character and fentiment, belongs to different chapters 4.

I fhould conclude with the final caufe of the relifh we have for motion and force, were it not fo evident as to require no explanation. We are placed here in fuch circumftances as to make industry effential to our well-being; for without induftry the plaineft neceffaries of life are not obtained. When our fituation therefore in this world requires activity and a conftant exertion of motion and force, Providence indulgently provides for our welfare by making thefe agreeable to us it would be a grofs imperfection in our nature, to make any thing difagreeable that we depend on for exiftence; and even indifference would flacken greatly that degree of activity which is indifpenfable.

NOVELTY, AND THE UNEXPECTED APPEARANCE OF OBJECTS.

OF all the circumftances that raife emotions, not excepting beauty, nor even greatness, novelty hath the most powerful influence. A new object produceth inftantaneously an emotion termed wonder, which totally occupies the mind, and for a time excludes all other objects. Converfation among the vulgar never is more interefting than when it turns upon ftrange objects and extraordinary events. Men tear themselves from their native country in fearch of things rare and new; and novelty converts into a pleafure, the fatigues and even perils of travelling. what caufe fhall we afcribe thefe fingular appearances? To curiofity undoubtedly, a principle implanted in human nature for a purpofe extremely beneficial, that of acquiring knowledge; and the emotion of wonder, raised by new and ftrange objeds, inflames our curiofity to know more of

To

them. This emotion is different from admiration; novelty wherever found, whether in a quality or action, is the caufe of wonder; admiration is directed to the perfon who performs any thing wonderful.

During infancy, every new object is probably the occafion of wonder, in fome degree; bcause during infancy, every object at firft fight is ftrange as well as new but as objects are rendered familiar by cuftom, we ceafe by degrees to wonder at new appearances, if they have any refemblance to. what we are acquainted with; for a thing must be fingular as well as new, to raife our wonder. To fave multiplying words, I would be understood to comprehend both circumftances when I hereafter talk of novelty.

In an ordinary train of perceptions where one thing introduces another, not a fingle object• makes its appearance unexpectedly the mind thus prepared for the reception of its objects, admits them one after another without perturbation. But when a thing breaks in unexpectedly, and without the preparation of any connexion, it raifes an emotion, known by the name of furprife. That emotion may be produced by the most familiar object, as when one unexpectedly meets a friend who was reported to be dead; or a man in high life, lately a beggar. On the other hand, a new object, however ftrange, will not produce the emotion, if the fpectator be prepared for the fight an elephant in India will not furprise a traveller who goes to fee one; and yet its novelty will raife his wonder: an Indian in Britain would

1 See chap. 1.

be much furprised to ftumble upon an elephant feeding at large in the open fields: but the creature itfelf, to which he was accuftomed, would not raife his wonder.

Surprife thus in feveral refpects differs from wonder unexpectedness is the caufe of the former emotion; novelty is the caufe of the latter. Nor differ they lefs in their nature and circumflances, as will be explained by and by. With relation to one circumflance they perfectly agree: which is, the fhortnefs of their duration: the inftantaneous production of thefe emotions in perfection, may contribute to that effect, in conformity to a general law, That things foon decay which foon come to perfection: the violence of the emotions may alfo contribute; for an ardent emotion, which is not fufceptible of increase, cannot have a long courfe. But their fhort duration is occafioned chiefly by that of their caufes we are foon reconciled to an object, however unexpected and novelty foon degenerates into familiarity.

Whether thefe emotions be pleasant or painful, is not a clear point. It may appear ftrange, that our own feelings and their capital qualities, fhould afford any matter for a doubt: but when we are engroffed by any emotion, there is no place for fpeculation; and when fufficiently calm for fpeculation, it is not eafy to recal the emotion with accuracy. New New objects are fometimes terrible,

fometimes delightful: the terror which a tiger inspires is greatest at first, and wears off gradually by familiarity on the other hand, even women will acknowledge that it is novelty which pleafes the most in a new fafhion. It would be rafh however to conclude, that wonder is in itfelf neither, pleasant nor painful, but that it affumes either quality according to circumftances. An object, it is true, that hath a threatening appearance, add's to our terror by its novelty: but from that experiment it doth not follow, that novelty is in itself disagreeable; for it is perfecly confiftent, that we be delighted with an object in one view, and terrified with it in another: a river in flood swelling over its banks, is a grand and delightful object: and yet it may produce no fmall degree of fear when we attempt to crofs it: courage and magnanimity are agreeable; and yet, when we view these qualities in an enemy, they ferve to increase our terror. In the fame manner, novelty may produce two effects clearly diflinguifhable from each other it may, directly and in itfelf, be agreeable; and it may have an oppofite effect indirectly, which is, to infpire terror; for when a new object appears in any degree dangerous,. our ignorance of its powers and qualities, affords ample fcope for the imagination to drefs it in the moft frightful colors. The firft fight of a lion, for

2

Effays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion, part 2. eff. 6.