part 7. of this chapter. 6 See this doctrine fully explained, chap. 25. Standard of Tafte. ful emotion raised by a monftrous birth or brutal action, is no lefs agreeable upon reflection, than the pleasant emotion raised by a flowing river or a lofty dome and the painful paffions of grief and pity are agreeable, and applauded by all the world. Another rule more fimple and direct for afcertaining the agreeableness or disagreeableness of a paffion as opposed to an emotion, is derived from the defire that accompanies it. If the defire be to perform a right action in order to produce a good effect, the paffion is agreeable: if the defire be, to do a wrong action in order to produce an ill effect, the paffion is disagreeable. Thus, palfions as well as acions are governed by the moral fense. These rules by the wisdom of Providence coincide a paffion that is conformable to our common nature must tend to good; and a paffion that deviates from our common nature must tend to ill. This deduction may be carried a great way farther but to avoid intricacy and obfcurity, I make but one other step. A paffion which, as aforefaid, becomes an object of thought to a spectator, may have the effect to produce a paffion or emotion in him; for it is natural, that a focial being fhould be affected with the paffions of others. Paffions or emotions thus generated, submit, in cominon with others, to the general law above mentioned, namely, that an agreeable object produces a pleafant emotion, and a disagreeable object a painful emotion. Thus the paffion of gratitude, being to a fpectator an agreeable object, produceth in him the pleasant paffion of love to the grateful perfon: and malice, being to a spectator a disagreeable object, produceth in him the painful paffion of hatred to the malicious perfon. We are now prepared for examples of pleasant paffions that are difagreeable, and of painful paffions that are agreeable. Self-love, as long as confined within juft bounds, is a paffion both pleafant and agreeable: in excess it is disagreeable, though it continues to be ftill pleasant. Our appetites are precisely in the fame condition. Refent ment, on the other hand, is, in every ftage of the paffion, painful; but is not difagreeable unlefs in excefs. Pity is always painful, yet always agreeable. Vanity, on the contrary, is always pleasant, yet always disagreeable. disagreeable. But however diftin&t these qualities are, they coincide, I acknowledge, in one clafs of paffions: all vicious paffions tending to the hurt of others, are equally painful and disagreeable. The foregoing qualities of pleasant and painful, may be fufficient for ordinary fubjects; but with respect to the science of criticism, it is necessary, that we also be made acquainted with the feveral modifications of these qualities, with the modifications at least that make the greatest figure. Even at first view one is fenfible, that the pleasure or pain of one paffion differs from that of another: how diftant the pleasure of revenge gratified from that of love? fo diftant, as that we cannot without reluctance admit them to be any way related. That the fame quality of pleasure fhould be fo dif ferently modified in different paffions, will not be furprising, when we reflect on the boundless variety of agreeable founds, taftes, and fmells, daily perceived. Our discernment reaches differences ftill more minute, in objects even of the fame fenfe: we have no difficulty to diftinguifh different fweets, different fours, and different bitters; honey is fweet, fo is fugar, and yet the one never is mistaken for the other: our fense of smelling is fufficiently acute, to diftinguifh varieties in fweetfmelling flowers without end. With refpect to paffions and emotions, their differences as to pleas fant and painful have no limits; though we want acuteness of feeling for the more delicate modifica tions. There is here an analogy between our internal and external fenfes : the latter are fufficient ly acute for all the useful purposes of life, and fo are the former. Some perfons indeed, Nature's favorites, have a wonderful acuteness of fense, which to them unfolds many a delightful scene totally hid from vulgar eyes. But if fuch refined pleasure be confined to a small number, it is however wifely ordered that others are not fen fible of the defect; nor detracts it from their happiness that others fecretly are more happy. With |