timate union, are frequently produced by the fame individual object. Nay, further, in the objects that touch us the moft, uniformity and variety are conflantly combined; witnefs natural objects, where this combination is always found in perfection. Hence it is, that natural obje&is readily form themselves into groups, and are agreeable in whatever manner combined: a wood with its trees, fhrubs, and herbs, is agreeable: the music of birds, the lowing of cattle, and the murmuring of a brook, are in conjunction delightful; though they ftrike the ear without modulation or harınony. In fhort, nothing can be more happily accommodated to the inward conftitution of man, than that mixture of uniformity with variety, which the eye difcovers in natural objects; and, accordingly, the mind is never more highly gratified than in contemplating a natural landscape. 333 CHA P. X. CONGRUITY AND PROPRIETY. MAN is fuperior to the brute, not more by his rational faculties, than by his fenfes. With refpect to external fenfes, brutes probably yield not to men; and they may alfo have fome obfcure perception of beauty: but the more delicate fenfes of regularity, order, uniformity, and congruity, being connected with morality and religion, are referved to dignify the chief of the terreftrial creation. Upon that account, no difcipline is more fuitable to man, nor more congruous to the dignity of his nature, than that which refines his tafte, and leads him to diftinguifh in every fubject, what is regular, what is orderly, what is fuitable, and what is fit and proper'. * Nec vero illa parva vis naturæ eft rationifque, quod unum hoc animal fentit quit fit ordo, quid fit quod deceat in factis dictifque, qui modus. Itaque eorum ipforum, quæ afpe&u fentiuntur, nullum aliud animal, pulchritudinem, venuftatem, convenientiam partium fentit. Quam fimilitudinem natura ratioque ab oculis ad animum transferens, multo etiam magis pulchritudinem, It is clear from the very conception of the terms congruity and propriety, that they are not applicable to any fingle object: they imply a plurality, and obviously fignify a particular relation between different objects. Thus we fay currently, that a decent garb is fuitable or proper for a judge, modeft behaviour for a young woman, and a lofty ftyle for an epic poem; and, on the other hand, that it is unfuitable or incongruous to fee a little woman funk in an overgrown farthingale, a coat richly embroidered covering coarse and dirty linen, a mean fubject in an elevated flyle, an elevated fubject in a mean ftyle, a firft minifter darning-his wife's stocking, or a reverend prelate in lawn-fleeves dancing a hornpipe. The perception we have of this relation, which feems peculiar to man, cannot proceed from any other caufe, but from a fenfe of congruity or propriety; for fuppofing us deftitute of that fenfe, the terms would to us be unintelligible '. conftantiam, ordinem, in confiliis fatifque confervandumi putat, cavetque ne quid indecorè effeminatève faciat : tum in omnibus et opinionibus et factis ne quid libidinosè aut faciat aut cogitet. Quibus ex rebus confiatur et efficitur id, quod quærimus, honeftum. Cicero de officiis, l. 1. *From many things that pafs current in the world without being generally condemned, one at firft view would imagine, that the fenfe of congruity or propriety hath fcarce any foundation in nature; and that it is It is matter of experience, that congruity or propriety, where ever perceived, is agreeable; and that incongruity or impropriety, whereever perceived, is difagreeable. The only difficulty is, to ascertain what are the particular objects that in conjunction fuggeft thefe relations; for there are many objects that do not: the fea, for example, viewed in conjunction with a picture, or a man viewed in conjunction with a mountain, fuggest not either congruity or incongruity. It feems natural to infer, what will be found true by induction, that we never perceive congruity nor incongruity but among things that are connected by rather an artificial refinement of thofe who affect to diftinguish themselves from others. The fulfome panegyrics beftowed upon the great and opulent, in epiftles dedicatory and other fuch compofitions, would incline us to think fo. Did there prevail in the world, it will be faid, or did naturé fuggeft, a taste of what is fuitable, decent, or proper, would any good writer deal in fuch compofitions, or any man of fenfe receive them without difguft? Can it be fuppofed, that Lewis XIV. of France was endued by nature with any fenfe of propriety, when, in a dramatic performance purpofely compofed for his entertainment, he fuffered himself, publicly and in his prefence, to be ftyled the greateft king ever the earth produced? Thefe it is true true are firong facts; but luckily they do not prove the fenfe of propriety to be artificial : they only prove, that the fenfe of propriety is at times overpowered by pride and vanity; which is no fingular cafe, for that fometimes is the fate even of the fenfe of juftice. naments. fome relation, fuch as a man and his actions, a principal and its acceffories, a fubject and its orWe are indeed fo framed by nature, as among things fo connected, to require a certain fuitablenefs or correfpondence, termed congruity or propriety; and to be difpleafed when we find the oppofite relation of incongruity or impropriety '. If things connected be the fubject of congruity, it is reafonable beforehand to expect a degree of congruity proportioned to the degree of the connexion. And upon examination we find our expectation to be well founded: where the relation is intimate, as between a caufe and its effect, a 3 In the chapter of beauty, qualities are diftinguished into primary and fecondary; and to clear fome obfcurity that may appear in the text, it is proper to be obferved, that the fame diftinction is applicable to relations. Refemblance, equality, uniformity, proximity, are relations that depend not on us, but exift equally whether perceived or not; and upon that account may juftly be termed primary relations. But there are other relations, that only appear fuch to us, and that have not any external exiftence like primary relations; which is the cafe of congruity, incongruity, propriety, impropriety: thefe may be properly termed fecondary relations. Thus it appears from what is faid in the text, that the fecondary relations mentioned, arife from objects connected by fome primary relation. Property is an example of a fecondary relation, as it exifis no where but in the mind. I purchase a field or a horfe: the covenant makes the primary relation; and the fecondary relation built on it, is property. whole |