A fine face, for example, raifeth in me a pleafant feeling if that feeling vanish without producing any effect, it is in proper language an emotion; but if the feeling, by reiterated views of the object, become fufficiently flrong to occafion defire, it lofes its name of emotion, and acquires that of paffion. The fame holds in all the other paffions: the painful feeling raifed in a spectator by a flight injury done to a stranger, being accompanied with no defire of revenge, is termed an emotion; but that injury raiseth in the ftranger a ftronger emotion, which being accompanied with defire of revenge, is a paffion: external expreffions of dif trefs produce in the fpectator a painful feeling, which being fometimes fo flight as to pass away without any effect, is an emotion; but if the feeling be fo ftrong as to prompt defire of affording relief, it is a paffion, and is termed pity: envy is emulation in excefs; if the exaltation of a competitor be barely disagreeable, the painful feeling is an emotion; if it produce defire to deprefs him, it is a paffion.

To prevent miftakes, it must be obferved, that defire here is taken in its proper fenfe, namely, that internal act, which by influencing the will, makes us proceed to action. Defire in a lax fense respects alfo actions and events that depend not on us, as when I defire that my friend may have a fon to represent him, or that my country may flourish in

arts and sciences: but fuch internal act is more properly termed a wifh than a defire.

Having diftinguifhed paffion from emotion proceed to confider paffion more at large, with refpect especially to its power of producing action.

We have daily and conflant experience for our authority, that no man ever proceeds to action but by means of an antecedent defire or impulse. So well established is this obfervation, and fo deeply rooted in the mind, that we can scarce imagine a different system of action: even a child will fay familiarly, What should make me do this or that, when I have no defire to do it? Taking it then for granted, that the existence of action depends on antecedent defire; it follows, that where there is no defire there can be no action. This opens another shining diftinction between emotions and paffions. The former, being without defire, are in their nature quiefcent: the defire included in the latter prompts one to act in order to fulfil that defire, or, in other words, to gratify the paffion.

The cause of a paffion is fufficiently explained above: it is that being or thing, which, by raifing defire, converts an emotion into a paffion. When we confider a paffion with respect to its power of prompting action, that fame being or thing is termed its object: a fine woman, for example, raises the paffion of love, which is directed to her as its object: a man, by injuring me, raises my refentment, and becomes thereby the

object of my refentment. Thus the caufe of a paffion, and its object, are the' fame in different refpects. An emotion, on the other hand, being in its nature quiefcent, and merely a paffive feeling, muft have a caufe: but cannot be faid, properly fpeaking, to have an object.

The objects of our paffions may be diftinguished into two kinds, general and particular. A man, a houfe, a garden, is a particular object: fame, efleem, opulence, honor, are general objects, be caufe each of them comprehends many particulars. The paffions directed to general objects are commonly termed appetites, in contradiftin&tion to paffions directed to particular objects, which retain their proper name: thus we fay an appetite for fame, for glory, for conqueft, for riches; but we say the paffion of friendship, of love, of gratitude, of envy, of refentment. And there is a material difference between appetites and paffions, which makes it proper to diftinguish them by dif ferent names: the latter have no exiftence till a proper object be prefented; whereas the former exift firft, and then are directed to an object a paffion comes after its object, an appetite goes before it, which is obvious in the appetites of hunger, thirft, and animal love, and is the fame in the other appetites above mentioned.

By an object fo powerful as to make a deep impreffion, the mind is inflamed, and hurried to action with a strong impulfe. Where the objec is lefs powerful, fo as not to inflame the mind,

nothing is felt but defire without any fenfible perturbation. The principle of duty affords one inftance: the defire generated by an object of duty, being commonly moderate, moves us to act calmly, without any violent impulfe; but if the mind happen to be inflamed with the importance of the object, in that cafe defire of doing our duty becomes a warm passion.

The actions of brute creatures are generally directed by inftinct, meaning blind impulfe or defire, without any view to confequences. Man is framed to be governed by reafon: he commonly acts with deliberation, in order to bring about fome defirable end; and in that cafe his actions are means employed to bring about the end defi red: thus I give charity in order to relieve a perfon from want: I perform a grateful action as a duty incumbent on me and I fight for my country in order to repel its enemies. At the fame.

time, there are human actions that are not governed by reason, nor are done with any view to confequences. Infants, like brutes, are mostly governed by inftinct, without the least view to any end, good or ill. And even adult perfons act fometimes inftinctively; thus one in extreme hunger fnatches at food, without the flighteft confideration whether it be falutary: avarice prompts to accumulate wealth, without the leaft view of ufe; and thereby abfurdly converts means into an end and animal love often hurries to fruition, without a thought even of gratification.

A paffion when it flames fo high as to impel us to act blindly without any view to confequences, good or ill, may in that ftate be termed inftinctive; and when it is fo moderate as to admit reason, and to prompt actions with a view to an end, it may in that flate be termed deliberative.

With refpect to actions exerted as means to an end, defire to bring about the end is what determines one to exert the action; and defire confidered in that view is termed a motive: thus the fame mental act that is termed defire with refpect to an end in view, is termed a motive with refpect to its power of determining one to act. Inflinctive actions have a caufe, namely, the impulfe of the paffion; but they cannot be faid to have a motive, because they are not done with any view to confequences.

We learn from experience, that the gratification of defire is pleafant; and the forefight of that pleasure becomes often an additional motive for acting. Thus a child eats by the mere impulfe of hunger: a young man thinks of the pleasure of gratification, which being a motive for him to eat, fortifies the original impulfe and a man farther advanced in life, hath the additional motive, that it will contribute to his health 2.

One exception there is, and that is remorse, when it is fo violent as to make a man defire to punish himself. The gratification here is far from being pleafant. See p. 188. of this volume. But a fingle exception, inftead of overturning a general rule, is rather a confirmation of it.